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Though Islamic economics, often used synonymously with Islamic finance, 
possesses an extensive general bibliography, very little has been written about its historical 
development as an idea in the Arab world. Still less has addressed the relationship of 
Islamic economics to decolonization. Through a series of snapshots of specific historical 
junctures and special focus on the representative writings of Shiite cleric Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sadr, this dissertation traces the formative years of Islamic economics in the 
Arab world. Two primary questions drive the analysis in this project: First, why and how 
was Islamic economics conceived as a form of spiritual and material decolonization? 
Second, why did Islamic economics eventually come to be defined narrowly as a form of 
banking primarily derived from Western conventional models? An examination of 
Western conventional banking’s nineteenth century eclipse of previous Ottoman 
economic structures, followed by an analysis of the religious political economy driving the 
rise of Islamic finance as an idea in the early twentieth century, serve to introduce the 
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origins of Islamic economics as an idea with enduring resonance, explaining its salience, 
urgency, and popular appeal. Then, the dissertation introduces the major relevant works 
of al-Sadr, Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy, 1959), Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economics, 1961) and its 
important second edition preface (1968), and Al-Bank al-lā-Ribawī (The Usury-Free Bank, 
1969), analyzing them as canonical texts in the theorization and development of Islamic 
economics in practice, with specific reference to the surrounding moment of Arab 
decolonization in which they were written. Islamic economics, as idea and as 
phenomenon, is ultimately a form of identity assertion and religious reclamation as much 
as economic practice. As a form of banking, it served a further decolonizing goal: as a 
means to compete successfully in the global arena with its Western conventional 
counterpart. As such, Islamic economics is an example of decolonization in both the 
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Much of the literature in the voluminous bibliography of Islamic finance, Islamic 
banking, and Islamic economics—typically considered under the same conceptual 
umbrella—takes the 1960s and 1970s as its analytical starting point. Written 
predominantly in English, the majority of these works were published from the 1990s on 
and are not histories.1 They are, instead, introductions to and descriptions of the vast 
array of Islamic financial products that are on the market –often with explanatory details 
regarding the ethical grounding and Islamic bona fides of the products2 —or economics 
analyses of the performance of Islamic products in different markets.3  The histories that 
                                                
1 As a very small sample, see, e.g., M. Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis, eds.  Handbook 
of Islamic Banking. (Chellenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007); Ali, S. Nazim. 
Islamic finance: current legal and regulatory issues. (Cambridge, Mass.: Islamic Finance Project, 
Islamic Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2005); Muhammad Taqi Usmani An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance (Hague: Kewer Law International, 2002). 
2 See, e.g., Gamal, Mahmoud A. Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006); Usmani (2002), Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor An Introduction to 
Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (Singapore: Wiley, 2007). Because this literature is so 
prolific, and because the financial products themselves are so numerous and so heavily 
publicized and marketed, conceptual and practical examples are few in this analysis, 
limited to chapters three and four. 
3 See, e.g., Masudal Choudhury, Islamic Economics and Finance. (Emerald Group Publishing, 
Ltd., 2011); Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, eds. Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking 





are included in most of these volumes—if they exist at all—are thus not the center of 
analysis or its driving motivation, and as such they are cursory, usually comprising only a 
few pages.4 As introductions to books that are often focused on branding or instructing 
business students, Islamic economics history in these volumes is typically limited to a brief 
allusion to Islam’s oldest juristic rulings on mercantile exchange.5 A reader may be 
forgiven for assuming from these summaries that Islamic economics as it is now practiced 
is an enduring phenomenon, extending back to Islam’s earliest origins. Other more 
technical texts offer rigorous analysis of the Islamic theological credentials of different 
banking products, describing their precedents and justification in the jurisprudential 
literature.6 Much of the literature on Islamic finance, produced by business journals and 
Muslim scholars, is characterized either by an overt goal to sell the reader on the financial 
and spiritual benefits of Islamic finance or by a more neutral desire to inform the reader 
on Islamic finance basics. Analysis and critique are quite rare.  
                                                                                                                                            
English—interspersed with Arabic financial terms—is the language of most Islamic 
banking literature because of its international character. 
4 Books such as Karim Ginena and Azhar Hamid’s Foundations of Shari’ah: Governance of 
Islamic Banks (Wiley, 2015) for instance, focus on the nature of Islamic law and its use in 
Islamic banks. The historical components of the text are pre-modern, with a little over a 
page dedicated to the twentieth century calls for Islamic banking. See 256- 57. On the 
other hand, Amr Mohamed el Tiby Ahmed and Wafik Grais Islamic Finance and Economic 
Development: Risk, Regulation, and Corporate Governance (Wiley Finance, 2014), begin their 
discussion in the 1960 and 1970s without attempting to contextualize the reasons for the 
sudden growth of Islamic banks. See Chapter One, 3- 10. 






Historicization of this phenomenon as a uniquely twentieth-century response to 
specific historical factors is, therefore, not common.7 There are several reasons for this 
lacuna. Foremost among these is that, increasingly throughout the twentieth century and 
picking up speed with the revolutionary decolonizing movements of the 1950s Middle 
East, the concept of Islamic economics entered the zeitgeist of the Arabic-speaking world 
in force. Region-wide, scholars, students, and politicians—both secular and religious—
began to discuss and debate the possibility of an Islamic economics in the form of Islamic 
banking in their writings. Because of the burst of publications, a proper intellectual 
genealogy of the rise of Islamic economics concepts in the climate of ideas from this time 
period would fill volumes, as different publications on the subject appeared throughout 
North Africa and the Middle East in record numbers.  
Second, Islamic banking in these nascent stages was primarily experimental; those 
banks that did attempt Islamic offerings often did not brand themselves as entirely 
Islamic, operating instead as conventional Western banks with niche Islamic offerings. 
Third, though the Arab East and its oil wealth make it the largest player in terms of 
investment in the contemporary global Islamic economy,8 populous non-Middle Eastern 
Muslim countries also acted as the fore-runners and path-breakers of Islamic finance. 
Malaysia and Indonesia were primary drivers, shaping the earliest successful experiments 
                                                
7 Although not a history, one of the best introductions to Islamic economics is Ibrahim 
Warde’s Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2010). Though its breadth precludes detailed analysis of Islamic economic history, Warde 
reviews areas often omitted from other texts.  
8 For a comparative chart, see, e.g., Naveed, “Al Rajhi Remains World’s Largest Islamic 
Bank.” Islamicfinance.com https://www.islamicfinance.com/2015/07/al-rajhi-worlds-





in Islamic banking in the 1980s and 1990s,9 and many of the most interesting writers on 
Islamic economics from the 1940s on—several of them widely read in the Arab Middle 
East—were Indian nationals.10 The global thrust of the idea, informing and exciting 
Muslim networks from the Middle East to Southeast Asia as the twentieth century 
progressed, marks it as both historically significant and as difficult to synthesize because of 
the different localized regional and national forces at play.  
Finally, the early, formative period is often left unmentioned because Islamic 
finance did not truly become viable in the Middle East until after the fall of the U.S.S.R. 
and the subsequent re-structuring and liberalization of the global economy.  Though the 
1960s - 1980s are universally acknowledged as the time period when practical 
experiments in Islamic banking had their beginnings, most early banks in the Middle East 
either failed or had limited financial offerings, making Islamic economics of this time 
more aspirational than real. As a result, a significant proportion of the voluminous data 
available on Islamic economics, Islamic banking, and Islamic finance is heavily or even 
exclusively focused on the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  
 
                                                
9 For a brief introduction to Islamic banking in Malaysia, e.g., No author. “Islamic 
Banking and Takaful.” bnm.gov.my 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=fs_mfs&pg=fs_mfs_bank (accessed May 20, 
2017). This government site, written in both English and Malaysian, is representative of a 
great deal of the kinds of data available. 
10 These include Nejatullah Siddiqui, Allama Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, and, perhaps the 






There is, in other words, a significant gap in the literature on the formative years 
of Islamic finance. Even at the most general level, few works attempt to answer the 
question of why religious identity in the early-to-mid twentieth century Middle East had 
become coupled with economic and financial practice. Still fewer approach the question 
of why Islamic economics, initially the brainchild of clerics and preachers, ultimately 
proved compelling enough to become a realized and popularized global phenomenon in 
the form of Islamic banking in the 1970s. This project began as a search for an answer to 
those questions.  
Through the course of my research, an issue came into sharp relief, notable 
because, despite its obvious importance, it was entirely unanalyzed in any article or book 
I came across: Islamic economics, and its realization in the form of Islamic banking, were 
originally conceived explicitly as forms of material and psychological decolonization. In 
other words, despite its name, the history of Islamic economics in the Arab Middle East is 
not only an economic history. The history of Islamic finance is also a chapter in the 
history of Arab decolonization. This dissertation is a history that accounts for the 
inseparability of these two seemingly disparate realms of Arab decolonization—the 
religious and the economic; the spiritual and the material—in the form of Islamic 
economics.  
In order to limit its conceptual scope, two main questions drive this project: First, 
why— and how—was Islamic economics conceived as a primarily psycho-spiritual form 
of decolonizing resistance? From its very inception, Islamic economics in the Arab world 
was not typical of discourses of decolonization or of economics. For example, though its 
formative texts engage to a greater or lesser extent with broader colonially-introduced 





never positioned itself as an economic decolonization akin to, for example, economic 
nationalism. How are we to understand this? Second, in keeping with the forward-looking 
nature of historical inquiry: How and why did Islamic economics—a topic whose 
potential permutations are vast—come to be narrowly defined as Islamic banking and 
finance by the 1970s?11 This last is more significant than it may sound on the surface. The 
first Islamic banks and financial products were intentionally designed from the outset to 
dovetail with their Western conventional counterparts. They were so successful in this 
endeavor that Islamic finance is often considered unremarkable by economists, dismissed 
as a niche market whose products neither disrupt nor innovate.12 Given that Islamic 
banking is a phenomenon whose contemporary practices and products are not markedly 
different from products in the Western conventional market at large, how could it have 
been initially conceived as decolonizing— or even as particularly Islamic? By answering 
these questions, this dissertation does more than provide a first installment in the early 
cultural and intellectual history of Islamic finance. It also participates in the developing 
field of Arab decolonization studies, juxtaposing disciplinary approaches and 
historiographies that are not often examined together.  
Because the potential parameters of a foray into the intellectual and cultural 
origins of Islamic finance in the Middle East are too broad to encapsulate in a single 
project, this dissertation further limits its temporal scope by focusing on the formative 
                                                
11 In much of the Islamic finance literature, “Islamic economics” and “Islamic finance” 
are used interchangeably. For the sake of clarity in this project, “Islamic economics” 
refers to the theory as a whole, and “Islamic banking” or “Islamic finance” only refer to 
actual banks and financial practices. 
12 See, e.g., No author listed, “Big interest, no interest: The market for Islamic financial 





period in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. Centered around the Ottoman imperial 
bankruptcy in 1875, the dissertation begins with a key stage-setting historical transition: 
Western conventional banking’s eclipse of the former Ottoman Islamic system. The 
dissertation then traces the formative intellectual and cultural state-building period of the 
early-to-mid twentieth century, focusing on the political economy and historical 
circumstances that lent the concept of an Islamic economics salience and urgency in the 
mind of Muslim clerics, Sunni and Shii alike. After a close evaluation of several canonical 
Arabic Islamic economics writings, the dissertation concludes by putting them once more 
in their broader regional context with the establishment of the first Islamic banks in the 
Middle East in the 1970s.  
As a form of banking, Islamic economics is a material and physical 
decolonization, measurable in ledgers and accounting books; a defiant demonstration of 
Arab power against a century of colonial culture and its residual economic hold in the 
Middle East. As spiritual praxis, it is a reflection of the pre-colonial self-conception of the 
faith: Until the colonial introduction of Enlightenment church-and-state divides, “Islam” 
was understood as synonymous with “the good life.”13 Muslims did not think of religion 
as a “separate and separable” category, parsed from other realms of human experience; 
“Islam” was a way of expressing the most proper, divinely sanctioned, moral approach to 
                                                
13 As stated by Bobby Sayyid: “Islam is the thinnest of phrases in the Muslims’ final 
vocabulary.  It is this thinness which makes it difficult to contest.  Ultimately, for Muslims, 
Islam is another word for ‘goodness incarnate.’” Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: 





human behavior.14 An inextricable element of the good life, at its purest Islamic 
economics is, therefore, good or pious or ethical economics. It is the way to best use 
commerce, trade, taxes, alms, and other sources of income for the building up and the 
good of the community. It seeks to avoid greed, monopolies, and disproportional risk. 
And, in keeping with that goal, it specifically eschews interest and credit as suspect means 
to ensnare the poor and distract the rich from their proper role as benefactors of the 
community.  
In order to return to this pre-colonial concept of good economic life as an 
extension of (and inextricable from) Islam, theorists of Islamic economics needed to 
respond to more than the Western credit-based banking and finance that had taken over 
the lands of the Middle East by the start of the twentieth century. Just as acutely, they 
needed to respond to the socioeconomic theories flooding in from Europe: capitalism, 
communism, and socialism. These were not idle or theoretical concerns—most of the 
modern Middle East had been first divided into nation-states by the colonizers and then, 
through the first half of the twentieth century, subjected to semi-colonial capitalist 
governance. As capitalism infiltrated the Middle East, Marxist and socialist ideas, also 
                                                
14 Dale Eickelman has called the nineteenth-century Middle East transformation to 
conceiving of Islam as a religion the “objectification” of Islam; an “emerging perception 
of Islam as a coherent, systematic, and self-contained set of beliefs and practices, separate 
and separable from worldly knowledge, which came to displace previously held 
understandings of Islam as embedded in everyday social practice and as something 
irreducible to a textbook exposition.”14 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: 
Jadidism in Central Asia. (University of California Press, 1999), 11. See also Dale F. 
Eickelman, "Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary 





originating from Europe, were translated into Arabic and gained traction, becoming 
particularly popular as a grassroots decolonizing response to colonialist capitalism by the 
1940s and 1950s. Thus, not surprisingly, growing concerns about nearly every aspect 
Western economics—from banking practices to economic theory—appear in the writings 
of secular intellectuals, popular preachers, and the Muslim clerical class, both Sunni and 
Shii, starting at the turn of the century. Among the latter, regular calls came for an 
Islamic “Third Way” that stood outside of capitalism and communism. These calls were 
all the more pressing because, despite the intellectual legacies of its formative orthodox 
theological schools, Islam had no jurisprudential tradition devoted specifically to the 
subject of economics. In order to construct a doctrine that could respond to the likes of 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx, Islamic scholars would need to forge new jurisprudential 
work, a process called ijtihād. Yet, in order to have read Smith and Marx in the first place, 
these scholars would need access to a secular as well as religious education.   
A man uniquely positioned to forge a nuanced jurisprudential response was Iraqi 
Shiite cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, an exceptional scholar with training in both the 
Western secular and Shiite academic traditions. Al-Sadr formed his theory of Islamic 
economics in response to the Western economic ideas that were gaining marked 
popularity among his countrymen and women in the 1940s and 1950s. Though many 
thinkers from throughout the Middle East had been discussing and debating the relative 
Islamicity of Western-based economics systems for decades, al-Sadr’s extraordinarily 
focused work is by far the most philosophically grounded, notable for both its depth and 
breadth. Because of their analytical rigor, his writings, particularly Falsafatunā (Our 
Philosophy, 1959) and Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economy, 1961), are the chief Islamic economics works 





to the second edition of Iqtiṣādunā in 1968, grounding its jurisprudential work and anti-
communist focus in anti-colonialist rhetoric, and arguing for his vision of Islamic 
economics as a form of physical and spiritual decolonization for the Muslim community. 
Immediately thereafter, as a follow-up to his Islamic economics work, al-Sadr wrote a 
manual conceptualizing Islamic banking, Al-Bank al-lā Ribawī (The Usury-Free Bank, 1969), 
likely its earliest practical guide. Al-Sadr’s life, works, and broader Shiite community 
transformations provide a prism through which much broader elements of the 
multivalent issues informing Islamic economics in the Arab Middle East may be viewed 
and understood. As such, after a stage-setting chapter on broader economic 
transformations in the late Ottoman-era Middle East, they make up much of the analysis 
here. 
The history herein is thus not simply a recounting of Arab-Muslim economics. It 
is a history of cultural reassertion through an idea, with the reclamation of banking and 
financial practices conceived as a touchstone of both an inner, intellectual and spiritual 
decolonization, and an outer, society-wide Muslim decolonization. Islamic banking 
appeared in earnest in the 1970s, a decade of deepening materialism and the hardening 
of Arab state power, as oil wealth and its global political and economic leverage were 
being realized through OPEC’s exponential growth and attendant economy-stalling 
embargos. A time of deep society-wide soul-searching, the 1970s were also the formative 
period of a new form of Arab decolonization: Islamism, and its attendant rejection of 
Western institutions. Islamic economics, made real in the form of Islamic banking, 
became an extension of Islamism in this matrix of spiritual return and economic 
reassertion. Acting as mirror and microcosm of broader regional culture, Islamic 





religious rationale: It also served as a springboard for Muslim solidarity at the level of the 
psyche, informing Islamism and Arab banking of the 1970s as much as being shaped by 
them. In this vein it acted, like most decolonizing mechanisms, as a means to facilitate a 
form of cultural competition on the material as well as spiritual levels— not only 
reclaiming culture from the Europeans, but surpassing them in the global economic 
market by doing so. Thus, Islamic economics serves as both a project of Sunni-Shii 
jurisprudential transformation and as a Pan-Islamic political means of decolonization, an 
economic ideology with both measurable material influence and resonance as religious 
reclamation. Its implications and scholarly relevance cross multiple fields, including 
religious studies, postcolonial studies, economic history, decolonization studies, and more. 
 
Historiographical Review 
Among the thousands of publications on Islamic finance15 some excellent and 
informative contributions stand out for the historian. They are included here to give a 
sense of the kinds of work that have— and have not— been done. Economist and 
historian Timur Kuran has established himself as one of the pre-eminent scholars of 
Islamic finance and Muslim economic history generally. His most well known book, The 
Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (2010), situates the blame for the 
current structural underdevelopment of the Middle East squarely in the hands of Muslim 
jurisprudents, arguing that Islamic law regulating economic life served as an impediment 
                                                
15 These publications, their number and content are discussed in an excellent 
ethnography of Islamic banking, Bill Maurer’s Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, 
Alternative Currencies, and Lateral Reason. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 





to modern economic development throughout the Ottoman era.16 His work on 
contemporary Islamic finance is collected in Islam and Mammon (2005), a selection of 
articles on Islamic finance originally published in different journals and volumes from 
1989 to 1997.17 In both Divergence and Mammon, Kuran sets himself apart as both Western-
trained economist and Muslim cultural critic: in the former volume, he uses his 
knowledge of economics to critique traditional Muslim regulatory frameworks; in the 
latter he argues—correctly—that twentieth century Islamic finance is not so much a 
unique economic system as it is a cultural response to surrounding historical and political 
forces. His focus and perspective throughout is that of an economist, using economics as 
the disciplinary lens through which to assess and weigh the merits of Islamic finance. 
Thus, for example, he argues that Islamic economics has little practical merit because it is 
a system that lacks overall coherence or notably superior positive outcomes in the form of 
poverty alleviation or growth.18 While the essays in Mammon are more economics-driven 
cultural commentary than traditional history, they constitute one of the first and only 
interventions of their kind in the field, including an essay that explicitly suggests one of 
my own conclusions: that contemporary Islamic finance is best understood as a means of 
asserting Muslim identity.19 
Charles Tripp’s Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (2006) is an 
encyclopedically-sourced and erudite discussion of the current relationship between Islam 
                                                
16  Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press 2010). 
17 Kuran, Islam and Mammon (Princeton University Press, 2005). The original publication 
information of the essays is listed on page xvii. 
18 Kuran, Mammon, 55. 





and different socioeconomic systems, with special focus on capitalism and Islamic 
socialism. Tripp’s work is an invaluable introduction to the bibliography of economics 
conversations that have been taking place throughout the modern Muslim world from the 
late nineteenth century to the present, including the Arabic speaking Middle East and 
Muslim Southeast Asia. A scholar of government, Tripp focuses primarily on introducing 
and summarizing the twenty-first century political and philosophical debates regarding 
the moral issues at stake for pious Muslims in an increasingly capitalist global economy. 
Thus, rather than single out specific works for in-depth analysis, he looks for general 
thematic parallels across conversations, across texts, and to a certain extent across time. 
In other words, though Moral Economy is constructed thematically according to a loose 
chronology, Tripp’s primary focus is not on the historical development of ideas, instead 
situating books on related topics next to one another without a close eye to date of 
publication. For the student of Islamic economics, Moral Economy is an excellent resource 
for the sheer breadth of material brought to the table, yet it is not a text whose goal is to 
inform the reader of how these conversations developed, or of their historical contours, 
contexts, and implications. 
Other scholars have contributed excellent introductions to specific areas of Islamic 
finance, often in the form of edited volumes. The Politics of Islamic Finance (2004), a 
compendium edited by Henry Clements and Rodney Wilson, is one such volume. A 
compilation of excellent thematic essays—on subjects ranging from the effect of 





scholarship and Islamic banking—with close case studies of Islamic banking in specific 
countries, it manages to cover a great deal of ground without losing depth.20  
The earliest of these sorts of compendia was Islamic Law and Finance (1988), edited 
by human rights and legal scholar Chibli Mallat, who introduced the volume calling for 
more intellectual history on the subject of Islamic finance.21 Mallat is the exceptional 
English-language scholar of Islamic economics, notable not only for this call for more 
intellectual history, but also for his early work singling out al-Sadr—now universally 
recognized as a giant in the Islamic economics literature—as one of its most exceptional 
contributors. His excellent and surprisingly under-used The Renewal of Islamic Law (1993) 
includes the most thorough English-language discussion of al-Sadr’s Islamic economics 
writings to date as part of a fascinating and compelling argument that al-Sadr was the 




Decolonization studies—like postcolonial studies, from which it is derived—is 
conceptually and theoretically vast. As a field focused around a loose subject, 
decolonization, it lacks disciplinary cohesion in the form of a definable object. Because so 
much of the world has at one time been colonized, one cannot limit decolonization 
studies to one specific area of the world or claim that it “is confined to a period, genre, or 
                                                
20 See Henry Clement and Rodney Wilson, eds. The Politics of Islamic Finance. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 
21 See Chibli Mallat, ed., Islamic Law and Finance. (London, 1988). Introduction.  





theme; nor can [one] name a stable First or Third World subject as its legitimate speaker 
(as can, e.g., women’s studies, African American studies, or gay and lesbian studies).”23 
Under its broad conceptual umbrella, work in decolonization studies has adopted the 
critical orientations from a range of other disciplines, from critical theory to history to 
political science—but it is not limited to them.  
Nevertheless, decolonization studies may be divided into two primary conceptual 
camps that are generalizable regardless of the society or time period under study: 
practical decolonization and psychological decolonization. These camps are descriptive, 
not prescriptive, and are neither reified nor lacking in occasional overlap. In the former 
camp, scholars— often historians and political scientists— look at the material effects of 
colonial abdication and transfer of power. Frequent topics of analysis include state-
centered structural changes resulting from decolonization, such as the functioning of 
political, economic, and educational systems.24 In the latter camp, scholars—often literary 
and critical theorists—borrow from the groundwork laid by postcolonial studies, focusing 
on the psychological un-doing of hegemonic discourses of colonialism. “Decolonizing the 
mind” is unlearning colonial cultures, including their racialized, gendered, and cultural 
                                                
23 Kelpana Seshadri Crooks, “Introduction.” In The Preoccupation of Postcolonial Studies, 
Fawzi Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri Crooks, eds. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 2000). Though speaking of postcolonialism in the original, Crooks’ 
succinct summary is just as relevant to decolonization studies. 
24 For an example of good theoretical work on this, see Margaret Kohn and Keally 
McBride, Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations, 





discourses of explicit or implicit subjugation.25 It is a rejection of the invading culture in 
favor of an (often-problematic) attempt to return to and reclaim what existed before. 
Because of the long tenure of European colonialisms globally, and because of their all-
encompassing ethos of sociocultural transformation for the colonized—an ethos that 
included the imposition of intellectual structures as much as sociocultural and 
governmental order— psychological decolonization globally has proven a much longer-
lasting project than practical decolonization. This is reflected in its predominance as a 
subject matter in the decolonization studies literature emerging from critical theory.26 
Among studies of practical decolonization, a disproportionate amount center on 
the stories and perspectives of the colonizers.27 This is due in large part to the detailed 
records kept by the British, French, Dutch, Germans, and others, and their ready archival 
accessibility. Yet, however unintended, the overlarge proportion of colonizer-centric work 
contributes to a form of continuing intellectual colonization: the stories of the powerful 
are inscribed as the primary narrative in the academic record, with the practical effect of 
                                                
25 This phrase was perhaps most famously used by Ngugi Wa Thiong’o in his Decolonizing 
the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Culture (Heineman, 1986).  
26 See, e.g., Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial 
Options (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
27 See, e.g., Robert Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business 
in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998). See also Martin Shipway’s comments on this problem in Decolonization and its 






eclipsing those of the weak.28 A result is the movement to “decolonize the academy,” 
filling in the gap by working to uncover histories of decolonization from the ground up.29 
In addition, for those who recognize the problematic nature of exploring decolonization 
through an exclusively imperialist lens, the solution that is all-too-often offered is to 
approach the history of the colonized through their own indigenous nationalist 
movements.30 Such analyses, while useful, limit the conceptual scope of historical 
decolonization to political analysis—itself a charged and often obfuscating approach, as 
European colonizers were frequently those who fashioned the borders of the nation-states 
and trained the colonized in nationalist political philosophies to begin with. Economic 
nationalism is further studied as a material metric for the indigenous reclamation of 
autonomy through the wresting back of economic control, yet it presents similar 
problematics: the economic structures reclaimed from the colonizers are also, often, 
originally of colonial design.31 Thus, even when attempting to avoid it, the pervasiveness 
of colonial hegemony across all sectors—political, economic, intellectual—makes it 
difficult to uncover histories that do not ultimately circle back to the ideologies and 
practical systems of the colonizers.  
Empirically-driven intellectual histories of the movements and ideologies 
propelling both practical and psychological decolonization can aid in capturing elements 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against 
Epistemicide, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 19-43. 
29 See, e.g., de Sousa Santos, Epistemicide; Carole Boyce Davies, Decolonizing the academy : 
African diaspora studies (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003)  
30 See, e.g., rtin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact, 1-16. 
31 See, e.g., Ayodeji Olukoju, “Economic nationalism and decolonization: West Africa in 





of the indigenous, agentive and constructive role of decolonization. Decolonization was 
not, after all, simply anti-colonial reaction; it was intentional, society-building response. 
Such work on the Middle East is rare, often topically limited to luminaries like Gandhi32 
and Fanon—men whose wildly divergent approaches to decolonization is sufficient to 
demonstrate that more work needs to be done to properly approach its political plurality 
and intellectual diversity. The history of ideas and movements that stand outside of 
nationalism can thus contribute greatly to the field as a whole, providing a needed path 
around colonial discourses while participating directly in the decolonizing of the 
academy. 
Conceived as a form of simultaneous practical (material) and psychological 
(spiritual) decolonization and rooted in indigenous religious and intellectual tradition, 
Islamic economics answers these criteria. It was through Islamic economics as praxis that 
the banking and financial industries would be literally decolonized through reclamation 
from European ownership and management. But the underlying accompanying 
intellectual and spiritual decolonization, inextricable from the material, was just as 
powerful. Islamic economics was not simply claiming the physical finance houses; it was 
transforming the underlying philosophical framework through which they would be run. 
In the same vein, it was not initially imagined simply as part of taking back governmental 
leadership from the colonizers; it was re-configuring and restoring an indigenous 
socioeconomic system distinct from communism or capitalism.  
Psychological decolonization, in other words, drives the material logic of Islamic 
economics; it is not an afterthought, but the organizing principle according to which the 
                                                
32 Though not in the Middle East, India and Pakistan are often used comparatively with 





practical decolonization is conceived. Not simply reactionary, Islamic economics is 
intellectually indigenous, agentive, and constructive; a twentieth century jurisprudential 
development whose philosophical and theological underpinnings harken back to pre-
colonial norms. As noted above, as an idea that posits the inseparability of the spiritual 
and the material, it derives its perspective from pre-Enlightenment era Islamic intellectual 
categorizations. Furthermore, as theorist and cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr explained, 
Islamic economics is a maḏhab (doctrine), not an ‘ilm (science); it has no neoclassical 
economics pretensions of “standing outside of normative judgments,” instead wishing 
explicitly to serve as a set of moral guidelines in the form of practicable prescriptions. On 
a theoretical level, Islamic economics consciously challenges many of the disciplinary 
limits we place on categories of analysis, including economics and religion, by introducing 
non-Western approaches to knowledge. By challenging Western academic constructs, it 




Given its centrality to the conception and development of Islamic finance, why is 
decolonization absent as a topic from the voluminous Islamic economics and finance 
literature? The answer to this question influences the methodological approach of this 
project.  
The absence of decolonization is not simply a reflection of how minimally Islamic 





decolonization studies as a field does not yet properly exist.33 Fortunately, two books 
forging the intellectual history of Arab decolonization are slated for publication by 
2018.34 Yet, for now, how does a new scholar effectively approach a topic without a 
robust secondary literature? Even more so, how does one approach a topic without an 
archive? 
In her incisive essay calling for work on decolonization in the Arab Middle East, 
Omnia El-Shakry discusses the problematics of research in an area in which archives 
have often been kept only by the colonizer, have been destroyed or edited by rising 
regimes, and are often rendered inaccessible by war and regional turmoil.35 Emphasizing 
how Middle East scholars have been forced to seek creative ways around the traditional 
Western historian’s “fetishization of the archive” in its pristine organized glory, El-Shakry 
speaks to ways that the Middle East archive—or its absence—have “occluded from view” 
                                                
33 Yoav Di-Capua comments on this “lack within what might be called the intellectual 
history of decolonization. How Third World intellectuals and their ideas informed 
decolonization, and how in turn they were shaped by it, is an important question, yet it 
remains largely unanswered in spite of a proliferation of studies on decolonization and 
postcolonialism.” See Di-Capua, “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the 
Intellectual History of Decolonization,” American Historical Review (October 2010), 1062. 
34 They are Yoav Di-Capua’s No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre and Decolonization 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2018), and Omnia El-Shakry’s The 
Arabic Freud: Psychoanalysis and Islam in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
forthcoming 2017). 
35 Omnia El-Shakry, “’History without Documents’: The Vexed Archives of 





specific kinds of regional decolonization narratives.36 She calls for a new, non state-
centered vision in approaching the Arab period of decolonization, arguing: 
 
Yet what if we thought of decolonization as an ongoing process and series of 
struggles rather than a finite event, as regional as well as national, intellectual and 
cultural as well as political, and religious as well as secular? We might then shift 
our attention away from dominant and declensionist narratives of decolonization 
as a state-driven and secular political process, to include members of the 
intelligentsia, social scientists, and religious thinkers who were bypassed in or 
excised from traditional archives. How, then, might we reimagine the archives of 
decolonization?37 
 
This project offers a non-nationalist (regional) cultural and intellectual history of a 
distinctly constructive decolonizing idea, conceived in large part by religious rather than 
secular intellectuals and coming into fruition in the post-WWII period. It is rather 
extraordinary, in fact, that this history has not been written before. Despite his prolific—
and highly accessible—output, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr has received remarkably short 
shrift in the intellectual history literature.38 I contend that this absence is due to two 
reasons, each of which is contained in El-Shakry’s statement: First, as a religious leader 
who operated in the Shiite intellectual milieu of the ḥawza (Shiite academy) of Najaf 
rather than the Western intellectual milieu, al-Sadr is outside the bounds of many forms 
of traditional academic interrogation.39 This lack of interrogation stems in part from the 
                                                
36 El-Shakry, “Vexed,” 924. 
37 Ibid, 925. 
38 Notable exceptions are the works of al-Sadr scholar T. M. Aziz, and human rights and 
legal historian Chibli Mallat’s The Renewal of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
39 It may be useful to compare al-Sadr with Sayyid Qutb in this regard. Qutb also wrote 
prolifically on many topics including a treatise on ribā (usually translated as “interest” in 





Western scholarly tendency to divide religious thought from intellectual thought, an 
Enlightenment-inflected church-and-state divide that often lacks justification in the 
context of the Middle East.40 Second, more broadly, al-Sadr’s chief areas of inquiry as an 
Islamic scholar, including Islamic economics, are often considered outside the purview of 
intellectual history or the history of decolonization itself. As noted earlier, this is because 
of the rigidity with which the Western academy has come to demarcate its disciplinary 
divides. Economics is not deemed a cultural phenomenon, an assumption that is 
exemplified by the Chicago school and Milton Friedman’s popular and persistent (and 
unfounded) assertion that economics stands outside of moral concerns.41  
El-Shakry herself argues for the need for to stop considering religious and 
intellectual thought as entirely discrete and separable when she states: “To date, 
                                                                                                                                            
analytically rigorous treatment of the topic, and despite the fact that later Islamic 
economics thinkers referred to al-Sadr more often than Qutb in their writings. This is 
likely due to Qutb’s general name-recognition and to his Western education. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that even Qutb’s contributions to Islamic economics 
are also understudied. See, e.g., El-Shakry, 926 – 929. 
40 Some would, no doubt, call this tendency a form of intellectual colonization in the 
academy. 
41 Chicago school co-founder Milton Friedman's famous 1953 pronouncement that 
“[p]ositive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgments” has had profound implications for the study of economics. Riffing 
on the positivist bent of the academy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Friedman built upon the work of nineteeth-century British economist John Maynard 
Keynes, arguing that economics deals with “’what is,’ not with what ‘what ought to be.’” 
See Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953 ), 4. For critiques of this view, see, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Economics As Religion: From 





scholarship on the Middle East has not sufficiently placed secular and religious thought 
within ‘a single analytic field’; nor has the heuristic value of these ideologically charged 
categories, perhaps themselves the product of the colonial encounter, been sufficiently 
questioned.”42 Through the course of this project as a whole, this secular versus religious 
heuristic is questioned through the use of al-Sadr’s works, and found wanting. El-Shakry 
further emphasizes how minimally questions of economic systems, especially capitalism, 
have been interrogated in the context of Middle East thought on decolonization and 
nation-state building.43 The formative period of Islamic economics is clearly an important 
addition to this literature.  
While broadening the theoretical and disciplinary lens of the inquiry clearly 
facilitates this project, it does not resolve a second methodological issue specific to the 
topic of Islamic economics: How does one write a history of a topic that spans so much 
time and covers so much intellectual and geographical ground?  
In order to explore a topic as vast as Islamic economics with both depth and a 
modicum of concision, this dissertation singles out a series of significant historical 
junctures in key places throughout the lands of the former Ottoman Empire rather than 
attempting a sweeping and comprehensive whole. As an idea that was explicitly designed 
to countermand the colonialist imposition of artificial polities and policies, Islamic 
economics defies easy positioning in one locale. Like many ideas, its history is 
transnational in scope and scale, from Cairo to Najaf and Jabal ‘Amil and more. Because 
Arab decolonization often used ideas intentionally to reach beyond and around the 
colonially-constructed nation-state, this dissertation works both to follow that expansive 
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reach and, in the telling, to honor its ethos. By focusing on snapshots of historically 
specific moments, both depth and specificity are enabled. 
Finally, Islamic economics poses a methodological challenge, noted above by El-
Shakry, due to the absence of archive. Di-Capua takes on this issue in his forthcoming 
Arab post-war decolonization history No Exit, arguing that we must construct a non-state 
archival alternative: Intellectual history may be constructed from the (often prolific) 
writings of Arab intellectuals themselves. Not just analyzing their texts, but looking at 
multiple editions across time, can offer further clues to the history.44 Each of these 
strategies is used in this dissertation.  
Furthermore, Di-Capua makes the case for situating the ideas of Arab intellectuals 
in the broader context of their individual humanity, asserting:  
 
[W]hereas Euro-American intellectuals regularly benefit from a fine-grained 
consideration of their inner motivations, urges and character, most Arab 
intellectuals, especially those associated with decolonization, remain 
fundamentally unknown. Their […] overall humanity— with all its beauty, 
promises, weaknesses, strengths and vulnerabilities— [is] only rarely associated 
with their ideas in a meaningful way.45  
 
In the case of the intellectual history of Islamic economics, I would take this 
methodological proposal one step further: the idea must not only be contextualized in the 
person or people of the individual intellectual(s) who contributed to its theorization. It 
should also be considered in the broader light of the surrounding culture and political 
economy that first precipitated the notion of a need for Islamic economics and then 
helped in its formation and eventual rise in the form of Islamic banking.  
                                                
44 Di-Capua, No Exit, 19. 





A case study approach enables a close reading of culture and political economy as 
vital components in the history of ideas. By focusing on one thinker’s community— in this 
instance al-Sadr’s Shiite community of Najaf—the case study approach further facilitates 
a sharper focus on forms and processes of idea development even as it provides a 
historical account of political economy. Islamic economics was, at heart, a theological and 
religious conception.  Colonization, and the semi-colonial British and French mandate 
system that managed much of the nation-states of the Middle East in the first half-century 
post-Ottoman collapse, led to significant shifts in Middle East polities and intellectual life, 
with profound implications for Muslim inter- and intra-sectarian relations. Transnational 
religious networks of intellectual and financial exchange, centuries old, were disrupted by 
the imposition of national borders and the creation of national economies post-WWI. 
New scientific, philosophical, and intellectual works— including Marxist and socialist 
tracts— flooded into the Middle East from Europe, challenging traditional religious 
thought and offering secular alternatives to societal organization that threatened the long-
held positions of religious elites. 
In response to these sharp ideological, intellectual, cultural, and political 
transformations, religious leaders from across the Middle East proposed their own 
alternatives, rooted in tradition and centered upon the notion of Muslim unity in the face 
of continued colonization. Among these was a World War II-era renewed movement for 
inter-sectarian (Sunni-Shii) rapprochement (taqrīb), a topic of considerable interest to the 
minority Shiites and of political value to the majority Sunnis. True Pan-Islamic unity 
across sectarian lines offered the chance for a political front against colonialism and 
colonial ideas. Part of that response would require political organization— and a polity 





economic ideologies including Marxism and socialism swept through multiple Arab 
Muslim countries throughout the first half of the twentieth century, religious intellectuals 
were galvanized into a theological, philosophical, and economic response. All of this 
informed the culture and political economy of Shiite Najaf, home of Islamic economics 
theorist and Iraqi Shiite scholar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in the early-to-mid twentieth 
century. Through a case study of his community, a deeper and more thorough 
interrogation of the climate of ideas and intellectual exchange involved in the formation 
of Islamic economics— including a discussion of the effects of the issues discussed 
above— is born out, making sense of the inseparability of religion from economics in its 
conception and clarifying the reasons for Islamic economics’ continuing psychological 
and political weight. 
 
The Formative Era of Islamic Finance 
This project divides the formative history of Islamic finance into two halves and 
four main junctures, all directed toward answering the decolonizing questions raised 
earlier: Why was Islamic economics conceived as a form of decolonizing resistance? And 
how did it evolve into a narrowly-defined banking practice that is in many ways 
indistinguishable from its Western counterpart while maintaining its decolonizing appeal? 
While relying on both primary sources and extensive secondary source materials from 
across disciplinary lenses, the Islamic economics analysis is derived primarily from the 
canonical Islamic economics works of Iraqi Shiite cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 
including Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy, 1959), Iqtiṣadunā (Our Economics, 1961), and Al-Bank al-





In the first half, the stage is set for the reader in a largely secondary-source driven 
chapter describing the first juncture: the transformation of Ottoman finance in the 
nineteenth century with the encroachment of French and British colonialism and their 
new, capitalist financial practice. As the Ottoman Empire spiraled into debt to the 
Europeans, exacerbated by the circumstances surrounding the 1875 Ottoman 
bankruptcy, the former systems of monetary organization of the Empire were swiftly 
eclipsed in favor of their European counterparts. Questions about the relationship 
between Islam and the new Western conventional finance initially entered the minds of 
Ottoman subjects as conventional Western banking practices proliferated.  Western 
conventional banking and finance, in other words, were always conceived as foreign. 
Still, the initial foreign-ness of a phenomenon does not necessarily guarantee that 
it will be consequently questioned and found wanting or worthy of resistance. Why did 
the notion of a response to Western conventional banking and finance gain traction and 
hold sway in the minds of clerics, leading eventually to specific proposals of an Islamic 
alternative? Why was Islamic economics in particular conceived as a response to the 
continuing assault of colonial cultures? Exploring the sociocultural factors that lent it 
particular anti-colonial urgency, Chapter Two moves to the second juncture of the first 
half of the dissertation: Using a more limited case study approach, it focuses on the 
cultural history and political economy of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s Shiite community 
of Najaf, summarized in the previous section. 
Yet what would Islamic economics look like? For all the many calls for an Islamic 
alternative that had percolated throughout the early-to-mid twentieth century Muslim 
Middle East, few detailed practical suggestions had been offered, in part because Islam 





second half and last two junctures of the dissertation analyze and contextualize the early 
Islamic economics intellectual works of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.  
Chapter Three moves to a close analysis of al-Sadr’s major Islamic economics 
works, Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy, 1959), Iqtiṣadunā (Our Economics, 1961). When the 
surrounding historical factors described in Chapter Two are taken into account, al-Sadr’s 
texts are seen as canonical works in the broader Arab dialectics of decolonization. The 
intellectual development of a practicable Islamic economics— a phenomenon that was 
emerging with greater strength, depth, and robust theorization— is thus historicized as 
part of the larger moment of rising Arab decolonization discourses of the 1950s and 60s. 
More than just the obscure musings of clerics and pious scholars, early Islamic economics 
was emblematic of cultural resurgence and renewed pride of place; a form of self-assertion 
that was envisioned as a means to displace the colonizer’s legacy, replacing it with a mode 
of monetary transaction that was simultaneously more ethical and more legitimately, 
authentically Muslim. As recounted in Chapter One, the monetary system of the 
colonizer’s legacy was not only part of the broader legal scaffolding that had brought the 
colonized under its control—it was literally the means by which Arabs had become not 
only indebted, but disproportionately so, to the colonizing powers. Islamic economics was 
powerful in theological and ideological terms as it symbolized both literal decolonization 
at the level of personal economy, and national or even international decolonization at the 
levels of the state, regional, and global economies. 
Chapter Four completes the historical introduction to the formative period of 
Islamic economics with one final juncture. After a chapter that focuses on the primary 
works of Islamic economics’ most ambitious Arab theorist, this project finishes by 





implemented. Focusing on the cultural and intellectual changes wrought by the aftermath 
of the 1967 War, Chapter Four positions Islamic finance’s first practical implementations 
as part of the broader region-wide movement toward Islamism. Seeking a unifying 
cultural orientation after the blow of the naksah (“setback,” the common Arab term for the 
1967 War), the wealthy Arab oil nations used petrodollars to export their form of 
conservative Salafism. In a region characterized by both the intellectual malaise of the 
aftermath of 1967 and a burgeoning transnational network of Egyptian teachers who had 
been persuaded by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, the belief in a “return to 
Islam” took hold on a grand scale. The identity of Islam— however it was imagined 
proved a powerful regional unifier, leading to cultural retrenchment and reassertion on a 
grand scale. Wealthy Arab Gulf states, many of them newly-founded, joined the Saudis in 
seeking a way to ensure that their primary public identity – that of wealthy Muslims – 
operated in accordance with the strictures of Islam. Interest-free banking became a 
common goal, swiftly exported to less wealthy states and adopted alongside the other 
ideals of Islamism. Al-Sadr’s final two economics tracts of the 1960s, analyzed in this last 
chapter, both responded to and shaped this milieu. At the twilight of the formative 
period, decolonization took shape region-wide through the adoption of Islamism, with 















Chapter One: Setting the Stage for Islamic Finance 
 
 
On October 7, 1875, a notice appeared in one of the fledgling periodicals that had 
been popping up in and around Istanbul throughout the preceding twenty years.46 In it 
the Ottoman public was informed that the Porte, under Sultan Abdülaziz (reigned 1861 – 
1876), had gone bankrupt.  
The ramifications of the bankruptcy were titanic. Through it, the material 
vulnerability of the Porte vis-à-vis European powers and financiers, previously handled 
through the relatively discreet behind-closed-doors negotiations of Viziers and 
ambassadors,47 was codified, formalized and publicized. Shortly thereafter (1878), 
Bulgaria seized upon Ottoman imperial weakness and, realizing its nationalist ambitions, 
seceded from the empire. Other regional nationalisms soon followed, leading eventually 
to the loss of the Balkans,48 thereby eliminating the Ottoman foothold in Europe and, by 
                                                
46 The bankruptcy had been proclaimed the preceding day, and was announced in the 
Basiret (established 1869) newspaper 7 October. Basiret had a circulation of 30,000 – 
40,000 by 1875, making it among the most widely-read popular Ottoman newspapers. 
On the bankruptcy, see Geyikdagi, 37. On Basiret, see Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of 
Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 120 – 124.  
47 See, e.g., Christopher Clay Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 1856-
1881. (IB Tauris: London, 2000). 
48 As early as the 1830s the Balkan states and Greece were fighting for independence. 





World War I, decreasing the Christian population of the Empire from a significant 
percentage to a tiny minority. Compounding the loss of Ottoman power, from the 1830s 
onward the European Great Powers successfully gained control of lands that were 
formerly part of the Ottoman Empire. France, for example, occupied Algeria and Tunisia 
in 1830 and 1881, respectively, while Britain took Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882. 
The Austrians absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, formally annexing them in 
1908. By 1877, the Ottomans had mounted a costly war to protect their border with 
Russia, a war that they lost. Despite the concerted efforts of Sultan Abdülhamid II 
(reigned 1876 – 1909) to create reforms and to compensate for, among other things, the 
considerable losses in tax revenue and the lavish expenditures of his predecessor,49 the 
Ottoman economy never fully recovered.  
 
This chapter sets the stage for the idea of Islamic economics, tracing the history 
that gave rise to the notion of Western conventional banking as foreign, a colonial 
encroachment. Centered upon the economic shock of the Ottoman bankruptcy, it 
describes the penetration of Western banking and finance into Ottoman and Egyptian 
                                                                                                                                            
in 1832, Romania in 1878, Bulgaria gained autonomy that same year and independence 
in 1908. 
49 Throughout the nineteenth century, various Sultans spent large sums of money on 
costly modernization projects, including huge expansions in the empire’s bureaucracy 
under Mahmud II (reigned 1808 – 1839) and his son Abdülmecid I (reigned 1876 – 
1909); an updated and expanded navy under Abdülaziz (r. 1861 – 1876); and huge 
private palatial estates and other lavish expenditures under Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz. 
As noted, above, external debt to the European powers was excessive and increased by 
orders of magnitude over the course of half a century, creating a power dynamic that 





lands through the British and French colonizing powers during a time of imperial 
financial instability. In order to provide further context for the alien-ness of the new 
Western finance, this chapter then presents one of the major elements of Islamic 
economic culture that Western conventional banking soon displaced: the system of waqfs 
(Islamic charitable endowments). The banking transformation was not only at the level of 
empire and international markets—capital and new European socioeconomic theories 
informed and altered the lives of Ottoman and Egyptian subjects alongside their Sultans 
and Khedives. To underscore the popular transformation of banking and economic ideas 
at the twilight of the empire, significant intellectual and cultural shifts that accompanied 
European cultural penetration, often called the Arab renaissance (nahḍa) are further 
briefly detailed. These popular intellectual transformations led to the rise of an Islamic 
revivalist movement, called Islamic modernism, whose framers designed it to confront— 
and, where it could— incorporate the new, European-influenced modernity. The earliest 
primary source documents regarding Islamic response to Western conventional banking, 
detailed in the final section, are from this era. Combined, these pieces of historical change 
paint a portrait not just of financial collapse, but of a society wrestling with new and 
foreign concepts in every arena of life: economic, intellectual, psychological, and spiritual. 
It was at this time, in turn of the century Cairo, that the seeds of Western finance and 
economics as foreign, and as requiring an Islamic response, first began to germinate in 
the Arab world.  
 
On the heels of a devastating crop failure and famine in 1873, Sultan Abdülaziz 
had faced widespread popular unrest. His extravagant expenditures on luxurious palaces 





little to ingratiate him to the public, and he was deposed in disgrace by his ministers on 
May 30, 1876, and incarcerated in the Feriye Palace. Several days later, on 6 June, he 
“committed suicide” in prison—though it was called an assassination by some—by 
slashing both wrists with a pair of scissors.50 A political crisis ensued, with internal 
nationalist and democratic movements under the Young Ottomans agitating for 
parliamentary democracy and forcing the promulgation of the first Ottoman Constitution 
in November 1876.51 By World War I, there was little the Empire, founded in 1299, 
could do to face the economic and military onslaught of the European colonizing powers. 
Indeed, the Ottoman bankruptcy may be one of the most significant—and least 
acknowledged—catalysts of historical change in modern world history.52 
The financial downturn of the Ottoman Empire had been building slowly 
throughout the nineteenth century. As is often the case, exact periodization is complex, as 
scholars of commerce, finance, banking and economics pinpoint different decades as the 
dawn of this financial crisis. Nevertheless, most attribute its origin to several main factors: 
Many, particularly of his time, blamed Abdülaziz’s profligacy, though this was largely a 
                                                
50 See, e.g., Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey: Volume 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 166. 
51 It was shortly prorogued in 1878. 
52 See Christopher Clay, Gold for the Sultan, 2. See also See Charles Issawi, The Economic 
History of Turkey, 1800 – 1914 (Chicago: University of Chicato Press, 1980), Chapter 3. 
See also Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 – 1913: Trade, Investment, 





slandering strategy.53 Others cite the Crimean Wars as the watershed moment, and the 
border skirmishes signaling Balkan secession and impending war with the expanding 
Russian Empire as the final straw.54 Looking farther back in the nineteenth century, the 
rise of sustained international commerce through increased trade with Europe, the 
economic advantages provided to certain Europeans through the Capitulations 
agreements, and the viable and robust nature of European capitalism enforced through 
encroaching colonialism are also frequently listed as pivotal reasons driving Ottoman 
economic collapse.55 With the collapse of economy, polity follows. 
                                                
53 See Clay, Gold for the Sultan, 57. Ismail of Egypt was also in the process of borrowing 
extensively at this time to bolster imperial reforms. This kind of borrowing is, in fact, a 
typical strategy of leaders, not unlike current IMF and World Bank loans to foster 
structural adjustment.  
54 See Pamuk, Monetary, 204. From 1875 – 1881, as the Ottomans faced this crisis, neither 
the European-backed Ottoman bank nor any other European financial institutions would 
loan the Ottomans money. They relied instead on Galata bankers, whom they had 
previously abandoned in favor of European banks as lenders. Pamuk notes that the 
Galata bankers rallied in a show of Ottoman patriotism to “mobilize support.” See 
Monetary, 204. 
55 See Owen, chapter 4, Issawi, chapters 2 -3. It is important to emphasize here that there 
was a near contemporaneous Egyptian collapse, also often considered an informal 
bankruptcy, in 1876. The reasons for the Egyptian collapse parallel the Ottoman collapse 
strongly, including extensive loans for expansion in transportation and deficit spending 
for public works. What is important here is that Egypt, as a province and then tributary 
state (1867 – 1914) of the Ottoman Empire, was integrated into the broader Ottoman 
economy and shared many of its economic features: it did not have a system of banking 
or an organized system of account like the Europeans, and by the end of the nineteenth 
century it was a primary exporter of raw goods (cotton) and importer of finished goods 





The bankruptcy was not only the result of the outside global pressures of 
European colonization or the ineptitude of the Sultan. During a time of explosions in 
both population and economic production and intense rural to urban migration, 
corruption among Ottoman notables and gentry grew. The Ottoman Empire had for 
centuries functioned through a decentralized tax system, administered by local tax 
farmers who often set their own local policies in coordination with the Porte. Though this 
inherent flexibility is likely a reason for the Empire’s longterm stability,56 the 
decentralization in and of itself caused large losses to the treasury.57 Combined with a 
terrible Anatolian famine in 1873, graft and embezzlement prevented the established 
system of tax farming from harvesting the requisite amount of income to offset imperial 
expenses.58 High interest rates and the structure of international lending itself meant that 
40 – 50% of all loans were siphoned off to middlemen, slowing Ottoman economic 
recovery.59 Each of these clearly contributed to the bankruptcy, and when combined, 
they paint a clear portrait of impending financial disaster. 
Ottoman leadership scrambled to find an economic corrective, yet they lacked the 
administrative and bureaucratic structures to adequately respond. As noted by economic 
historian Stefania Ecchia, the fiscal crisis that led to the 1875 Ottoman bankruptcy and to 
the subsequent establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881 “was 
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rooted in the lack of any central administration of the financial system.”60 It was not just 
that there was no concept of a public budget in the existing Ottoman financial structure 
to begin with— the first Minister of Finance had only been appointed in 1837, and public 
budgets were not part of his responsibility. It was also that there was quite literally no 
proper accounting and no accountability. There was no requirement of “ensuring a 
balance between income and expenditure: usually the Sultan’s ministers jointly agreed on 
the sum to be allocated to each government department without rendering any kind of 
account to the Minister of Finance.”61 Corruption was widespread. Ministries would 
simply issue new bonds to finance their expenditures when needed, and— 
 in a particularly glaring omission— “[u]ntil 1880, there was no department of audit and 
account.”62 
Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire did not keep internal records in the same way 
that the Europeans did. For example, disaggregated data on fiscal revenues and 
expenditures is only available from 1887 on, eleven years after the bankruptcy and fifty 
years after the first Minister of Finance was installed.63 No official trade records existed 
                                                
60 Stefania Ecchia, “The Economic Policy of the Ottoman Empire (1876 – 1922), Munich 
Research Papers on Economics No. 42603 (IDEAS Archive, Nov. 2012), 2.   
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Ecchia, 4. Nevertheless, to argue that the Ottomans were entirely inept, which is 
the tacit (or explicit) argument of many scholars of Ottoman financial history of this 
period, would be ungenerous to the point of inaccuracy. For example, the final tipping 
point that drove the empire to bankruptcy was an event outside of the Ottoman’s control, 
the worldwide Great Depression (called by that name until it was eclipsed by a larger 
depression in the twentieth century) of 1873 – 1896. After his accession, Abdulhämid 





before 1878.64 In previous decades (1854) Istanbul had taken out its first foreign loan 
agreement in order to finance the Crimean War, a debt which quickly spiraled out of 
control.65 Soon, trapped in a cycle of paying down principal and interest on the debt 
itself, the Empire was forced to declare a moratorium on payment as the debt mounted to 
£252 million British.66 As Murat Birdal notes, to get a sense of the dizzying disproportion 
of the Empire’s debt-to-income ratio, by Abdulhämid’s accession in 1876 the total annual 
estimated revenues of the treasury were about 9% of this figure.67 
This debt to the French and the British—resulting quite literally from the 
Ottoman’s first successful international loan68 —forced the Ottomans’ hand. A 
                                                                                                                                            
reforms to stabilize the banking sector, and recognized that centralizing the taxation 
system was the easiest way to do so. The Sultan was never able to bring in enough capital 
to finance the reforms, so, like his predecessors, he continued borrowing. See, e.g., 
Geyikdagi, chapter 2. 
64 See, e.g., Geyikdagi, V. Necla. Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2011), 25. Geyikdagi further emphasizes the difficulty in establishing accurate 
accounting of foreign trade from the European sources, noting the variability in exchange 
rates, price rate fluctuations, and different definitions used in trade statistics between the 
empires. 
65 For more on the circumstances surrounding this loan, see Geyikdagi, 32- 35. 
66 Ibid. See also Ecchia, 2. 
67 Murat Birdal, The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial 
Control in the Late Nineteenth Century (I.B. Tauris: New York, 2010), 54. Cited in Ecchia, 2. 
68 International loans were new to the Ottomans, though attempts had been made since 
the reign of Murat IV (1623 – 40) in the seventeenth century. His later successors Ahmet 
III (1703 – 30), Selim III (1789 – 1807) and Mahmut II (1803 -39) also attempted to 
borrow internationally, but were turned down. Instead they debased gold and silver coins 





centralized organizational system that documented income and expenditures was 
required in order for them to even hope to repay it. The Great Powers, eager to both 
literally cash in on their expanding colonial ambitions and to be repaid the considerable 
sum, offered to help the Ottomans to organize their fledgling finances, setting up the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administation in 1881.69 As part of its terms, France and Britain 
agreed to lower the amount of debt on the loan, but only on the specific condition that 
they would now take over control of Ottoman revenues.70  
Simultaneously, British and French diplomats, counselors, advisors, and bankers 
both took over the management of much of the recently-established “Ottoman” banking 
system.71 As only one of several examples,72 the Ottoman Bank, a European-modeled 
institution that had been established in 1856 with branches in Beirut, Izmir, Galata and 
                                                                                                                                            
respectively, leading to the depreciation of the Ottoman currency relative to the British 
pound sterling by 352 percent.” It was not until the Crimean wars that the Ottomans 
were successful in their attempts at foreign borrowing, taking out a loan of five million 
pounds sterling at the urging of imperial Britain and France, who guaranteed the interest 
payments. See Geyikdagi, 31, 33. 
69 See, e.g., Davis, The extent of British financial investment in Egypt further influenced 
their military choices in the ‘Urabi Revolt. Lord Cromer, British consul-general of Egypt, 
always considered Egyptian financial organization among his chief callings. See John 
Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (Praeger, 1970). It is also worth noting that after the Ottomans 
declared bankruptcy, the collateral for the restructured Ottoman loan included in annual 
Egyptian tributary revenue to the Porte. See Geyikdagi, 37. 
70 Geyikdagi, 41. 






Salonica, was headquartered in London and opened at the behest of the British.73 Within 
a few years, in 1863 it was reorganized from its initial intended purpose as a commercial 
bank. With additional backing from the French, it became the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
(Bank-ı Osmanî-i Şahane) and expanded its economic role significantly, working also as a 
state bank that issued banknotes and initiated external borrowing.74 Throughout this 
process, it was run by committees operating out of London and Paris, its upper 
management positions held by British and French nationals.75 By the 1890s— 
after the bankruptcy had devastated the Empire— other British- and French-backed 
banks were pouring in.76 
At the same time, the British sought greater control over Khedival Egypt, which 
had become an Ottoman tributary state rather than a province in 1865 and had 
experienced a parallel bankruptcy in 1876.77 Egyptian tributary taxes to the Ottomans 
had been part of the collateral refinancing the 1875 bankruptcy, and the British were 
                                                
73 Locally-run Ottoman banks also sprang up, but most were focused on limited regional 
populations. These include the Bank of Salonica (founded 1888) and the Bank of 
Mytilene (founded 1891). See Pamuk, 221. 
74 See Geyikdagi, 35, Pamuk, Monetary, 221. 
75 Many of these could be holders of berats, Ottoman minorities who had special 
relationships with European countries guaranteeing them a form of diplomatic immunity 
and freedom from taxation. 
76 See, e.g., Pamuk, Monetary, 221; Thobie, Jacques, “European Banks in the Middle 
East,” in Rondo Cameron and V. I. Bovykin (eds.), International Banking 1870 - 1914, 
(Oxford University Press, 1991), 421 – 25; Clay, “The Origins of Modern Banking in the 
Levant: the Development of a Branch Network by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1890 - 
1914,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (1994), 589 – 614. German banks 
became a presence primarily after WWI. See Pamuk, Ottoman Empire, 62 - 81 





increasingly concerned about making sure that the Ottomans and the Egyptians would 
make good on their debt. As local Egyptian movements sought more national 
independence leading to the 1882 ‘Urabi Revolt, British policymakers sought more 
influence to ensure their own flows of capital.78 Foreign indebtedness and foreign trade 
further entwined the states’ fortunes, as English bondholders feared losses and English 
textile workers feared a rebellion would result in lack of guaranteed inflows of cotton.79 
The 1882 British occupation of Egypt, which would last in one form or another until 
1954, had the financial concerns of their own as its driving motivation, creating strong 
incentive for British enforcement of an outside system of land irrigation, cultivation, and 
economic accounts.80   
Holding the financial leash, the Great Powers requested further that their 
nationals living in the Ottoman lands be given perks and priority in international trade.81 
As successive sultans worked to free the empire of debt, they became even more 
entangled in the international economy. European capital directly funded much of the 
proliferation of rail lines and the construction of ports in coastal Ottoman cities in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Attendant economic expansion through foreign 
trade was exponential, as “foreign trade in the areas within the 1911 borders of the 
Empire, Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq increased by about fifteen fold between the 1820s and 
                                                
78 See Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920 – 
1943. (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1983), 42. 
79 Ibid, 43. 
80 Ibid. See also Clay, chapters 3 -4. 





World War I.”82 As Geyikdagi emphasizes, “From the mid-nineteenth century, when the 
Ottoman Empire was in woeful political and economic circumstances, foreign investment 
made its inroads. For years to come, it was influential in the political field, having a major 
stay in the state administration, and in the social field by shaping the people’s way of 
life.”83  
This last is crucial to understanding how Western conventional banking came to 
be perceived as inextricably linked with foreign-ness and colonialism in the popular 
imagination. As capital flowed into the empire, the use of money as a medium of 
exchange became more common from the cities to the hinterlands, and new, physical 
houses of financial exchange— new to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century— 
soon followed.84 Thus it was through bankruptcy and mounting foreign debt that the 
modern Western conventional system of banking, encroaching for decades, conquered 
the financial system of the crumbling Empire.  
 
Banking and Islam: Ribā, Ethics, and Social Justice 
It is little wonder that turn of the century Ottomans and Egyptians perceived 
banking at interest with suspicion, a foreign import that had already proven to have dire 
                                                
82 Pamuk, Monetary, 205. See also C. Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800 – 1914 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Chapter 3; and Pamuk, The Ottoman 
Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 - 1913: Trade, Investment and Production (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), Chapter 1; see also Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” in 
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consequences.  Yet these concerns were not simply a result of European colonialism and 
the bankruptcy. The question of relationship to capital, and of the most pious way to 
conduct economic life, had existed in the Muslim world long before European 
intervention. Though lacking an established jurisprudential tradition devoted exclusively 
to economics as a concept, Islamic law was rooted in the concept of social justice. It had 
warned against unscrupulous business practices from its inception, when the Prophet 
Muhammad had revealed a strict prohibition against usury in the Qur’an. In order to 
understand the complex origins of Islamic finance in the twentieth century, a brief 
summary of Islamic theology relating to credit and interest is laid out here. 
Ribā, a Qur’anic term, has been the chief concern of Muslim clerics with Western 
conventional banking since it became the international standard. Pakistani scholar of 
Islam Fazlur Rahman’s work on the issue of ribā is among the most comprehensive and 
clear, and as such it is briefly reviewed here.85  
Though ribā is often approximated as “usury” or “interest” in the contemporary 
English-language literature on Islamic finance,86 it carries more distinctive associations in 
the original classical Arabic.87 Derived from an Arabic root whose related meanings 
include to grow, to increase / prosper, to rise, to swell (as in foam), and to nurture (a 
                                                
85 See Rahman, “Ribā and Interest,” Islamic Studies 3:1 (1964), 1 – 49. 
86 English, as the common language of the globe, is also the primary language of 
contemporary Islamic finance. Typically the literature includes a substantial number of 
un-translated Arabic terms, most of them names of different products and specific 
banking concepts. Ribā is often used interchangeably with interest in this literature. 
87 Rahman prefaces his article with the insistence that attempts to translate it are the 





child), ribā is used in different senses in the Qur’an and in the hadith literature,88 leading 
later jurists to parse the term into the ribā al-Qur’an and the ribā al-faḍl (“ribā of excess,” 
also called the ribā al-Ḥadīth, described below).89  
Qur’anic language prohibiting ribā is emphatic and dire. In Sūrah al-Baqarah (The 
Cow) II, 274 – 277: 
 
Those who consume ribā shall not rise except like the one who has been struck by 
the Devil's touch. This is because they say that selling and ribā-making are one and 
the same thing, whereas God has made selling lawful and has forbidden ribā. 
Whosoever receives an admonition from his Lord and desists, he shall have his 
past gains, and his affair is committed to God; but whosoever reverts –those are 
the inhabitants of the Fire, therein dwelling forever. God destroys ribā but makes 
alms prosper.90 
 
From these verses, the intensity with which Muslim jurists sought to avoid ribā may be 
well understood. Yet, the verses provide no clear definition of what exactly is to be 
avoided.  
The reason for the lack of clarity is explained in a tradition that states that, when 
context is taken into account, these verses may very well be among the last revealed words 
                                                
88 Rahman, 2. The hadith literature is comprised of the sayings and actions attributed to 
Muhammad and his early companions, passed down through the generations and 
recorded. They are considered the pious model from which Muslims should derive their 
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89 Rahman, 2. The Qur’an and hadith literature include the most detail about the life of 
the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Their examples are considered the most 
righteous, with the result that Muslim tradition has developed a system of deriving as 
much as detail as possible from this literature in order to have a model of piety off of 
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of the Qur’an.91 Because of this, so the tradition went, the Prophet did not have sufficient 
time to clarify fully the “constituent elements of ribā” before his death, and, therefore, that 
people should avoid anything that appears similar to it.92 Sūrah al-Imran, III: 130 further 
states, “O you who believe, do not consume ribā with continued redoubling and protect 
yourselves.”93 Clerics and thinkers like Rahman have interpreted this to mean that ribā 
was often a particularly severe form of usury practiced during the time of the Prophet, in 
which the principal of a loan was doubled—and perhaps continued redoubling—if the 
creditor could not pay it when due.94 Nevertheless, the lack of definitional certainty 
remains. 
Hadith literature is normally used to clarify and contextualize the poetic and often 
obscure references of the Qur’an. Yet in this case it only adds to the complexity: all 
manner of financial transactions are labeled ribā in different hadiths. For example, one 
hadith, the origin of the term ribā al-faḍl, (ribā of excess) insists that one must trade equally: 
 
Abu Sa’id al-Khudri reported God’s messenger as saying: ‘Gold is to be paid for 
by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, and salt by salt like for 
like, payment being made ‘hand to hand.’ If anyone gives more or asks for more 
he has dealt in ribā. The receiver and the giver are equally guilty.’95  
    
                                                
91 4. It is worth noting here that the accuracy and veracity of this tradition is not upheld 
by all. Rahman, for example, disputes it. 
92 Ibid, 4. 
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94 Ibid, 6. 
95 Quoted in Rahman, 13. These hadiths are taken from the Saḥih al-Bukhari and are 





Such a prohibition leads to juristic confusion—what exactly is traded if like is exchanged 
exactly for like? It is hard to imagine two wheat crops at a precisely equivalent state of 
health and quality. How— and why— would one trade at all with such parameters? Yet 
other hadiths state, “There is no ribā except on loans,”96 sidestepping the equal trade 
question entirely. Such contradictory statements have been the subject of jurisprudential 
discussion since the formative days of the orthodox Islamic maḏhabs (schools of thought)97 
and— important for our purposes— remain a matter of debate today.  
Ribā, then, remains a contested matter in every sense, from its definition to its 
interpretation to its implementation.  For our purposes, it is important to emphasize that 
by the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, interest— and credit generally— was widely 
understood to be synonymous with ribā. Furthermore, it is important to make explicit one 
of the implicit through-lines of this summary: ribā carries one clear and foundational 
implication, present in all of its instantiations in the literature: taking unjust advantage of 
one’s business partners is a cause for divine wrath. Ribā is, then, an ethical issue, and 
avoiding it is both moral imperative and prerequisite to the central Islamic ethical 
framework of fairness and social justice. 
Here it is also vital to dispel a possible misconception: Despite the widespread 
consensus among Islamic theologians that interest is not compliant with the sharia, 
historical evidence of interest-based finance in one form of another is present throughout 
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Ottoman lands from the time that we have documentation.98 As emphasized in the next 
section, though a thorough analysis would exceed the scope of this project, it is important 
to emphasize that credit and interest have always been part of finance in one way of 
another, in lands West or East. While there are undoubtedly regional differences in 
financial culture yet to be discovered in the different Ottoman provinces, the use of 
interest in finance was ubiquitous in Ottoman culture up until the late nineteenth 
century, used by men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, rich and poor, for as long 
as we have documentation.  
 
What Came Before: Traditional Ottoman Economic Culture 
Much of the extant history and historiography of the Ottoman financial collapse 
focuses on why the Europeans were triumphant; on why the Ottomans, introduced for 
the first time to lines of credit and banknotes and interest-bearing loans and international 
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in a state of transformation. Due to the linguistic inaccessibility of Ottoman Turkish— 
it is a highly ornate and rarely taught language—and the relative difficulty of finding 
information in the Ottoman archive, there is much we do not know about Ottoman 
history. In addition, the history of money itself in the Ottoman Empire has an added 
layer of complexity. As Middle East economic historian Şevket Pamuk explains, 
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system if one existed.” Pamuk, Ottoman Monetary History, xi. For a discussion of the 
development of credit in the medieval period, see Abraham L. Udovitch, Partnership and 





banking, were unable to compete with the European colonizing powers in the financial 
arena. A byproduct of this focus on the victors has meant that very little has been written 
in this literature on what the new European system of finance displaced.99 Much can and 
has been said about Islamic economic culture and the Ottoman Empire. In the interest of 
brevity, this section focuses on the area of nineteenth century Ottoman socioeconomic 
culture whose eclipse most influenced the later development of Islamic economics: the 
socioeconomic system of waqfs (charitable endowment, similar to a European trust). 
The collapse of the system of waqf sheds light on the origins of the Islamic finance 
question in addition to explaining why the Ottomans were so ill equipped for Western 
finance. Before modern banking, a primary means of socioeconomic organization in 
communities across the Ottoman Empire was the waqf. Records of these endowments, 
kept by the Islamic courts100 in individual municipalities throughout the empire, have 
proven an invaluable source— often the only source, in fact— for historical 
                                                
99 This is not to say that there is no general Ottoman economic history; volumes have 
been written about Ottoman economic history and Islamic economic culture, each of 
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reconstruction of socio-religious and economic norms in different segments of the 
empire.101 This section combines different case studies from urban centers across the 
Ottoman Empire in order to reconstruct some notable characteristics about the nature of 
waqf and their socioeconomic function in the pre-colonial period. It is noteworthy, 
however, that our information on waqfs is patchy, and that because Islamic law is 
characterized by pluralism, regional and municipal variations in waqf administration 
abound. Because of this, specific municipalities and time periods are named with each 
characteristic. 
According to the Ḥanafi school102 of Islamic law, the school of the Ottomans, the 
definition of waqf is: “the detention of the corpus from the ownership of any person and 
the gift of its income or usufruct either presently or in the future, to some charitable 
purpose.”103 In order to become waqf property, the owner must declare it so, reserving its 
income for a specific person. Upon this declaration the owner abrogates his ownership 
and the property ceases to be his or hers. “It cannot be transferred or alienated by him 
[or her], the administrator of the waqf, or the beneficiaries; and it does not devolve upon 
the owners’ heirs.”104 Although one of the requirements for property to be waqf is that it 
be reserved for charity, this may be an intended rather than immediate goal; allowances 
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can be made for one’s income to be reserved specifically for one’s descendants “in 
perpetuity, with a provision that upon the extinction of [one’s] descendants, the income 
shall be used for relief of the poor or some other charitable object.”105 There are two 
fundamental kinds of waqfs: first is the waqf ahli, or family waqf (just described); second is 
the waqf khayri, or charitable waqf, in which the property goes immediately to a charitable 
purpose. These two kinds of waqfs can be combined, as when part of the property goes to 
specific relatives and the rest directly to charity.106 
Waqfs are administered by a mutawalli (trustee), whose duty it is to administer and 
protect the waqf in addition to receiving and distributing any of its proceeds to its 
beneficiaries, and who is always under the legal and religious authority of a qadi (Islamic 
religious judge).107 As a charitable contribution, the waqf can be said to belong to God. 
Having been declared waqf, property cannot change its status; theoretically it cannot “be 
the subject of any sale, disposition, mortgage, gift, inheritance, attachment, or any 
alienation whatsoever.”108 Usually land, libraries, buildings such as mosques and 
hospitals, the administration of such, and flocks and herds are acceptable forms of waqfs. 
A final important—and religiously contested—form of waqf endowment is the cash waqf 
(waqf al-nuqūd). A cash waqf is “the establishment of a trust with money the interest from 
which might pay the salary of a teacher, or preacher, or even unashamedly pass into the 
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pocket of the founder of the trust.”109 Because Islamic law explicitly forbids ribā (usually 
understood as interest), cash waqfs are questionable in terms of legality. Yet they were 
accepted and used extensively throughout many cities of the Ottoman Empire, opening 
“a legally sanctioned and governmentally controlled money market for the small lender 
and buyer.”110 
Within the Ottoman Empire, waqfs were an integral, interweaved component of 
social and economic life from the time of its inception in 1299. As Bahaeddin Yediyildiz 
explains, by the eighteenth century: 
 
[T]hanks to the prodigious development of the waqf institution, a person could be 
born in a house belonging to a waqf, sleep in a cradle of that waqf and fill up on its 
food receive instruction through waqf-owned books, become a teacher in a waqf 
school, draw a waqf-financed salary, and, at his death, be placed in a waqf- 
provided coffin for burial in a waqf cemetery. In short, it was possible to meet all 
one's needs through goods and services immobilized as waqf.111 
 
Across the urban centers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, waqfs were utilized 
as an effective means to safeguard individuals, their families, and their property against 
the reach of the Sultan because waqfs, as designated property of God, were considered 
untaxable. Thus the significance of waqfs within Ottoman socioeconomic structure should 
not be understated. 
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Waqfs were not simply a means to shelter wealth. When considered as a means to 
protect one’s family from state interference, they take on added significance. This is 
particularly the case when they are contextualized within broader Islamic inheritance 
law, according to which inheritance is fixed, largely favors the male descendants, and 
cannot be altered in the interest of a specific individual. The waqf was a way to both 1) 
circumvent religious tradition if one desired to, for example, leave more money or assets 
to a female or male heir, or attempt to guarantee the prosperity of a specific line of 
descendants, and 2) protect one’s assets from taxation. Indeed, family waqfs were usually 
entitled to tax reductions, if not complete exemptions.112 Moreover, a waqf owner could 
legally designate him or herself as the first mutawalli (trustee) of his or her own family waqf, 
determine his or her own salary, and also hire members of his or her own family to work 
the waqf land. Thus the trappings of a social structure revolving around the development 
and administration of waqfs can well be seen: the more expansive the waqf, the more 
power and prestige associated with the families involved in its administration.113 The vast 
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majority of waqfs established in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Egypt and 
Istanbul, for example, were family waqfs (as opposed to charitable waqfs, in a ratio of 5:1) 
and were founded by ruling class elites.114 Moreover, as economic historian Timur Kuran 
emphasizes, for those who were already in power, the family waqf was a favored means to 
safeguard against hard times and the possibility falling out of favor with the sultan.115 
Yet, despite the abundance of family waqfs, the prominence of external (non-
familial) religious endowments must be emphasized when examining the socioeconomic 
implications of waqf endowments in the urban centers of the Ottoman Empire. Ruth 
Roded, in a study of popular beneficiaries of waqf in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Aleppo, notes the frequency of religious schools and both great and neighborhood 
mosques.116 Further, Daniel Crecelius, in his study of the waqf of Muhammad Bey in late 
eighteenth century Cairo, describes the lavish religious complex endowed through 
waqf.117 The fact that many waqfs were religious in nature reflects the strong charitable 
bent of both Cairene and Aleppine—and by extension broader Ottoman—culture, and 
the ways in which waqfs served as a non-state system of wealth redistribution. Indeed, 
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Abraham Marcus, in his analysis of eighteenth century Aleppo, speaks of hundreds of 
waqfs “formed by philanthropists support[ing] services and communal institutions, 
displaying one of many aspects of the public spirit and activism essential to understanding 
the workings of the city.”118 Court records indicate that minority religious confessions—
Christians and Jews—could and did designate property as waqf throughout the Ottoman 
Empire; this was a community endeavor.  
Still, religious and economic interests were intertwined. In addition to the 
benevolent and pious nature of religious waqf endowments, they also, like the family waqf, 
served to maintain the social hierarchy of Ottoman society in any given city.119 Given the 
power of the Muslim religious authorities, especially their ability to name waqf trustees 
and thereby affect the economics of their cities, the designation of waqfs as religious 
complexes were a highly effective way to reinforce local social and political structures. 
Religious donations, on a social level, could establish the religiosity and piety of the 
founder, and ensure a lengthy and positive political relationship between the qadi 
(religious judge), ‘ulamā’ (Islamic religious authorities), and other religious leaders and the 
donor. 
As noted earlier, credit and interest have always been part of finance in one way 
of another, in lands West or East. Through a careful study of waqf records, scholars have 
unveiled data that indicates Ottoman subjects—including Muslims—were engaged in 
interest-based finance throughout at least the last four centuries of the empire’s existence. 
                                                
118 See Abraham Marcus. The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth 
Century. (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1989) 287. 
119 See, e.g., Gabriel Baer, “The Waqf as a Prop for the Social System (Sixteenth-





In one of many examples, scholar Ronald Jennings examined Ottoman waqf records in 
the Anatolian cities of Amasya, Kayseri, Karaman, and Trabzon in the sixteenth century 
over a twenty-year period, finding thousands of debt-based court cases between family 
members and between the community at large, with women registered as well as men. 
Rates of interest on these loans were between ten and twenty percent, all clearly and 
unapologetically documented in the court registry.120 As Pamuk emphasizes, the 
abundant supply of capital listed in the documents indicates that no one confessional, 
geographic, or socioeconomic group of moneylenders monopolized the credit markets: 
Muslims, Jews and Christians were all involved,121 signifying that “the profit motive 
permeated all segments of the urban societies in these areas, not just the people of the 
bazaars but the rural landholders, the Ottoman military class, and the ‘ulamā’ as well.”122  
Charitable endowments served an additional societal purpose, probably their most 
crucial. In the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, “health, education, and welfare were 
entirely dependent upon gifts and [charitable] endowment income” (emphasis mine).123 
Unlike modern Western governments, who frequently subsidize the cost of hospitals, 
schools, and other large public works, Istanbul was often uninvolved in their financing 
(unless the Sultan or his family endowed public charitable waqf land, which happened 
occasionally). Instead, they were made up of revenue and lands from charitable waqfs. 
The lack of extensive social services provided by the Porte, combined with widespread 
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desire on the part of Ottoman subjects for some form of property rights, meant that 
people had little incentive to pay their taxes and every incentive to utilize waqfs to get 
around them. 
Not surprisingly, by the nineteenth century, a significant proportion of 
agricultural land in the Empire was tied up in waqf endowments and exempt from 
taxation. Estimates place between one quarter and three quarter of all arable land in the 
Empire as designated as waqf, as well as a much higher proportion of urban property.124 
According to Timur Kuran: 
 
Available aggregate statistics on the assets controlled by waqfs come from recent 
centuries. At the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, three-quarters of 
the country's arable land belonged to waqfs. Around the same time, one-eighth of 
all cultivated soil in Egypt and one-seventh of that in Iran stood immobilized125 as 
waqf property. In the middle of the 19th century, one-half of the agricultural land 
in Algeria, and in 1883 one-third of that in Tunisia, was owned by waqfs.126 
 
The amount of revenue rendered inaccessible to the Sultan was thus considerable. 
As the Ottoman Empire spiraled further and further into debt to the European 
Great Powers throughout the nineteenth century, ambassadors and bankers proposed the 
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expropriation or taxation of waqfs lands to Ottoman Viziers and ministers several times, 
with less than enthusiastic responses. In 1860, for example, the British government 
proposed a comprehensive package of reforms to Ali Pasha, an Ottoman statesman, with 
the aim of increasing Ottoman revenue to offset debts. Among the list of financial reforms 
was the “proposal that the exploitation for revenue purposes of forests, mines, public 
lands and waqf property should be entrusted to a mixed commission of Ottomans and 
foreigners” including a British and French committee member.127 Yet the Ottoman 
Sultan refused, citing religious reasons.128 It was only on the eve of the bankruptcy in 
1873 that the expropriation of waqfs through massive secularization was considered in an 
offer to the British and French by Mehmet Rustu, an Ottoman statesman.129 Even then, 
however, British and French representatives in private letters doubted the sincerity of the 
offer.130 It never came to fruition. 
Though questions of space prohibit an in-depth elaboration, it is important to 
emphasize that, though a vital piece of the Ottoman socioeconomic system, waqfs were 
gradually stripped of power throughout the Middle East and North Africa as Western 
finance became standardized. With the British and French protectorates and later semi-
colonial mandates starting in the mid-1880s—most of them justified by the colonizers as a 
necessary response to Ottoman and Egyptian foreign debt management failures— waqfs 
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came under European control, eliminating their independent power.131 This standard of 
government control remained in place with the transition to Middle East nation-states, as 
Algeria, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey nationalized their waqf properties during 
decolonization.132  
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Thus, returning to the basic question that drives this chapter: Why was Islamic 
economics conceived as a necessary response to European colonialism? In part, it is 
because the centuries-old economic system that European finance displaced was 
quintessentially Islamic, and because it acted as far more than just a trust or charitable 
endowment: waqfs constituted a powerful socioeconomic mediator within Ottoman 
communities, leveling economic disparities, aiding the poor, contributing to a sense of 
community, and often effectively preventing the usurpation of power by imperial elites; 
they were a socioeconomic glue of society. Ironically, because they provided so many vital 
social and economic functions, the structural and cultural function of waqfs prevented the 
imperial consolidation of power and resources, particularly during the turbulent 
nineteenth century. In other words, they did not lend themselves well to international 
banking systems, and they did not compete well with the aggressive, laissez-faire capitalist 
system introduced from Europe.133 But, it is important to note, they did lend themselves 
for centuries to local municipal and intra-empire social stability. Furthermore, they were 
perceived as quintessentially socially just, seamlessly interweaving religious morals and 
obligations with financial practice.  
This last should not be understated, as it is vital to the exploration of the rise of 
Islamic finance: Islam itself was not understood by everyday nineteenth-century 
Ottomans as something separable from everyday life (or from economic transactions); 
Islam was the good life, encompassing all. Economic transactions were thus not distinct 
from Islam; all was part of a whole. The notion of a separate, discrete (Western) finance, 
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rooted in the solitary goal of capital accumulation and management, was culturally 
foreign, a European innovation that stood outside of Ottoman understandings of the role 
and function of commerce and personal gain. There was, therefore, a strong historical 
and religious precedent in for Ottoman Muslims to consider carefully the morality and 
religious compliance of economic systems.134 
 
 
The Nahḍa and New Arab Publics 
Why did Ottoman and Egyptian subjects of the late nineteenth century come to 
view interest-based banking as foreign, a colonizing construct? The most immediate 
answer is that, as described above, physical banking institutions and the kinds of 
documentation that come with them— places of audits, deposits and accounts– were 
indeed new European imports. Ottomans had not previously organized their moneys in 
quite the same way. More deeply, the answer comes from a cultural transformation that 
took place throughout the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, itself only partially 
due to European colonial infiltration.  
Concomitant with French colonialism and later British occupation, 
Enlightenment culture had also swept in to the Middle East, both through colonial 
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conquest and through active solicitation by inquisitive Ottoman (and later Egyptian) 
subjects and rulers.135  Indeed, it was active interest in European advances that led in part 
to the spending that eventually fuelled the Ottoman bankruptcy. Intent upon learning the 
new European science and technology, starting in the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman 
subjects increasingly studied abroad in Paris and London. As nineteenth century 
Ottoman sultans and Egyptian reformer Muhammad Ali invested heavily in a 
modernized state infrastructure, expanding railways and working to industrialize, they 
also sought teachers to keep them competitive in a new age of science and philosophy.136 
Political science, European literature and languages, European philosophy and more was 
soon translated and published locally by eager returning students, thirsty for continued 
knowledge from abroad. Alongside European colonial occupation and European-
introduced education, this homegrown movement for intellectual and cultural 
advancement, often called the Arab nahḍa (renaissance), transformed— and in many ways 
created—the nineteenth century Arab public sphere. Radiating outward from epicenters 
in Cairo and Beirut, nahḍa publications and the new secular public education set the tone 
for public political discourse during the final half century of the Empire. Cairo in 
particular, one of the largest urban centers of the Middle East, was culturally formative 
for this Arab cultural rebirth. 
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The nahḍa literally ushered in (through translation) questions of polity and self-
governance, citizenship and rights. Classical liberalism entered the Ottoman and 
Egyptian zeitgeist alongside new theories of capitalism and communism. Societal self-
definition was at a premium as Ottoman and Egyptian middle class publics considered 
the personal and political implications of the dialectics of sovereign and subject, setting 
their sights instead on a new vision of state and citizen. All of these questions were derived 
from European ideas in translation, arriving to the Ottoman and Egyptian worlds 
alongside sustained colonial occupations. 
As a result of new, European-influenced secular education, by the end of the 
century (1882 – 1900) urban centers like Cairo housed a rich and diversified community 
of rising intelligentsia educated by the state, men (and a few women) who were becoming 
the “makers, as well as the primary consumers, of modern Egyptian political life, social 
institutions, and cultural production.” This urban bourgeoisie was called the effendiyyah, an 
“embryonic professional middle class” who formed new literary circles and salons 
informed by the exponentially expanding circle of Cairo journalist publications – “no less 
than 627 newspapers in Cairo and Alexandria (compared to 13 alone between 1852-
1880).”137 This new intelligentsia was characterized by their experimentation with new 
European philosophical, literary, and scientific ideas as they forged their own unique 
modernized culture:138  
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As a new professional, salaried class, effendis were directly affected by the quotidian 
realities of wage earning and banking even as they explored ideologies of nationalism and 
independence from Europe. Some nahḍa -era effendis came to view usury, interest, and 
banking itself as colonial imports and parts of a system of alien-imposed oppression. For 
example, the association of usury with foreign occupation and economic domination is 
marked in the early writings of Talaat Harb, an anti-colonial effendi businessman who—
like many members of this rising proto-middle class— received a new, state-sponsored 
and European-influenced secular professional education in the Khedival law school.139 A 
man of humble beginnings, Harb wrote virulently against the British occupation in his 
1911 book advocating the creation of an Egyptian national bank, ‘Īlāj miṣr al-iqtisadī wa 
mashrū bank al-misrīyīn (Egypt's Economic Remedy and the Project of an Egyptian Bank), explicitly 
attacking outside moneylenders for crippling the peasantry through a cycle of endless 
indebtedness.140 It is likely that this was a deeply personal project— given his 
impoverished circumstances, Talaat’s father Hasan Harb may have been “forced to resort 
to usurers to support himself and his family.”141 Harb’s response to the colonizers’ cruelty 
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was economic nationalism, a concept he promoted relentlessly. By 1920, Harb founded 
the successful (still in operation) Bank Miṣr (Bank of Egypt), an Egyptian-owned and run 
institution. 
Thus education and the rise of a salaried middle class— the result of government 
education and the indirect result of colonial organization—brought with them increased 
use of and demand for money, as well as concerns regarding its regulation, provenance, 
and use, making banking itself a more central priority for the average Ottoman and 
Egyptian urbanite by the dawn of the twentieth century.142  Simultaneously, the nahḍa 
and the expansion of print culture led to discussion and debate regarding the 
socioeconomic theories surrounding the new European capitalist infiltration.143 One 
should not, therefore, view the colonized as passive absorbers of this new colonial culture; 
through the nahḍa, they were grappling with change and selectively adopting their own 
variants.  
As World War I approached—and in the context of nearly a century of near-
constant imperial attrition in the form of independent nationalist secessions144— nation-
state construction, and questions of economics of state, rose in relevance among effendis. 
The meaning of foreign-ness versus indigenous-ness was highlighted through this process 
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of cultural change, and, as Harb demonstrates, in the wake of colonialism cultural lines 
were drawn. Potential legislators and entrepreneurs, aware that Ottoman economic 
inefficiencies could not stand up to the new European banking, sought guidance in 
accounting law while local activists sought new national financial institutions, separate 
from the Europeans.  
 
Finance and Islam 
Muslim religious leaders too felt this influx of ideas, leading them to reevaluate 
their approach to tradition as they sought to craft a new direction that would both 
incorporate and respond to modernity. More than any others, Cairo Mufti145 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849 – 1911, in office 1899 until his death in 1905) and his student 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 – 1939) are known for changing the trajectory of Islam in 
the twentieth-century Arab world through their revised approach to Islamic tradition, a 
project that came to be known as Islamic modernism. ‘Abduh was deeply concerned 
about both the influence of European ideas upon his fellows and the continuing 
encroachment of colonialism. A student of the prestigious Cairo Sunni educational 
institution, Al-Azhar, ‘Abduh’s response to these concerns was innovative: In order to 
enable Islam to answer the complexities and claims of modernity, ‘Abduh advocated 
jurisprudential revision.146 His methodology was radical and disruptive, laying the 
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groundwork for the later twentieth-century Salafi movement147: instead of turning to the 
work of the centuries-old jurisprudential schools in which he himself was trained, ‘Abduh 
taught that Muslims should seek guidance for right living in the earliest records of the life 
of the Prophet and his companions, the sunna. The best way to interpret the Islamicity of 
modern life was through renewed ijtihād, a process of independent rational 
investigation.148 
This new, modernist and modernizing approach was both formed by the nahḍa 
and formative of it. Actively seeking a way to communicate with the common people, 
‘Abduh and his disciple Rashid Riḍa advocated a shift away from the arcane, insular, and 
largely inaccessible formal religious commentaries of custom, instead publishing religious 
judgments (fatwas) and commentaries openly to the public in periodicals on topics of the 
day. Rida’s journal Al-Manār, published in Cairo (1898 – 1917), was their primary organ. 
The new, educated and literate middle-class effendiya, already searching for societal self-
definition, were now able to engage much more directly with Muslim leaders’ approach 
to religion and modernity—itself a striking and transformative prospect in a region in 
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which the vast majority had been illiterate and unexposed to the rigors of Islamic 
traditional education.149  
The relationship of Islam to the new Western conventional banking practices was 
not a common subject in ‘Abduh’s and Rida’s commentaries and judgments. However, 
the few that we have are demonstrative of the concern that credit-based banking 
presented for practicing Muslims as they began to assume management of Western 
conventional finance houses, invest in them, and even found their own. Among the 
earliest religious sources that introduces the question of Islamic finance is a debate 
between the fin de siècle Khedive of Egypt Abbas II (in office from 1892 – 1914) and 
Muhammad ‘Abduh.150  
In 1898, several British entrepreneurs had established the Bank of Egypt with full 
Khedival support. Responding to a governmental request, ‘Abduh issued fatwas (religious 
rulings) on the permissibility of the bank’s activities. Among these was a ruling that 
approved placement of waqf endowment revenues in the national bank as investment 
funds, rather than in their usual place in the treasury.151 In keeping with his Islamic 
modernist ethos, ‘Abduh’s unusually open interpretation of ribā (usury or interest) was 
based on the idea that, originally, Muslim rules about the use of money—including the 
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prohibition of interest—were derived with the goal of social justice. In this case, 
depositors were allowed to profit from interest on the argument that the Qur’an 
“prohibited only such interest as would increase the amount to be paid back on a loan.” 
In other words, because this form of investment did not impoverish people, it was 
acceptable.152  
In his tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis, a commentary written by religious elites), ‘Abduh 
clarifies that his primary concern regarding ribā, derived from the Qur’an, is rooted in the 
ethics of social justice and concern for the poor. He states that the ribā of the Qur’an is 
… [T]he ribā which relates to credit transactions such that if a poor man could not 
repay his debt even after the passage of a long time or of many years, the amount 
he owed was increased manifold. This ribā ruined homes, emptied the human 
heart of fellow-feeling and created a gulf of enmity and hatred between the rich 
and the poor. When the Prophet limited ribā to the ribā which is involved in credit 
transactions, he really made clear the ribā meant by the Divine injunction and on 
whose non-observance God threatened the Muslims with a dire punishment, 
which is even severer than the threatened punishment for disbelief. Would any 
person gifted with reason and intelligence maintain that this prohibition of ribā is 
harmful to human beings and prevents them from adding to their wealth? If 
capital cannot accumulate without ruining the homes of the poor and satiating the 
avarice of the greedy, then not one man would view with approval this kind of 
addition to wealth.153 
Thus ribā was only to be prohibited when its use contributed to impoverishment; it was 
not, in ‘Abduh’s view, wrong in any and all circumstances.  
This interpretation of ribā as it relates to social justice was tested shortly thereafter, 
when a locally owned and operated interest-bearing savings fund was created. In 1901, 
the Egyptian Postal Administration under Khedive Abbas had introduced a new Savings 
                                                
152 Gesnik, 175. 





Fund (ṣunduq al-tawfīr), a fully Egyptian enterprise based on British colonial precedent.154 
The relative piety of interest-based banking and finance—and of the religious 
permissibility of Muslims managing banks and funds involved in such practices—quickly 
became a factor in ‘Abduh’s assessment. Unlike his earlier ruling, ‘Abduh balked at the 
permissibility of interest-backed deposits in the Savings Fund.  His objection to the fund 
was rooted in social justice: Such a system “exploits” the money it takes from the people 
and “does not borrow it from them out of necessity,” ‘Abduh argued. However, ‘Abduh 
allowed for the possibility that the moneys from the fund could be used in a licit muḍaraba 
contract.155 Muḍaraba contracts, sometimes called profit-and-loss contracts, are similar to 
a commenda partnership.156 They are one of the earliest attested forms of Muslim 
mercantile exchange, and involve one partner providing capital for a venture and the 
other partner providing labor. In a muḍaraba contract, interest is avoided because both 
partners agree ahead of time to split the profits by percentage. Furthermore, if the 
venture proves unsuccessful, only the original owner of money incurs the loss.157 
Abduh’s disciple Rashid Rida later recalled the affair, explaining that ‘Abduh’s 
negative ruling had come at the request of the people, stating that over 3000 of the 
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depositors refused to participate in the fund “out of religious conviction,” and adding that 
“some men in government, including the director of the Administration of the Posts” had 
asked the Mufti for his formal opinion on the religious permissibility of the earnings from 
the Savings Fund.158 In response to Abduh’s negative reaction, the Khedive convened a 
council of ‘ulamā’ in the royal palace, the Qasr al-Qubba, and “charged them to draft a 
shar’i interpretation for ṣunduq al-tawfīr, so that it would be religiously acceptable to the 
people.”159 This challenge to ‘Abduh by the Khedive was met in stride: though nowhere 
do we have the details of the resulting plan, Rida later insisted that said plan was identical 
to his and ‘Abduh’s.160 As can be seen from ‘Abduh’s arguably inconsistent rulings in this 
formative period, clarity regarding the role of Muslims in Western conventional banking 
was murky at best at the turn of the century. 
From these few rulings we cannot gain a sense of a systematic framework from 
‘Abduh on issues of banking and finance— it is quite unlikely that he thought of banking 
and finance in terms of overarching frameworks. It is clear instead that his primary 
concerns are social justice and, relatedly, the ethical implications of enriching oneself 
outside of the act of labor. This is of some significance. In his commentary on the second 
Sura of the Qur’an, ‘Abduh argues that money “is simply an indicator of the value (qima) 
of commodities.” If money itself becomes “the object (maqṣud) of the production of 
wealth” it will result in impoverishing the people by stripping it from the many and 
concentrating it in the hands of those who “limit their works to the exploitation of money 
                                                
158 Al-Manar, 6: 13 (1904), 717. See also Mallat, 71. 
159 See A. Chris Eccles,  Egypt, Islam, and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation. 
(Berlin: K Schwarz, 1984), 416, cited in Mallat, 71. 





by money.”161 He further expresses concern that focus on money for its own sake results 
in hoarding of money in “safes (ṣanadiq) and financial houses (buyūt malīyya) known as 
banks,” with the result that the capitalist earns profit off of the backs of the poor who 
derive little from their labor.162 
The above is remarkable because of how pithily it encapsulates successive debates 
on not only the Islamicity of Western conventional banking, but also the Islamicity of 
capitalism, socialism, and communism. Concerns over the ethics of finance—specifically 
regarding the ethics of earning profit from money itself rather than from labor or the sale 
of commodities—are the centerpiece of the conversation, and we will see them over and 
over again as we continue. Yet, as described, the context of the concern was one in which 
Western conventional banking and finance had already been introduced and, through 
colonialism, had made significant headway in dominating the functioning of markets. 
 
This chapter has set the stage for the idea of an Islamic economics through a 
review of the rise of Western conventional finance in the Middle East and a discussion of 
what it displaced. Always perceived as a foreign phenomenon, Western conventional 
banking and its eclipse of the former Ottoman Islamic economic system typified the 
complicated relationship between colonizers and colonized from the outset. Already 
possessed of a vibrant intellectual tradition and centuries of functional socioeconomic 
religious culture exemplified through the waqf system, early Islamic thinkers applied their 
own systems of analysis to the question of the piety and adoptability of Western 
conventional finance.   
                                                






The responses of ‘Abduh and Riḍa to Western conventional banking are among 
the earliest on record, remembered largely because of Riḍa’s prolific literary output in his 
magazine, Al-Manār (published 1898 – 1917). They demonstrate some of the complexity 
and initial confusion regarding how to respond to this quintessentially foreign and 
colonially-inflected concept. Orthodox Islamic tradition had not developed a systematic, 
coherent jurisprudential framework on matters of finance and economics, relying instead 
upon a loose tradition in which individual cases were assessed off of general ethical 
standards and theological guidelines. Specific economic rules were few and centered 
around the broader ethos of social justice, involving the positive works of paying alms and 
taxes and providing for the poor, and the injunction against greed, theft, the nebulously-
defined ribā, and the like. Yet, by the turn of the century, the new Western finance had 
eclipsed previous socioeconomic systems (such as the waqfs) even as colonizers carved out 
more and more control of Muslim lands. Soon, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
Western socioeconomic theories began to take hold of the imaginations of Arabs 
throughout the Middle East. Western conventional banking, and Western economics 
generally, required a response. 
For Islamic finance to arise as a phenomenon, a more systematic framework of 
response to European would be required. This would require a deeper reach into 
questions of the Islamic relationship to economy. Such as system was to take shape in the 














Chapter Two: Intellectual Origins: Transnational Shiite  
Networks and the Political Economy 
of Faith, 1900 – 1950 
 
 
In the late 1950s, the most intellectually ambitious call ever heard for an Islamic 
economics came from a cleric of a minority sect living in the far reaches of the former 
Ottoman Empire. Unlike his Sunni predecessors— all of whom had simply questioned 
the ethics of Western banking—Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr framed the call for Islamic 
economics as part of a bigger decolonizing intellectual project: what would the 
parameters of a truly functional modern Islamic society look like? How would the 
economy fit in this larger Islamic polity? His examination of this question took the form of 
a multi-book treatise,163 examining the question of an Islamic state through a close 
philosophical and theological exploration: Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy, 1959) and Iqtiṣādunā 
(Our Economics, 1961).164  
                                                
163 Al-Sadr had intended to write a trilogy, ending with Mujtama’na (Our Society). At the 
time of his death at the hands of Saddam Husayn’s regime in 1980, no such manuscript 
had been discovered. 
164 Focusing on issues of finance and banking, he later developed a lengthy manual that 
described what, in practical terms, an interest-free banking system would look like: al-
Bank al-lā-ribawī fī-l-Islām (The Usury-Free Bank in Islam), published in 1969. This manual is 





Al-Sadr’s proposal was uniquely Shiite: a secularly-oriented early exercise in ijtihād 
(a process of rational investigation) from a man who would become one of the most famed 
Shiite leaders of the twentieth century. This chapter explains why a Shiite cleric would be 
particularly invested in this line of thought, presenting it as a logical outgrowth of 
transnational Shiite and intra-sectarian conversations happening throughout the region as 
the Ottoman Empire retreated further into memory, the European colonizers fell, and a 
vision of modern Islamic rule took hold. 
This chapter follows the story begun in chapter one, tracing the intellectual 
development of the economic question in the Middle East along a second axis, focusing 
on 1) the transformation in Shiite education in the twentieth century; 2) transnational 
theological development in the form of a renewed movement for inter-sectarian 
rapprochement; and 3) the rise of a Shiite communist movement in the context of 
broader Iraqi interest in communism. It is through this exploration of a specific thinker 
and his community that the cultural influences and political economy that gave rise to 
Islamic economics is made legible. Following a brief biography of al-Sadr, this chapter 
seeks answers to the following: What led Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a Shiite marjaʿ165 in 
Najaf in the 1950s and 60s, to think deeply about a viable, practicable Islamic economics? 
In the now autonomous lands (Iraq) of a former empire that had been predominantly 
Hanafi, why would the most rigorous theological and practicable proposition for Islamic 
                                                
165 A marja’ is a title indicating the highest level of Shiite religious authority. All marja’s are 
Grand Ayatollahs and considered sources on Islamic law second only to the Qur’an, 
prophets, and imams in Shi’ism. See, e.g., Robert Gleave, “Conceptions of Authority in 
Iraqi Shi’ism: Baqir al-Hakim, Ha’iri and Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and Marja’iyya.” Theory, 





economics—a proposition that would be implemented by Sunnis and Shia alike by the 
end of the twentieth century—come from a Shiite? In order to answer these questions, 
the development of Islamic economics within this uniquely Shiite matrix is situated 
against and contextualized through a discussion of the regional rise of a truly pan-Islamic 
anti-colonial nationalist movement in the mid-twentieth century. Shiite minority status, 
Shiite intellectual systems, and transnational intellectual exchange were, I argue, 
transformed by simultaneous movements toward both Pan-Islam and intra-Islamic 
rapprochement (tarqrīb) in the mid-twentieth century. Simultaneously, alarm grew in the 
halls of the ancient Shiite schools in Najaf and Karbalah as communism appeared on the 
brink of replacing colonialism in Iraq, even encroaching into their long-held enclaves. As 
Al-Azhar166 sought for pan-Islamic unity in the face of continuing colonization, a Shiite 
movement foregoing quietism was enboldened, born of a firm theological identity and 
leading to a new sectarian approach to politics, statecraft, and, of course, economy.  
 
Al-Sadr: A Short Biography 
Most extant biographical accounts of al-Sadr were written post-mortem, and are 
often more elegiacal than strictly biographical. Scholarly interpretation of such writings, 
which are characterized by lofty language and ascribe unusually saintly qualities to al-
Sadr, is doubly complicated by their relative scarcity; few accessible accounts of al-Sadr 
remain that were written by people who personally knew him during his lifetime.167 Much 
                                                
166 Al-Azhar is the main Sunni theological institution, established during the Fatimid 
Empire in Cairo. 
167 See, e.g., Ghaleb Hasan Abu ‘Ammar, Al-Shahīd al-Sadr Ra’ed Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fil-





of the source material on Al-Sadr’s life and work is thus more properly classified as 
hagiographical, written in the stylized language of Shiite memorials. This leaves the literal 
truth of oft-cited Al-Sadr anecdotes somewhat open-ended; whether he did indeed write 
his first treatise, ostensibly on logic, at the age of eleven,168 or have such a singular 
character that other students felt prompted to imitate his mannerisms,169 is anyone’s 
guess. Regardless, Al-Sadr’s own prolific bibliography stands for itself as a significant 
contribution to Shiite and Western economic thought. The scarce source materials 
themselves, in addition, underscore the difficulty of obtaining information for research on 
Iraq after decades of repressive regimes and wars. 
Following a brief biography of al-Sadr, this chapter explores the broader 
intellectual and cultural milieu in which he was raised. This not only provides context for 
his life and work, helping to fill in some of the pieces missing from biography, but also 
gives us a sense of both the reasons for his unique intellectual and theological 
preoccupations and of the reasons that they were considered relevant outside of his 
narrow clerical circle. A powerful voice in local (Najafi), nation-state (Iraq), transnational 
(Shiite), and regional (Middle East) political, religious, and intellectual thought, al-Sadr’s 
economic beginnings and their broader relevance are introduced here. 
                                                                                                                                            
Characteristics, Causes and Prospects,” Middle East Journal 35:4 (Autumn, 1981), 578 – 
581; Ṣāʼib ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd, al-Shahīd Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr: min fiqh al-aḥkām ilā fiqh al-
naẓarīyāt (Bayrūt : Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li-Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2008); Pierre Martin, 
“Une grande figure de l’islamisme en Irak” Cahiers de l’Orient, 8-9, (1987), 117 – 135; 
Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law. (Cambridge, 1993), 8-15.  
168 al-Ḥamīd, 5. 





Al-Sadr was born 1 March 1935 in Kazimiyya, Iraq, to a well-known family of 
Shi’ite ‘ulamā’. His great-grandfather lived a life that inaugurated several generations of a 
peripatetic and deeply intellectual existence for the al-Sadr family, moving across imperial 
boundaries from Shi’ite center to Shi’ite center.170 Sadr ad-Din al-‘Amili (d. 1847) hailed 
from Ma’raka in Jabal Amil in Southern Lebanon and emigrated to study first to Isfahan 
and then to Najaf, where he died and was buried. Al-Sadr’s grandfather Isma’il was born 
in Isfahan in 1842, and moved to Najaf and then to Samarra’ (Iraq), where he became a 
leader in the local ḥawza. He died in Kazimiyya in 1919.171 Al-Sadr’s father, Haydar, was 
born in Samarra’ in 1891, and studied with the Ayatollah al-Ha’iri al-Yazdi in Karbala. 
Despite the al-Sadr illustrious family pedigree, intellectual lineage, and extensive family 
connections among the international Shi’a elite, the family lacked financial means, and 
Haydar passed away when Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was only a toddler in 1937, leaving 
the family in penury.172  
This combination of transregional religious community connections and extreme 
poverty was formative in al-Sadr’s life and, no doubt, eventually influenced his keen 
interest in the ethics of the relationship between religion and economics. He was raised 
and educated under the supervision of his maternal uncle and eventual father-in-law, 
                                                
170 The transnational nature of the al-Sadr family, and their intellectual and religious 
networks across empires, is representative of elite families in Shi’a religious networks 
generally, a topic which is being explored in greater detail in the academic literature in 
the last decade. See: Elvire Corboz, Guardians of Shi'ism: sacred authority and transnational 
family networks (Edinburgh University Press, 2016); Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia 
politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf (Columbia University Press, 2008). 






Sheikh Murtaza al-Yasin, and his older brother Isma’il, and in 1945 moved with his 
family to Najaf, where he remained until his death.173 His first published work, Fadak fi al- 
Tarikh, emerged in 1955 (when he was only twenty years old), a history of the oasis of 
Fadak— a locus of Shiite religio-historical identity— after the death of the early Islamic 
matriarch Fatima.174 While always a devout and faithful man, al-Sadr’s later work 
signaled a clear broadening from this early propensity toward narrowly Shi’ite theological 
matters and analysis.  
Part of a rising generation of newly politicized Shiite clerics, by the late 1950s al-
Sadr was deeply involved in Iraqi politics. Long associated with the Iraqi Islamic Call 
Party (Ḥizb Al-Daʿwa Al-Islāmiyya, founded 1957), the specifics of his relationship were 
always kept under careful wraps because of the dangers wrought by its criticism of the 
ruling Baath Party.175 Always a proponent of religious foundations in statecraft, al-Sadr 
and his ideas of a theocratic government176 came head-to-head with Saddam’s Ba’athist 
                                                
173 Ibid, 15. 
174 Despite the specifically Shi’a focus of this early work, it is notable as a representation 
of al-Sadr’s overall lifelong intellectual focus to situate Shi’ism historically and to find 
ways to make the transnational Shi’a an extension along an Islamic historical continuum. 
Al-Sadr’s interest in historicizing Shi’ism alone renders him unique. See, e.g., Talib M. 
Aziz, “The Meaning Of History: A Study Of The Views Of Muḥammad Bāqir Al-Ṣadr” 
Islamic Studies, 31: 2 (Summer 1992), 117-140. 
175 See, e.g., Talib M. Aziz, “The Role of Muḥammad Bāqir Al-Ṣadr in Shii Political 
Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (2016), 4 -5. 
Members of the Da’wa stated that al-Sadr was its founder and the architect of its political 
goals and rationale.  
176 Although it far exceeds the scope of this project, it is important to note here that al-





regime throughout the 1970s. By 1980, soon after the successful Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, Saddam came to consider al-Sadr and his anti-regime political activism too 
much of a threat. His Revolutionary Command Council pushed through legislation 
“sentencing all past and present members of the Da’wa party or its affiliated 
organizations, or people working for its goals, to death.”177 In a particularly grisly 
murder, al-Sadr was kidnapped and forced to watch his own sister tortured to death 
before being killed by Saddam’s regime April 5, 1980.178 He was only forty-five years old. 
 
Al-Sadr’s family connections coupled with his intellectual gifts gave him unique 
access to people and positions of influence. The post-WWI British Mandatory 
government over Iraq had nominally ended in 1932, and Al-Sadr’s childhood years saw 
Iraq constantly embroiled in political intrigue and coups d'état—six from 1936 to 1941 
alone. This perpetual instability stirred continuing popular political and religious debate, 
mirroring the broader Arab world after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, regarding 
what form nationalism and the state should take; who should have power; and what role 
religion should play in governance and statecraft.179 Ottoman, Arab, and Iraqi identities 
                                                                                                                                            
Sadr scholar Chibli Mallat has argued persuasively that al-Sadr’s ideas about the nature 
of Islamic government directly inspired Khomeini. See Mallat, Renewal, Chapters 2 -3. 
177 Aziz, “The Role, ” 217.  
178 See, e.g., Sam Dagher, (December 28, 2008), “Ex-Hussein Officials and Others Go on 
Trial,” The New York Times.  
179 See the preceding chapter. For a comparative discussion of Iraqi nationalist 
imaginings versus other former Ottoman areas including Syria and Turkey, see Sami 
Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq.” International Journal of 





competed with ethnic and confessional identities—Yazidi, Kurd, Shia, Sunni—and 
imported Western philosophical and governmental structures in this ideological battle. 
Strong popular distaste for the continuing British presence in Iraq was festering, 
becoming one of the sole political issues around which Iraqis could unify, leading to brief 
Iraqi support of the Axis powers, Britain’s enemies, during WWII (1941). Such self-
interested global power plays would characterize much of the geopolitical strategy of most 
of the countries of the former Ottoman Empire throughout the Cold War. It was in this 
chaotic environment of political uncertainty and competing antithetical ideological 
allegiances that Al-Sadr gained his earliest sense of nation, religious devotion, homeland, 
and identity. Al-Sadr’s work, then, was written in the context of an Iraqi Shi’ite 
intellectual renaissance, and his response, detailed below, to the multiple competing 
ideologies of his time marks him as unique and reflects the growing twentieth century 
evolution of Shiite clerical political activism in the new reality of international nation-
states.180  
As a young man in the late 1950s, still a student and not yet a formal member of 
the Shiite clerical establishment, Al-Sadr used family contacts to rise to prominence in a 
newly-formed (1958) Shiite activist group in Najaf, Jamā’at al-‘ulamā’, whose express goal 
                                                
180 Al-Sadr’s generation and the choice of his compatriots to reject political quietism—
with its attendant mystical Shia implications—is commonly credited with giving rise to 
the Ayatollah Khomeini and other contemporary Shiite forms of Islamic political 
agitation. See Mallat, Renewal, Chapters 2 -3. On Iraqi Shiite clerical quietism, see, e.g., 
Rachel Kantz Feder, “Fatima's Revolutionary Image in ‘Fadak fi al-Tarikh’ (1955): The 
Inception of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's Activism.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 





was to counter antireligious—and specifically communist—influence in society.181 This 
was a rising concern among Iraqi Shiites, as will be shown. Through his father-in-law 
Sheikh Murtaza Al-Yasin and older brother Isma'il Al-Sadr, Baqir Al-Sadr was able to 
regularly write and publish leaflets against communism and socialism, even briefly writing 
weekly anti-communist radio addresses that were broadcast on government radio through 
the permission of the Qasim regime.182 By the late 1950s—the time at which he wrote the 
formative texts of Islamic finance—he had not yet reached marja’ status, though he was 
already well-known and widely respected. 
 
The Shrine Cities: Najaf and Educational Reform 
Alongside the broader national (secular) Iraqi school system, the Shiite 
educational system transformed dramatically throughout the course of the twentieth 
century, having a direct effect on the kinds of information that al-Sadr and his cohort 
could access. As such, a brief introduction to Shiite education is included here.  
Iran and the Persian world have long been the locus and symbol of Shiite identity, 
often eclipsing the Arab Shiite world. Yet, from at least as early as the seventeenth until 
the early twentieth centuries, the shrine cities of Iraq were the center of the Shiism 
intellectually and spiritually for people of all ethnic and regional backgrounds. 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was educated in Najaf, one of the two holy shrine cities (al-
ʿĀtabāt al-muqaddasa, literally “the holy doorsteps”) alongside neighboring Karbala in 
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southern Iraq. Najaf of the 1940s and 1950s provided his formative intellectual 
experiences, in a time and place when Shiite education—and Iraq itself —was in a state 
of intense self-interrogation and transformation.  
The Shiite educational institutions in the shrine cities, called the ḥawzāt ʻilmiyya 
(communities183 of learning), had become the most significant intellectual centers of the 
Shiite world by at least the early nineteenth century. As centers of Islamic learning, the 
ḥawzāt possessed unique attributes relative to their Sunni counterparts. First, Shiite 
theology subscribed to a jurisprudential practice, ijtihād, that had fallen out of fashion by 
the eighteenth century among Sunnis.184 Usually loosely translated as “independent 
reasoning,” ijtihād is a Muslim theological concept defined as “the process by which a 
jurist or Islamic legal scholar formulates a judgment about an issue for which there is no 
                                                
183 Though often translated in this manner, ḥawza literally means “’property,’ ‘possession,’ 
‘area,’ or ‘territory’ and conveys a sense of sanctity, particularly connoting the 
preservation of tradition from outside attack.” See Devin J. Stewart, “Portrayal of an 
Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78.” 
In Linda S. Walbridge, ed. The Most Learned of the Shiʿa. (Oxford University Press: 2001), 
221. 
184 By the eighteenth century the idea that ijtihād was a Shiite practice, long abandoned by 
Sunnis, was commonly held among jurists. This was, in part, due to the severe restrictions 
placed on the practice in the Sunni orthodox schools. By the eleventh century, as Wael 
Hallaq notes, there are many discussions among Sunni scholars about whether mujtahids 
exist. See Hallaq, “On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids 
and the Gate of Ijtihad.” Studia Islamica, 63 (1986), 136-37. The frequent calls from 
Islamic modernists Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Riḍa for a broadened practice of 
ijtihād further demonstrate that it had become a limited endeavor among the Sunni 





clear precedent in the Qur’an or sunna.”185 It is, in essence, a way of determining the 
Divine will through extensive informed research and reasoning. Hashim Kamali explains: 
 
ijtihād is defined as the total of the effort expended by the jurist in order to deduce, 
with a good degree of probability, the rules of the shari’a on the basis of the 
detailed guidance found in the sources.  Some ‘ulamā’ have defined ijtihād as the 
jurist’s use of all his faculties either to deduce the rules of sharia from their sources, 
or to put them into practice and apply them to specific questions. Ijtihād essentially 
consists in a deduction (istinbāt) which represents a probability (zann), and so does 
not include the extraction of a rule from an explicit text.186 
                                                
185 The Muslim belief that the life, teachings, and example of the Prophet Muhammad 
constitute the final and complete model upon which people should shape their lives, 
serves as precursor to the religious concept that innovation of any kind, or bid’a, is 
tantamount to apostasy. For the pious Muslim, daily life must be rooted in the example of 
the life of the Prophet. This has led to a jurisprudential tradition who look to texts 
describing the life and behaviors of the Prophet and his companions as the model for 
pious life. It is for these reasons that so many Muslim writers have continued to return to 
sacred theological tradition and history in order to establish a specifically Muslim 
authenticity or permissibility for modern and imported political and philosophical 
institutions. 
186 Muhammad Hasham Kamili, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, no publication 
information, 366.  Cited in Tariq Ramadan, “Ijtihād and Maslaha: The Foundations of 
Governance,” in Islamic Democratic Discourse, ed. M.A. Muqtedar Khan (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2006), 10. A person who practices ijtihād is called a mujtahid. In both the 
Sunni and Shii traditions, a mujtahid was historically expected to be a righteous, pious 
scholar who was well acquainted with Arabic, his respective jurisprudential traditions 
(Sunni or Shiite), the foundational texts of Islam, and the relevant issues of his day. (Male 
pronouns are used intentionally here; there had been very few mujtahidas throughout 
Islamic history, though more have come from the Shiite tradition than the Sunni 
tradition.)  During the early centuries of Islam the practice of ijtihād by learned mujtahids 






Since ijtihād was contested, Sunni clerics sought other means of determining right 
conduct.187 Shiites, on the other hand, continued in the belief that individuals could attain 
the level of knowledge and training necessary to derive Islamic law through reasoning. 
Unlike Sunnis, they had a longstanding and robust tradition of practitioners of ijtihād, or 
mujtahids, leading to an evolving theology and an intellectual culture that allowed for 
flexibility in the embrace of modernity while simultaneously prizing the close parsing of 
new intellectual currents.  
                                                                                                                                            
Foundations of Governance,” in Islamic Democratic Discourse, ed. M.A. Muqtedar Khan 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 14 
187 These include the concept of ijmāʿ (consensus), which arose from a famous hadith 
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad: “My community will never agree upon an error.”  
The interpretation and application of ijmāʿ remain a matter of debate, hinging largely 
around the issue of how “community” is defined.  Some argue that this refers to the entire 
community of Muslims and that, for example, this statement is thereby a clear precedent 
for Muslim democracy. Historically, however, the term “community” has more often 
been limited to the community of legal scholars associated with the schools of 
jurisprudence, or ʿulamāʾ (learned ones, singular ʿālim). It should be noted that there is no 
formal hierarchy of religious or what we may call “scholastic” authority within Sunni 
Islam; thus someone was an ʿālim largely because he (all uses of the male pronoun are 
deliberate and conscious in this section) both claimed to be one and was recognized as 
one by others.  Furthermore, the “schools” (madhāhib) are not formal educational 
institutions as such.  They may be more clearly conceptualized as “schools of thought.” 
See, e.g., Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia 





The Shiite approach to ijtihād shaped a system of learning and certification in the 
ḥawzāt that was distinct from Sunni counterparts:188 The curriculum in the ḥawzāt in the 
ʿAtabāt was constructed around the charismatic leadership of individual mujtahids. This 
led to a structure, preserved from the medieval period, in which the curriculum -- such as 
it existed at all -- was passed down by tradition and custom as opposed to being 
developed through a formal decision-making body.189 Students were allowed to choose 
their own topics of study and length of study, with essentially no formal institutional 
oversight. The mujtahids themselves were the central and defining focus of the 
                                                
188 Nevertheless, these systems were not entirely different; the ḥawzāt were modeled on the 
Sunni madrasa system in terms of “the mode of teaching, the process of professionalization 
and the centrality of patronage as a social bond.” Litvak, Meir. “Madrasa and Learning 
in Nineteenth-Century Najaf and Karbalā'.” In Ende, Werner and Rainer Brunner, eds. 
The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political Culture (Leiden, Brill: 2001), 58.  
189 The origins of the curriculum of the ʿAtabāt are a matter of historical debate. What is 
known is that, by the eighteenth century, a three-staged Shii curriculum had been 
implemented. Like their Sunni counterparts, by whom they were heavily influenced, Shiis 
taught subjects divided into two broad categories: “transmitted sciences” (‘ulūm naqliyya) 
and “rational sciences” (‘ulūm ‘aqliyya). The specifically Shii element of their curriculum 
was centered upon jurisprudence (fiqh). Of the three uniquely Shii stages, first came the 
preliminaries, in which students were taught Arabic grammar and introduced to the 
jurisprudential traditions. The second stage, sutuh, continued with the study of uṣūl al-fiqh 
(principles of jurisprudence). The final stage was the dars al-kharij (from dars kharīj al-kitaab, 
a reference to the lack of specific book chosen for study). Students were allowed to study 
under senior mujtahids on “topics in uṣūl al-fiqh of their own choice,” with the end goal of 





community—it was they who received funding, not the institutions; individual students 
were “disciples of specific mujtahid, and not of the madrasa” in and of itself.190  
Education in the ḥawzāt was further characterized by a heavy emphasis on oral 
recitation and memorization, and students were encouraged to engage in debate as a 
demonstration of intellectual prowess and breadth of learning. Because of the Shii 
emphasis on ijtihād, these debates held greater prominence than in Sunni schools; 
independent thought was esteemed over rote memorization of fiqh. Students were allowed 
to challenge their teachers’ ideas—though not their status or achievements—and these 
disputes, often public, established informal social  (and religious) hierarchies.191  
Finally, though Sunni theology was not the focus of the Shiite curriculum, Shii 
scholars of the nineteenth century were often well-informed of Sunni teachings, itself “a 
common phenomenon among minorities, who perceive themselves as waging an 
ideological struggle against the dominant and oppressive majority.”192 This tradition of 
charismatic leadership, theological flexibility, and acute awareness of the intellectual 
currents of the outside world, were each to have profound impact on Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr’s cohort in the ḥawzāt, as we shall see. 
 
 
Educational Transformation, the Nahḍa and the Shii Transnational 
Unlike the Sunni traditional schools, by the twentieth century Shiite schools were 
bastions of modern, reformist thought as much as traditional centers. In addition, Shiites 
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were deeply attuned to surrounding ideas, not only of their co-religionists abroad, but of 
their fellow countrymen. Michelle Browers explains:  
 
While we should not be surprised to find such similar developments among Sunni 
and Shii intellectuals in Arab contexts, it is somewhat surprising to find [modern 
and reformist] ideas developing within the traditional religious institution of the 
ḥawza (the Ikhwan did not develop out of al-Azhar, for example)193. […] English 
language scholarship on modern Arab political thought gives less attention to 
these parallels than those Shii individuals who express them in their attempt to 
forge movements aimed at reform, modernization, and revolution. […] These 
were not isolated individuals, working on the margins of Arab political thought. 
Rather, these individuals were aware of, familiar with, and fully engaged in, 
debates taking place in intellectual circles outside the ḥawza.194  
 
 
As a minority sect concentrated in several far-flung urban hubs, Shiites developed strong 
transnational networks of intellectual and cultural exchange. Iraqi Shiites in the shrine 
cities experienced the nahḍa, or Arab intellectual renaissance, alongside their Sunni and 
Christian Arab counterparts in Lebanon and Cairo. At the turn of the twentieth century 
“students and ʿulamā in the shrine cities were not unfamiliar with ideas of patriotism 
toward one’s country (waṭan) as distinguished from the Muslim believer’s responsibility 
toward the Islamic nation (umma), the importance of Shi’i-Sunni unity in the face of 
European expansion, and the need to revive Islam and reconcile it with modernity.”195 
Shiite students in the shrine cities encountered these ideas by reading the works of Islamic 
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modernists, including Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī, Jamāl Al-Dīn Al-Afghani, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, 
and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā. Significantly, these concepts “developed a life of their own 
[in the shrine cities] as students andʿulamā received them with little or no regard to their 
authors.”196 Islam broadly conceived—rather than its sectarian differences—was a 
powerful unifier as clerics confronted modernity. Still, Shiite publications that explored 
these ideas did not begin to appear until after the Young Turk Constitutional Revolution 
of 1908 and the lifting of the Ottoman ban on such publications and political 
associations.197 This lack of concern for sectarian difference was significant, as we shall see 
later in this chapter. 
The Young Turk Revolution transformed Iraqi public education and the Iraqi 
public sphere. Secular education was introduced throughout Iraq, in both Sunni and Shii 
areas. By 1909 two public schools had opened in Najaf, al-Madrasah al-‘Alawīya and al-
Madrasah al-Murtadawīya, both of them supported by influential Shiite clerics,198 and both 
teaching mathematics, English and French as part of the curriculum.199 At the same time, 
the literary life of the city expanded, with journals imported from Turkey, Iran, Egypt, 
and India. As early as 1911, an estimated fifty to one hundred journals arrived in Najaf’s 
libraries every week, including the major Arabic nahḍawi publications al-Manār, al-
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Muqaṭṭam, al-Muqtaṭaf, al-Hilal, al-Muqtabas, and the Persian journal al-Habl al-Matin.200 
Soon Najaf founded its own Arabic magazine, al-‘Ilm – the first Shiite Arabic magazine 
published from Iraq, and only the second Shiite Arabic magazine of its kind after al-‘Irfān, 
which was published out of Sidon, Lebanon.201 By the 1920s, the major periodicals Al-
Hilāl, Al-Thaqāfah, Al-Risālah, Al-ʿUsu ̣̄r and Al-Siyāsah Al-Usbūʿiyah were available in the 
Najafi book market, in addition to the works of transformative twentieth-century 
luminaries such as Ṭāhā Ḥusayn.202 
But educational reform was not a limited or specifically Iraqi national issue, 
though it was both of these.203 It was an extension of the broader issues faced by Shiites 
since the (largely Sunni) nahḍa and the rise of Islamic modernism. As centers of the Shiite 
world, Najaf and Karbala were the intellectual training ground and literal crossroads of 
Shiis from throughout the former Ottoman and Qajar Empires. Educational reform, and 
the implications of what it would mean for Shiite identity in a world of changing politics, 
was truly transnational. 
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intellectual debate and exchange between prominent Shiite thinkers. 
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In an important paper, Sabrina Mervin traces the transnational beginnings of the 
movement for educational reform in the shrine cities through an examination of the 
clerical movement in Jabal ‘Amil, a small Shiite enclave in Lebanon. Beginning in 1909, 
the first critique of the Najaf system of higher education appeared in al-‘Irfān, the 
aforementioned Shiite magazine edited and published in Sidon, Lebanon.204 The initials 
of Sadr al-Din al-Sadr—Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s paternal uncle—accompany the 
article, titled “Naẓra fī al-madāris al-dīniyya” (“A Consideration of the Religious 
Schools”).205 In it the elder al-Sadr criticizes the lack of formalization and regularization 
in the curriculum of the shrine schools. He further decries the culture of competition 
between mujtahids vying for marjaʿ status, indicating the depth of his critique of the overall 
system.206  
From then on, advocacy for educational reform continued to bubble up in Shiite 
publications, much of it written by Lebanese clerics who had been educated in Iraq and 
had an investment in returning to Lebanon as part of the movement to revive Shii 
education there.207 By the 1920s, two such clerics mounted a systematic critique of the 
religious education of the shrine cities: Muhsin Al-Amīn (1867 – 1952) and Muḥsin 
Sharāra (1901 – 1946). Al-Amīn argued that the traditional freedom of the students to 
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choose their own professors, subjects, schedule, and level of courses created disarray 
(fawḍa).208 Arguing for greater curricular regulation, he focused on a change in student 
manuals. This call, far from inciting controversy, was largely ignored.209 
Sharāra, a much younger cleric, was one of several children of prominent families 
of Jabal ‘Amil who were studying in Najaf. Like the previous thinkers, he publicly 
supported altering the curriculum, personally studying English and mathematics 
alongside the traditional Shiite course of study.  In 1925 he and several fellow students 
joined with some Iraqis to form an association, al-Shabība al-‘āmiliyya al-najafiyya (ʿĀmilī – 
Najafī Youth) that called for an embrace of modernity and the inclusion of new literature 
in the curriculum.210 Of significance, as we shall see, several of these men would later 
“remove the turban,” becoming avowed communists.211 
In 1928, Sharāra published three articles in al-‘Irfān, calling for a Shiite 
Muhammad ‘Abduh to come transform the Najafi educational system.212 This overhaul 
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210 Among the members of the group were ʿAlī al-Zayn, Hāshim al-Amīn, Muḥammad 
Sharāra, and the Iraqis Abd al-Razzāq Muḥyī al-Dīn, Ṣāliḥ al-Jaʿfarī Āl Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, 
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211 Ibid. See also Mervin, Un reformisme chiite, chapter V. 
212 al-ʿIrfān 16:1 (August 1928), 95 – 100; 16:2 (September 1928), 201 – 207, and 16:3 
(October 1928), 331 – 337. His call was explicit and controversial, seeking educational 
reform in line with what had been done at al-Azhar under the direction of ‘Abduh, 
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was to include “modern sciences like sociology, psychology, foreign languages, and the 
comparative study of religion.”213 His call led to a significant public debate among clerics 
in the pages of al-‘Irfān. Yet only ten years later ʿAlī al-Zayn issued a comparable call for 
reform—a call for full reorganization of the curriculum, the religious institution, and the 
surrounding cultural life of Najaf with the express goal of mirroring Al-Azhar—and this 
call met with minimal outcry.214 Through transnational networks, dialogue and 
intellectual exchange led to the acceptability of educational change.215 And, as noted later 
in the chapter, the idea of modeling that change on a Sunni reformist template was given 
greater credence and support. 
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215 For native Iraqis, the question of Shiite education was part and parcel of the broader 
transformations of Iraqi society in the 1930s. Formal political independence and the 
establishment of the Iraqi monarchy in 1932 brought the urgency of the Shiite question 
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By the late 1940s, when Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr had become a student in 
Najaf, sustained critique of the educational institutions had given way to an acceptance of 
Western subjects, enabling him to study Western thought side-by-side with the more 
traditional Shiite curriculum. 
Thus Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s calls for a Shiite Islamic modernism in the form 
of Islamic economics were part of broader intellectual trend within Arab Shiism of his day 
centered in Najaf. Educational transformation—the ability for Shiite ‘ulamā’ to gain a 
systematic education in Islamic and Western intellectual traditions—coupled with the 
influx of nahḍawi publications, led to Shiite proposals of an Islamic reformation, though 
they germinated for several decades before Shiite Islamic modernism came to full fruition. 
True Shiite Islamic reform came late. Mervin has argued that “until 1950 and the 
publication of al-ʿAqaʾid al-imamīyya (The Imami Articles of Faith) in Najaf by the Iraqi 
reformist Muhammad Riḍa al-Muzaffar (d. 1963), no Shii writer had attempted to 
compose a systematic modernist vision of theology similar to Muhammad ’Abduh’s 
Treatise on Divine Unity (Risālat al-tawhīd).”216  
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This question of a Shiite Islamic modernism altered the fabric of twentieth-
century Shiism, as members of the Shiite elite explored questions of science, medicine, 
political philosophy including communism, and other kinds of philosophy (existentialism). 
In doing so, members of the Shiite clerical establishment did not perceive themselves as 
heretical, though they were sometimes accused of being so by co-religionists. Instead, they 
perceived themselves as active participants in a system in which all truth emanated from 
God; as seekers of a divine truth with a divine mandate to explore, understand, and apply 
the new information and philosophies that came their way. 217  
 
 
Financing the Ḥawzāt 
Transnational networks were not the only agents of change in Najaf. The rise of 
nation-states brought with them real and unintended practical changes in the lived 
experience of the clerics who lived there.  Because they were Shii centers in a 
predominantly Sunni area, the shrine cities were traditionally financially independent of 
the state, not “enjoy[ing] government patronage from the Ottomans and Qajars, a fact 
which had an important impact on their internal organization and financial foundations.” 
As such, “unlike many other centers of Islamic learning during the nineteenth century, 
the ḥawzāt in the ʿAtabāt were not subject to governmental pressures to reform and 
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remained largely immune to the growing western challenge in the region effecting their 
internal life.”218  
Throughout the process of educational change, the question of how to properly 
finance the ḥawzāt lingered. Although Shiites had a lengthy tradition of waqf endowments 
comparable to that of the Sunnis, the shrine cities had traditionally retained intellectual 
autonomy by keeping their financing separate from political institutions.219 The political 
independence of the ʿAtabāt meant that they were not supported by waqfs, a matter of 
increasing significance as waqfs were expropriated and diluted of power region-wide, 
including in Iraq, by different nation-state governments throughout the twentieth 
century.  
Financial support instead came from the donations of believers.220 By the early 
twentieth century, the shrine cities were largely supported by bequests and contributions 
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219 See Faleh A. Jabbar, 150; Nakash, 205. 
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from throughout the Shiite world. Just as the educational system was centered upon the 
personality of mujtahids who took student disciples (as opposed to institutions from which 
students matriculated), donations were made to individual mujtahids and not to the ḥawzāt 
as institutions. These donations often came from Shiite rulers, pilgrims, and ‘ulamā’.221 
Foreign donors, particularly from India and Iran, were among the most generous222 and 
by the nineteenth century the shrine cities had developed an economy that revolved 
entirely around donations to powerful mujtahids and payments for on-site religious 
services, including charities223, payments for religious services, and income from 
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Nakash, 205. 
223 Traditionally, mujtahids in the shrine cities had been paid through a variety of religious 
payments separate from the standard Muslim religious duty of charity (zakat), including, 
among others, the khums (from “fifth), traditionally “half of a fifth” of a pious Shiite’s net 
income. These religious payments included several types. Under the first type there were 
two obligatory payments, the saḥm al-imam (“share of the imam”), or “half of a fifth (khums) 
of a believer’s net income”; and the radd al-mazalim, a fee for “absolution payment for 
oppressive wrongdoing,” which included “the acceptance of government employment, 
which for a strict Shii was unlawful.” Under the second type, there were three types of 
voluntary charity, including haqq al-wasiya, or one-third of the heritable property of a 
deceased believer; sawm wa-salat, a fee paid to observe prayers and fasting for deceased 
Shia; and finally money “vowed to leading mujtahids in return for recovery from sickness 
or extrication from danger.” Finally, there were donations directly to the shrines 





pilgrimage and rites relating to the dead.224 These donations “also fostered structures of 
patronage, affected the position of the supreme mujtahid, and enhanced the power of the 
mujtahids vis-à-vis the Iranian and Ottoman governments.”225 Powerful mujtahids were thus 
the de facto rulers of the cities, and the local economy— including the ḥawzāt— relied on 
their charisma and religious standing for their support.   
Twentieth century Iraqi independence and the rise of the modern system of 
nation-states undercut the balance of this economic system. Jabal ‘Amil became part of 
the Lebanese state, increasingly embroiled in its own local politics. Qajar Iran gave way 
to the modern Iranian state, and with the shifting borders came shifts in identity, ethnic 
and national, and attendant focus on local, intra-nation state investment and donations.  
More local opportunities for education in Lebanon as well as a broad shift in educational 
structure region-wide further altered the stability of finance. No longer directly in contact 
with transnational Shiite flows of people and patronage, the shrine cities struggled to 
offset their revenue stream losses with donations from within Iraq. Najaf and Karbala 
were never able to recover fully financially from the Ottoman collapse and the rise of 
nation-states, a fact that had far-reaching influence upon the thinking and lived 
experience of Shiite mujtahids, including Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in the following 
decades.  
The presence of the independent ʿAtabāt in southern Iraq had long been a matter 
of concern for political elites, first for the Sunni Ottoman government, and later for the 
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Sunni Iraqi monarchy out of Baghdad. Perceived as a possible fifth column because of 
their religious status, wealth, and political independence, the leaders of the ḥawzāt were 
treated with distrust. Rather than seeking alliances, the Ottomans and later the Iraqi 
monarchy had acted to weaken and limit their power and influence.226 Over time, local 
Iraqi governmental interference from the British and decisions from abroad from the 
Iranians led to a dramatic decline in khums, a form of tithe, flowing into the pockets of the 
shrine city mujtahids, each a result of changing political borders and growing nation states. 
For example, upon coming to power in Iran, Reza Shah (ruled 1925-1941) sought to 
bolster Shiite communities within his own borders, immediately implementing a policy 
that diverted Iranian charitable funds from the shrine cities to the Iranian city of 
Mashhad. The effects were felt in Najaf and Karbala almost immediately.227  Thus the 
modern nation state posed a serious existential challenge to long-established Shiite 
tradition. 
But a drop in transnational patronage was not the only reason that the economy 
of the ḥawza in Najaf took a downturn in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Unlike urban educational centers in Iran, the Shii clerical class of the Iraqi shrine cities 
was not economically well integrated with the mercantile class. Whereas bazaar 
merchants in Iranian cities often received a religious education and were socially (and 
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economically) rewarded for demonstrations of piety, creating a close and mutually 
supportive network of ‘ulamā’ and merchant class, no such thing existed in Najaf.228 The 
mutual economic integration that could have buttressed and fortified the city during 
moments of economic downturn had never developed between the ḥawza and the 
surrounding Najafi marketplace. This was in large part because, particularly in Baghdad 
and surrounding areas, the merchant class was predominantly comprised of Iraqi Arab 
Jews.229 By the time of the Iraqi Jewish exodus in the 1940s and 1950s, few Shiites had 
operated in the bazaar. The concerns wrought by poverty— a result of dramatic systemic 
change in previously well-established forms of financing the shrine cities— were not mere 
abstractions, but the lived reality of Shiite hierarchy. 
While the financial well being of the ʿAtabāt was in question, the transnational 
networks of intellectual exchange that had existed for centuries did not die out. Shiism 
was in the midst of its own nahḍa, with significant modern ideas circulating throughout the 
Shiite world in the form of peripatetic thinkers and clerics.  
In this way the educational debates and transformations in the shrine cities were 
the intellectual heart and staging ground of much broader changes in the Shiite world, 
each wrought by the nahḍa and the winding down of colonial influence region-wide. 
Throughout the interwar years as the British and French began to draw back, the rising 
generation of Shiites responded to the influx of new ideas through experimentation, with 
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prominent thinkers adopting and discarding ideologies in an atmosphere of often heady 
and heated public exchange.230  
For the purposes of this project, two of these responses will be briefly examined: 
the rise of a transnational Sunni-Shiite movement toward taqrīb, or religious 
rapprochement, and the transnational rise of a Shiite communist movement. Both of 
these movements were center stage during Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr formative 
educational years in Najaf, and both powerfully influenced his concept of an Islamic 
economics. 
 
Taqrīb and Transnational Rapprochement 
A little-studied231 movement in Middle East history was pivotal in laying the 
theological, intellectual, and political groundwork for a future viable Islamic economics, 
an outgrowth of broader Pan-Islamic sentiments that percolated region-wide between the 
two World Wars. This was a resurgence of calls for taqrīb,232 or Shiite-Sunni 
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rapprochement. In the twentieth century, taqrīb gained momentum through the Islamic 
modernist movement (described in Chapter One), spearheaded by Muḥammad ‘Abduh 
and continued through Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā. Although both of these Sunni Azharite 
scholars were intensely and openly critical of Shiism writ large, they were also deeply 
invested in an ecumenical, conciliatory Islam that would unite the peoples of the Middle 
East politically, socially, and religiously. This vision was shared by Shiite scholars, and 
gained traction among religious leaders in Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq throughout the 
interwar years, leading to the formation of ecumenical societies like Jamā’at al-Taqrīb and, 
by the 1940s, regular calls for Sunni and Shii clerics to promote that vision.  
Though a devout Shiite all his life, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr reached adulthood 
in this climate of calls for universalism and reconciliation. Taqrīb and the sentiment of 
rapprochement that it engendered shaped al-Sadr’s highly universalistic approach as an 
early progenitor and proponent of Islamic economics (described in Chapter Three). Until 
today, the Shii-Sunni controversies that have embroiled the region are notably absent in 
Islamic economics as it is has come to be practiced, and most current financial institutions 
have developed to provide their customers with a plurality of Islamic religious opinions 
from multiple clerics on “sharīʿah boards.”233 
A sporadic cycle of taqrīb movements has existed in Islamic history from at least 
the time that Sunnis and Shiites began to conceptualize themselves as separate sects— 
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 rather than as community members with different opinions— several centuries after they 
split.234 But first, in order to understand the nature of rapprochement, it is first necessary 
to review briefly the nature of the divide.  
By the late eleventh century CE, Sunni jurists had positioned themselves as “the 
foremost religious authorities in Islam,” having established institutions that came to be 
known as the orthodox Islamic schools (maḏhabs) of law.235 In achieving orthodox 
ascendancy over the various competing ideological currents among the faithful, these 
schools—the Ḥanbalī, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī maḏhabs, each named for a pious 
jurist—had enshrined a system of sanctioned orthodox Islamic pluralism: Recognizing the 
frailty of humanity and the impossibility of ever truly knowing the will of the Divine, each 
school accepted each other’s rulings as valid and sufficiently orthodox.236 This mutually 
accepting orthodoxy exists to this day. 
As part of formalizing orthodoxy, the maḏhab system was designed “to exclude 
other claimants to religious authority,” 237 sidelining political leaders (caliphs), 
                                                
234 Though our current vantage point in history encourages us to pinpoint the Sunni-Shii 
split at its earliest manifestations, Sunnis and Shia themselves did not evolve to consider 
themselves unique sects for several centuries. See, e.g., Stewart, Devin J. Islamic Legal 
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philosophical theologians (as opposed to jurisprudentially-focused traditionalists), and—
most important for our purposes—groups with a historical disagreement over the 
imamate, such as the Twelver Shiites who would eventually predominate in Najaf and 
Karbala.238 Theologians with philosophical differences from the traditionalist schools239 
and Shiites were soon obligated to fall in line in order to gain credibility or left to exist 
outside of legitimized religious authority. Such were the earliest seeds of much later 
bastions of Islamic orthodoxy, including the physical training ground of Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo where luminaries such as Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍa 
received their training. 
The Sunni system and its theological boundaries were bound up in the 
development of Shiism. Though the Shiites did not simply reduplicate the Sunni system 
in their own orthodox traditions, “it is nevertheless clear that the parameters set by the 
Sunni legal maḏhabs guided the Shiites’ formulation and implementation of their views 
concerning the elaboration of Islamic law.”240 Theirs was a structure of defensive 
response; of self-assertion against claims of heterodoxy, or worse, heresy. As outsiders 
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seeking recognition and validity, in the early tenth century a group of Twelver Shiites 
“created a Shiite tradition of legal study within the Shāfiʿī maḏhab” which lasted through 
the modern period into the nineteenth century.241 Not only were Twelver Shii scholars 
“passing” as Sunnis, but this was “not a temporary, ad hoc, measure; for many of the 
participants in the tradition it involved years of study, teaching, and writing as 
Shāfiʿīs.”242 A second strategy to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the Sunni maḏhabs was to argue 
that the principle of consensus (ijmāʿ) – the concept that agreement on a course of action 
among a group of pious, educated theologians was enough to establish the relative piety 
of said act – also applied to Shiites.243 This argument was, in essence, that Twelver Shiites 
themselves are a fifth maḏhab who deserve legitimacy through orthodox recognition.244  
By the nineteenth century, this long legacy of Shii-Sunni division and debate had 
become entrenched. As a minority sect, Shiites developed a variety of survival tactics, 
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including “political quietism,”245 or avoiding political engagement for safety or for 
theological purity, and taqīyyah, or religiously justified dissimulation about religious 
belief.246 At the same time, among the learned, Shiite contributions to the development of 
orthodox (Shāfiʿī) legal interpretation were undeniable, and as noted, Shiites had long 
accepted Sunni methodologies for establishing orthodoxy. These issues were likely 
instrumental in the choice of famed nineteenth-century peripatetic Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani - mentor of Muḥammad ‘Abduh and, alongside him, progenitor of Islamic 
modernism - to dissemble about his own Iranian Shiite origins, leading him instead to 
claim Sunni (Ḥanafī) Afghan as his birthplace.247  
 
Al-Afghani had an undeniable influence on ‘Abduh’s Pan-Islamic and ecumenical 
tendencies.248 When each was expelled from Egypt for a brief time in 1884, they met and 
worked together in Paris, producing the short-lived journal Al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā (“the 
firmest bond,” a Qur’anic allusion) with Islamic unity its driving theme. Still, these early 
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conversations about Pan-Islamic unity, broadly conceived, typically used the Islamic 
terms ittiḥād (oneness, togetherness) or waḥda islāmiyya (Islamic oneness). Taqrīb, on the 
other hand, was reserved for Sunni-Shii rapprochement. 249 
As noted in Chapter One, Pan-Islamic unity in the interest of combatting 
colonialism animated much of ‘Abduh and his disciple Riḍa’s Islamist modernist work 
after ‘Abduh’s return to Cairo in 1888. It further characterized much of their intellectual 
contributions to the rising Salafi movement. In turn, Salafism created an opening for a 
popular discussion of taqrīb among Sunnis. “Salafism” arose within Sunni Islam, its name 
derived from a hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. The Arabic “al-Salaf al-
Ṣāliḥ” (“pious predecessors”), from which Salafi is derived, refers to the most righteous, 
early Muslims of the first three generations after Muhammad. In keeping with this title, 
Salafis seek to return to the religion’s earliest, pre-sectarian practices, and advocate 
Islamic revival and reform through adapting Islamic law and jurisprudence to the 
conditions of modern life. Largely uninterested in the Sunni jurisprudential schools, 
Salafis instead advocate the practice of ijtihād in order to derive right Islamic practice, 
thus—however unintentionally—bridging the divide between the sects. Along with ijtihād, 
Salafis support issuing legal rulings (fatwas) on dilemmas of the day as their primary means 
of determining right practice.250 This transformation of tradition within popular Sunnism 
was supported by Cairo Mufti ‘Abduh and his disciple Riḍa, whose long-published 
periodical al-Manār— a journal expressly founded as an extension of Al-ʿUrwa al-
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wuthqā251—is filled with their fatwas.252 Significantly, by the early 1900s, Riḍa’s fatwas in 
al-Manār regularly addressed questions of Shii-Sunni relations, often emphasizing 
brotherhood across sectarian lines.253  
Although not always conciliatory, conversations among Sunni and Shii elites 
about the principle of Islamic unity— largely driven by Sunnis in the interest of a future 
political Pan-Islamism— continued throughout the early decades of the twentieth 
century, gaining significant ground with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924.254 By 
1931, for example, the Jerusalem General Islamic Conference (al-mu’tamar al-islāmī al-
‘āmm), a meeting with one hundred fifty delegates from twenty countries on Pan-Islamic 
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cooperation, included a strong Shiite showing and an explicit call for common ground on 
the part of both a Shiite cleric and Riḍa himself.255  
Yet the majority of these conversations were centered on political unity rather 
than theological reconciliation. Nevertheless, between the strong interest in a post-
Ottoman Pan-Islamic unity and the theological changes wrought by ‘Abduh and Riḍa, 
the ground had been softened. The first known explicit call in the twentieth century for 
full rapprochement— rather than Pan-Islamic cooperation— came from a Shiite Iranian 
cleric, Muhammad Taqi al-Qummi (d. 1990) who traveled to Cairo in 1946, intent on 
establishing an organization that would resolve the sectarian divide. 256 Qummi was both 
dogged and persuasive, quickly gaining the support of the rector of al-Azhar, Mustafa 
Abd-al Raziq,257 a support that continued on after Raziq’s death in 1948 with the 
following two rectors, ‛Abd al-Majid Salim (d. 1954) and Mahmud Shaltūt (d. 1963).258 
Shiite interest and support was swift as well: in 1947, Damascus-based scholar Sulayman 
Ẓahir published in al-‘Irfān, urging Muslim support of the movement and its broader 
goals.259 Meeting for the first time in Cairo in January 1947,260 the Jamā’at al-Taqrīb 
(“Society for Rapprochement,”) was comprised of representatives from throughout the 
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lands of the former Ottoman Empire, united by a vision of a true and lasting 
reconciliation between Cairo’s Al-Azhar, bastion of Sunni orthodoxy, and the dominant 
Shiite schools.261 Theologically and politically, the Jamā’at al-Taqrīb wished to do for the 
broader Muslim world what had been done within the formative years of Sunni 
orthodoxy: to create a mutually accepting and supportive space for orthodox theological 
difference.  
In order to achieve their aims, the group mirrored other advocacy groups of their 
day, publishing books and newspapers, utilizing lectures and radio broadcasts, and calling 
for both the regular convocation of Pan-Islamic conferences and the “uniform teaching of 
all Islamic schools [maḏhabs] in Islamic universities.”262 By 1949 they had established a 
journal, Risalāt al-Islām, to broadcast their message, usually publishing on areas of 
common theological ground between Sunnis and Shiis.263 Aware of the minimal holdings 
on Shiite topics in Al-Azhar’s libraries, they further established a public institute to collect 
and house information on rapprochement, including all of the different Islamic schools of 
thought, Dār al-taqrīb bayn al-madhāhib al-islāmiyya (House of Rapprochement Between the 
Islamic Schools).264 Soon Dār al-taqrīb became a place for Shiite scholars and politicians to 
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visit in Cairo, among them Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and Pakistani 
Minister of Education Fazlur Rahman in 1951.265 
Jamā’at al-Taqrīb had a particular appeal among Salafists and Pan-Islamists. Its 
president, Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Alluba Pasha, had been treasurer of the 1931 Pan-Arab 
Jerusalem Congress and had extensive Salafi contacts, including Muslim Brotherhood 
founder Hassan al-Banna. Salafi focus on returning to the earliest Islamic traditions to 
find precedent for right living, their related lack of interest in the Sunni orthodox schools, 
and their acceptance and promotion of ijtihād (as noted, popularly considered a Shiite 
practice), made them uniquely accepting of the notion of inter-sectarian rapprochement. 
For those, like al-Banna and Alluba, who deeply distrusted the West and believed in Pan-
Islamic unity, reconciliation was a natural cause to take up. Well known for his interest in 
Islamic unity, al-Banna was by all accounts interested in and supportive of Jamā’at al-
Taqrīb’s endeavor, though he died shortly after its founding.266  
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Though possessed of an active Sunni Salafi base, the Jamā’at al-Taqrīb’s 
publications mirrored early Shiite strategies for orthodox inclusion. For example, Rector 
Mahmud Shaltut regularly called its participant groups maḏhabs in his writings.267 Their 
primary organ, Risalāt al-Islām, was published for seventeen years (until 1966) focused on 
building upon points of inclusion and commonality, eschewing controversy by publishing 
articles about similarities between the two sects. 
The Jamā’at al-Taqrīb had real and lasting influence, indicating increased ties 
between Al-Azhar and Najaf. In February 1959, Rector Shaltūt issued a fatwa in the 
official review of the University, formally authorizing the teaching of Shii jurisprudence 
there for the first time in over nine hundred years.268 Entitled “Islam, Religion of Unity,” 
the fatwa utilized arguments common to the RI, citing the pluralism of early Islam and 
the importance of ijtihād for collective decision-making while denouncing bigotry and 
prejudice against the Shiites.269 This educational transformation, significant in and of 
itself, was also political, a response to the July Revolution in Iraq. Shaltūt was extending a 
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branch of Azharite support to the Iraqi Shiite ‘ulamā’ who were increasingly concerned 
about new Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim’s relationship with Shiiite communists. That same 
year Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Hakīm issued his own fatwa to his Shiite countrymen, stating 
on no uncertain terms that communism was heresy.270 Though Qasim would shortly 
change his mind about partnering with the communists, the religious lines had been 
drawn across national boundaries. As stated by Sagi Polka, “Before long, al-Azhar and 
the Shiites found themselves in cahoots against the new regime in Iraq.”271 This religious 
concern with communism was center stage in Iraq, as we shall see shortly.  
 
Thus, though never a large movement, the Jamā’at al-Taqrīb was representative of 
a renewed twentieth-century venture in theological thought and inter-sectarian dialogue, 
first opened in the Sunni world by ‘Abduh and Riḍa’s calls for Islamic reform and 
deepened by their openness to ijtihād.272 Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was never directly 
involved with the Jamā’at al-Taqrīb, but, as a topic in transnational Shiite periodicals and 
international discussion, it would hardly have been unknown among the tight 
transnational networks that comprised his circle. The idea of an active and evolving 
theological rapprochement, when combined with the Shiite reformation within Najaf and 
considered alongside regional calls for Pan-Islamic political unification, would have 
naturally created a heady climate of intellectual and theological possibility right at the 
cusp of Iraq’s 1958 Revolution. This was all to have a powerful effect on al-Sadr, and a 
direct effect on the tone of his economic writings.  
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Iraqi Communism and Al-Sadr 
In the thought of al-Sadr, Islamic economics was conceived in large part as a 
response to the rise of communism as an ideology and as a movement, both in the Shiite 
circles he inhabited and in the region as a whole. A brief introduction to the rise of 
communism in Iraqi Shiite circles is offered here in order to provide context for the later, 
deeper analysis of anti-communist decolonialist narratives in Iqtiṣādunā, explored in the 
next chapter.  
The twentieth-century rise of communist movements throughout the lands of the 
former Ottoman Empire has been well documented in the literature.273 In response to 
broader challenges of social justice, freedom, sovereignty, and a stable and inclusive 
cultural orientation, Sunnis and Shiis alike experimented with political philosophies in the 
process of forming national identities.274 A detailed examination of the rise of 
communism would exceed the parameters of this project. Nevertheless, while this section 
limits its focus to Iraq and those who were members of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s 
generational cohort, it must be remembered that these individuals were responding to 
ideas and movements on the local (Najaf), national (Iraq), transnational (intra-Shiite), and 
international (global) stages. Shiites in particular, as a minority sect, had a legacy of being 
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closely attuned to the ideas of the majority Sunnis, and this tendency extended to their 
close attunement to Enlightenment ideas as they were introduced and implemented by 
the colonizers. Iraq as a whole was embroiled in debates about the nature of the polity 
they wished for as the British left their country; questions of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic 
nationalism, Iraqi sovereignty, and socioeconomic philosophies including socialism, 
communism, and capitalism, were part of daily discourse across ethnic lines. Initially held 
in Sunni cafes throughout Mosul and Baghdad, these conversations slowly bled into the 
shrine cities, influencing the political and ultimately theological thought coming from the 
hawzāt. A brief sketch of the rise of communism as both a political orientation and a party 
in Shiite circles is included here to provide context to al-Sadr’s thinking. 
First it must be noted that early Arab communist political parties as a whole took 
their cues only generally from broad Marxist and Leninist philosophy, selectively 
implementing ideas as they focused on building community. Though communism was a 
subject of intense interest from the rising Shii generation, the early twentieth century 
movement was not closely based on its foundational European texts. A primary reason for 
this was the lack of complete and competent translations. Stefan Wild argues that one 
may reasonably assume that in the first decades of the twentieth century there were only 
“single trains of thought, quotes, and buzzwords” (“immer nur einzelne Gedankengänge, 
Zitate, und Schlagworte”) of Marxist original works in Arabic.275  
For example, the earliest known full translation of Marx’s Capital in Arabic 
appeared quite late, published in Egypt in 1947 from translator Rashad Barawi.276 This 
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was likely the translation read by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, since later editions were 
published out of Beirut and Damascus in the 1960s, after Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr had 
begun publishing his critiques of Marxism and communism. These translations of 
communist works contained numerous problems that were common to the time period: 
first, few Arabic-speakers were conversant enough in European languages to render the 
nuances of complex philosophical thought. Barawi, for example, did not have sufficient 
German, instead translating Das Kapital from an intermediary work, the 1886 English 
translation.277 Second, the existing Arabic lexicon struggled to fully capture the new ideas 
flooding in from these European texts. Translators worked to rectify this by inventing new 
words, expanding the Arabic dictionary and effectively transforming the Arabic language 
over the course of a few decades in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
difficulty of rendering ideas across language and culture led to a loss of linguistic subtlety, 
sometimes altering the meaning of important concepts.278 Wild explains, for example, 
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that the distinction between “worker” and “proletariat” was lost from the rallying cry 
“Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!”, which was commonly rendered “Yā ‘ummāl al-
‘ālam ittaḥidū!” —even in later editions.279 Furthermore, commentary and 
contextualization—necessary to properly understand the many European cultural 
references in dense and difficult communist texts—were left out of the Egyptian 
translation of Das Kapital entirely. Without this the many names and cultural references 
would have meant little to the average Arab reader.280  Communist thought and 
communist movements throughout the Arab Middle East, then, should be evaluated not 
in comparison with European movements, but as their own singular and distinctive Arab 
ideal.  
Throughout Iraq, communism was gaining appeal among the rising generation, 
many of them sons of local sayyids. In Najaf this fascination with communism extended 
to the sons of ‘ʿulamāʾ, some of whom were among the “most militant of the Party.”281 
Hanna Batatu, superlative scholar of Iraq, attributes the rising interest in communism 
squarely to the economic troubles facing both the Iraqi countryside and the shrine cities, 
just described.282 Before colonial intervention, land itself was not considered a commodity 
in Iraq, much as it had not been in much of the arid desert lands of the Middle East. 
Instead, what could be grown from the land was valued, and a socioeconomic structure 
                                                                                                                                            
tradition, concern about “foreign borrowings and impositions” (710) and political 
intrigue. See also Wild, 99, 100, 102. 
279 Ibid. 
280 See Wild, 99 – 102. 







developed that valued trade negotiation and loyalties based on kinship, clan, and tribe 
rather than one in which land was strictly apportioned and regulated by law. This 
changed in 1920 with British intervention. By the 1950s, several decades of colonially-
imposed fiscal policies had divided and tethered land to traditional tribal leaders, altering 
the social, political, and economic fabric of Iraq away from nomadic kinship groups, 
making tribal leaders into landowners and offering them representative status in the 
colonially-controlled government based on that status. In this semi-feudal system, poverty 
and corruption were rampant, and traditional ties of kinship and tribe were deliberately 
undermined, leading to the collapse of small-scale, family based subsistence agriculture. 
Resentment brewed among the poor, and tribal leaders who now possessed great power 
in parliament in Baghdad dealt with diminished social and political power in their rural 
homes. The desire to take back rights to the land, and the simple explanation 
communism offered for their suffering, led peasants and impoverished youth alike to take 
up the mantel of communism, however minimally they understood the technicalities of its 
Marxist-Leninist roots. 
In addition to material concerns, scholars Rula Jurdi Abisaab and Malek Abisaab 
argue that Shiite religious tradition itself makes communism a particularly legible and 
integrable political ideology for the faithful. Contending that an interest in communism 
goes even deeper among Shiites than concerns for social justice, communal autonomy, 
and mutual prosperity, they describe an “affinity with Shiite eschatological and doctrinal 
traditions,” explaining that some Shiite “leftists and their sympathizers saw communism 





as a moral system resonating with Shiite emancipatory and spiritual symbolisms.”283 
According to several (mostly unnamed) communist Shiite activists interviewed by the 
Abisaabs, there are several reasons that communism does not feel alien to Shiis, most of 
them centered in eschatology. Shiite tradition holds that the only acceptable form of 
government is under the sovereignty of the restored imamate. All other forms of state rule 
must be rejected or resisted, a teaching that led historically to the dual existence of a 
strong tradition of Shiite political quietism on the one hand, and bloody anti-government 
resistance on the other.284 This concern over right rule was also the direct inspiration for 
both Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s and Ruhollah Khumayni’s concept of the rule of a 
designated jurisconsult, called by Khumayni in Persian “velayet al-faqih,” who acts as pious 
steward of the community until the imam returns to take his place.285 True rule will 
happen, according to Shiite eschatology, after the coming of the Mahdi, a messianic 
figure who returns to establish a righteous utopic order. This ideal, a deeply entrenched 
in Shiite tradition, makes the general principle of revolution leading to idyllic communist 
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egalitarianism familiar and resonant.286 Indeed, communism itself, particularly Marxist 
revolutionary ideals and prescriptions for a resulting egalitarian haven, has strong 
parallels in the eschatology of many religious traditions. 
It is important here to recognize the role of communal solidarity in the rise Shiite 
communism. Most Shiite communists—both in Lebanon and in Iraq—were observant 
and pious or impious to varying degrees, yet the culture of Shiism, including its ritual 
observances, permeated day-to-day life. The holy month of ‘Ashura, for example, is 
observed communally rather than limited to a few self-selected believers, leading 
historically to communists in Iraq competing for the chance to organize ‘Ashura 
parades.287 Though rigorous text-based religious training is limited to pious elites in most 
religious cultures, the popular culture of Shiism was shared by communist, Ba’athist, and 
capitalist, believer and non-believer alike. 
In this way left-leaning Shiite activists could use cultural common ground as a 
means to persuade compatriots to their cause. They did so by imbuing “early pious and 
austere Muslim personalities […] with protosocialist qualities to confirm Islam’s stand 
against the avarice of the ruling elites, their indulgence, and their indifference to the 
welfare of believers.”288 Some leftists argued that the first Shiite Imam, ‘Ali, demonstrated 
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socialist leanings, citing a famous letter in which ‘Ali urged the newly appointed governor 
of Egypt to provide for the people. This letter speaks of governing through consensus by 
ministering to the interests of the many, and of prioritizing “the most comprehensive in 
justice, and the most inclusive of popular contentment, for the discontent of the common 
folk (al-‘amma) undermines the contentment of the elite (al-khassa).” It further discourages 
over-taxing the poor.289  
Thus attraction to communism, especially by impoverished peasants, was 
understandable, particularly in an era in which landed notables and colonizers, whether 
the French in Lebanon or the British in Iraq, had literal monopoly and taxation power. 
For landless Iraqis, communism “promised to resolve problems in labor, land reform, and 
agricultural development in the countryside attributed largely to the landed elites’ 
exploitative practices” while not alienating Shiites from their cultural roots.290 Iraqi Arab 
nationalists were further embittered and disillusioned by the British colonial support of 
Faysal’s Iraqi rule, steering them toward a solution in communism. Intellectuals joined in, 
disappointed in Faysal’s inability to combat British policy, eventually mounting a socialist 
critique of Arab nationalism as a whole. Shiites, always attuned to the intellectual currents 
around them, were at the forefront— Nakash describes the intellectual milieus of Najaf 
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and Karbalah throughout the 1920s, 30s, and 40s as roiling with questions about political 
rule and reform, anticolonial struggle, and national identity.291 
The particular danger to clerics of a popular, local movement that situates 
traditional Shiite teachings as proof-texts of communist legitimacy was palpable in al-
Sadr’s Iraq. As more and more Shiites joined the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), totaling 
42% of its membership in 1951, the clerical class became alarmed: Communism had 
become the largest political party in the Middle East.292 The ICP continued at an 
astonishing growth rate among Iraqis of all sects throughout the 1950s, its records 
showing a strong momentum as the Party jumped from 507 names on the membership 
rolls in 1953 to between 20,000 – 25,000 by 1959.293 Batatu emphasizes further the ICP’s 
palpable power: It could bring people into the streets like no other of political party of its 
time, surpassing even the Ba’athists.294 This power alarmed more than just the clerics, as 
Abd al-Qarim Qasim, newly installed President of Iraq after the Revolution, quickly 
soured on the communists that he had once supported, desiring to curb their influence 
once in office.295 Qasim was all too quick to ally himself with the conservative Najaf 
clerics, both seeking to control the rising Party. By 1960, at the same time that al-Sadr 
was writing Iqtiṣādunā, his then-superior marja’ Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Hakīm declared 
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communism illegal via fatwa,296 simultaneously seeking violent means to put down the 
growing communist movement in the shrine cities.297 
Thus the existence of communism as an ideological enticement that was both 
local and global, both anti-religious specter and on-the-ground political campaign, 
galvanized the increasingly impoverished clerical class of the shrine cities. And all of this 
took place against the backdrop of a much larger Iraqi political transformation, during a 
time period of exceptional political intrigue and regular coups d'état, lending a particular 
urgency to al-Sadr’s response.  
 
A common thread runs through each of the major topics of this chapter: 
transnational networks and the mid-century transformation of Shiite education; the rise of 
a movement for inter-sectarian rapprochement (taqrīb) as a unifying regional force against 
the European colonizers; and the growth of communist parties in Iraq and beyond. Each 
of these came as a response to colonialism and its aftereffects. In one way or another, 
each of these was born of a desire for self-assertion and popular indigenous reclamation 
against the influences of foreign power and foreign ideology. The birth pangs of a climate 
demanding decolonization—both in the sense of literally ridding the region of the 
physical presence of the colonizers, and in the sense of purging the ideological structures 
that the colonizers had implemented—is evident here. Decolonization would not simply 
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be a removal of the interlopers. It would be a confident and consciously constructed new 
Arab world, characterized by intellectual and ideological autonomy and philosophically 
derived from the best of the present and the pre-colonial past. The structures of 
knowledge, power, and wealth—their intellectual and ethical edifices as well as their 
individual leaders and administrators—were the most vital to reclaim. And, as we shall 
see, Islam offered the ready template for reclamation and reinvention. 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was neither the only person to write about the question 
of Islamic economics, nor was he the first. He was, however, the first thinker to 
simultaneously propose the ethical and theological need for a specifically Islamic 
economics and to invent and explore real-world, practicable applications of his idea—or, 
as he would put it, exercise ijtihād in order to discover the Divine will regarding right 
economic practices. His identity as a gifted Arab Shiite from a prominent family, coupled 
with the extraordinary intellectual milieu and epistemic moment in which he lived, 
uniquely positioned him to do this creative work. As a mujtahid participating in a Shiite 
nahḍa and witnessing the widespread appeal of communism among his cohort in Najaf 
even as the shrine cities began to suffer economic collapse, there is little wonder that his 
mind turned to the theological ethics of communism, and to the question of economy as a 
whole. Further, as a cleric with associates who were involved in the movement toward a 
truly pan-Islamic rapprochement at a time of national revolution, it is not surprising that 
he cast his ideological and theological net wide, thinking and writing expansively about 
his role in a world in which Shiism might for the first time not be a persecuted minority. 
Finally, as a cleric writing as the clouds of colonialism dispersed, al-Sadr’s ideas—and the 
many movements to which he was responding— were all undergirded by the memory of 





Thus, alongside colonial penetration, Shiite theological structures were a pivotal 
factor creating the intellectual space for the development of Baqir al-Sadr’s concept of a 
precisely theorized Islamic economics, and Sunni transformation in the form of Islamic 
modernism is what enabled it to be heard. Because of the Najafi legacy of financial and 
intellectual autonomy, Shii clerics were unbeholdened to the practicalities and obligatory 
compromises of national politics. The new, emboldened, non-quietest form of ijtihād that 
Baqir al-Sadr and his cohort practiced was only possible because these men were 
unaccustomed to the realities of political concession in the context of their religious views. 
Even more important, ijtihād itself—accepted by Sunnis as well as Shiis—held the key for 
Baqir al-Sadr to begin to envision an applied Islamic economics in the context of his 
vision of an ideal Islamic society. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, al-Sadr’s Falsafatunā and Iqtiṣadunā, published 
in 1959 and 1961, are remarkably universalistic, citing Sunni scholars as much as Shiites, 
and engaging extensively with secular as well as religious scholarship. When put in the 
broader context of this chapter, these authorial choices are made comprehensible: 
Though al-Sadr was a lifelong Shiite, he was also a cleric attuned to the ideas of his day, 
including the widespread discussion of possible theological rapprochement as a means to 
combat continued colonialism. The religious implications of this rapprochement, 
particularly for a member of a minority sect that had yearned for it for literally centuries, 
cannot be overstated. Perhaps more than Pan-Islamic ideals, taqrīb held out the possibility 
of a truly transformative moment for pious Shiites, including the potentiality of claiming 
their (in their eyes) rightful place as full participants and equals in the Muslim theological 
and political community. Given this climate of ideas, it is clear why a cleric’s mind would 





treatise in the form of traditional Islamic judgments (fatwas), but instead by using his 
diverse education to issue a much more far-reaching call.  
As Baqir al-Sadr took up his pen, he was responding as much to the political 
instability rocking his countrymen as to the crisis of ideology in his inner Shiite circle. His 
response, framed by the theological structures of his faith and written according to the 
dual Western-Islamic intellectual traditions of his education, was not a mere refutation of 
communism as un-Islamic and un-Iraqi. It was, as we shall see in the next chapter, also a 





























Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and the Decolonization 
 of Islamic Economics 
 
“As for the Islamic movement, it lives in the scope of cultural struggle  
more than it does in the field of political struggle...” 
-Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah298 
 
 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was the progenitor and primary intellect behind the 
current field of Islamic economics, constructing the theological framework and 
conceptual underpinnings for the later Arab Islamic financial industry of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This chapter introduces his two works that 
established the field, eventually prompting the development of an entire banking system, 
Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy, 1959) and Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economics, 1961). 
Like its earlier rumblings, Islamic economics emerged in the late 1950s as a 
response to regional transformations, making it an idea that persistently acted as 
microcosm of major Muslim movements in successive Middle Eastern generations. I 
contend here that, more than simply an exercise in ijtihād, al-Sadr’s most famous works 
are best understood and interpreted as a formative contribution to Arab-Muslim and 
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Iraqi decolonization literature, centered upon the goals of social justice, the deracination 
of colonial interventions (communism) and the assertion that Islam, conceived as the 
original culture of the Iraqi past, holds all of the answers to the Iraqi future. While 
Chapter Two focused on the specifically Shiite cultural and intellectual elements 
informing al-Sadr’s economic climate of ideas—including the educational system, the rise 
of communism among Iraqi Shiites, and the transnational movement toward Sunni-Shiite 
rapprochement—here al-Sadr’s thought will be situated further in its national and 
international context. The 1955 Bandung Conference, and Iraq’s participation in and 
perception of it, will set the stage for a close analysis of his first two Islamic economics 
texts as decolonizing propositions. 
As described in Chapter Two, Baqir al-Sadr’s family, colleagues, and cohort had 
witnessed a marked change in their lifetimes: though transnational intellectual exchange 
across Shiite communities continued, the centuries-old tradition of resources—religious 
tithes, offerings, and donations— flooding into the Iraqi shrine cities from Lebanon, Iran, 
and other lands abroad, had dwindled to a trickle. The old religious schools no longer 
held their luster for a people whose economy was reeling from long-term colonial 
occupation; their philosophical and scientific traditions could no longer pass muster when 
compared to the Enlightenment thought being taught in the new Iraqi public schools. 
Communism—particularly Soviet propaganda—became increasingly palatable to a 
desperately poor population even as Soviet consolidation of power caused consternation 








Iraqi Dialectics of Decolonization: Bandung 
In the years leading up to the Iraqi 1958 July Revolution, a global shift in power 
took place. With World War II and its aftermath came a huge drawback in British and 
French colonial occupations worldwide, a winding down of colonial influence that created 
the space for independent local nationalisms to come into fruition. Simultaneously the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. stepped forward as the global superpowers of the new atomic age, and 
global alliances fell into place that divided the globe’s polities into a trifecta: The First 
World was the U.S. and its Western European NATO allies; the Second World was the 
U.S.S.R. and its Eastern Communist bloc; and the Third World, largely formerly 
colonized countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, was constituted from the rest. 
The 1955 Bandung Conference was one of the first international attempts to forge 
an analogous alliance among these non-aligned Third World nations. Viewing global 
power structures from the margins of the Cold War, Third World national leaders 
proposed a comparable Third World alignment, focusing on a dual international strategy 
of economic cooperation and human rights initiatives. Led by five host countries—
Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Burma—the conference included twenty-nine 
invitees from throughout East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, among them Egypt and 
Iraq.299 Gamal Abdul Nasser, fresh from his victory with the Free Officers and soon to 
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nationalize the Suez300 (in 1956), quickly rose to prominence in the conference as the face 
of the Middle East,301 announcing early his intentions of carefully measured Arab 
neutrality.302 
The Iraqi representative to Bandung, former foreign minister and Prime Minister 
Fadil al-Jamali, had a different take from his more famous counterpart. A signatory to the 
UN Charter, Jamali proposed instead a third bloc, comprised of the Third World, in the 
interest of mutual protection from the Western and Eastern blocs.303 Jamali’s concerns 
were oriented toward the continuing colonial occupation and the specter of encroaching 
communism. Speaking to the general assembly on April 19, 1955, he announced boldly 
that Iraq considered three international forces to “disturb peace and harmony”: 
colonialism, Zionism, and communism. Jamali further insisted that communism was 
simply a new form of colonialism, a “one-sided materialistic religion” that “denies God 
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and the spiritual heritage of mankind.”304 Both were an affront to Iraqi human rights. 
This claim, announced in front of communist conference leader Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai, led to fierce debate over the definition of colonialism in the final Bandung 
communiqué.305 
After the conference divided into subgroups, Jamali continued voicing his 
concerns to the Bandung Cultural Committee, calling colonialism itself a war on culture, 
arguing that, internationally, there was extensive evidence that colonialism led to 
discrimination through policies that deny “fundamental rights, impede cultural 
advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider 
international plane.”306 Jamali’s answer to the human rights menace of colonialism-
through-communism was distinctly cultural. He “evolved a cultural solution in answer to 
Western domination and suggested that Islam as a practice and a cultural basis might protect 
Arab countries from any kind of imperialism” (emphasis added.)307 Thus Iraqi leadership, 
increasingly concerned that communism would take the place of colonialism, openly 
expressed interest in indigenous Iraqi cultural and religious solutions— in Islam itself— as 
an answer to the problems of independent statecraft.  
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Back home, Bandung dominated the Iraqi headlines.308 Discussions of Egyptian-
backed neutrality and Iraqi isolationism filled the pages of Al-Zamān and Al-Bilād.309 In the 
intervening years between Bandung and the July Revolution, the concerns of the 
conference—concerns of the nature of an Iraqi post-colonial identity on the national, 
regional, and international stages—continued to fuel public discussion and debate as the 
communist party grew in popularity and influence.310 As an opportunity to appear 
progressive rather than reactionary, Bandung served as the Iraqi leaderships’ answer to 
Nasser’s populist socialism and was used to buttress the hegemony of the Iraqi ruling 
political elite in the face of daily opposition. In an environment in which the Iraqi public 
was debating fundamental change, the Bandung Conference gave the government a 
chance to appear a champion of the people. It proved significant enough to the Iraqi 
leadership and in the Iraqi public imaginary that the leaders of the July Revolution cited 
commitment to its Ten Principles in their Proclamation 1 in the immediate aftermath of 
the coup.311  
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It is in this context that al-Sadr—a young student and not yet a formal member of 
the Shiite clerical establishment—used family contacts to rise to prominence in a newly-
formed (1958) Shiite activist group in Najaf, Jamā’at al-‘ulamā’.  Their express goal was to 
counter antireligious—and specifically communist—influence in society, and they had the 
full backing of new Iraqi Prime Minister`Abd al-Karim Qasim. Fearful of the rising 
power of communism to topple his fledgling post-revolutionary government, Qasim was 
eager to promote anti-communist messages. With the aid of his father-in-law Sheikh 
Murtaza al-Yasin and older brother Isma'il al- Sadr, the younger Muhammad Baqir Al-
Sadr was able to regularly write and publish leaflets against communism and socialism, 
even briefly writing weekly anti-communist radio addresses that were broadcast on 
government radio through the permission of the Qasim regime.312 Shiite clerics, once 
known for their political quietism, were now leading the Iraqi national anti-communist 
charge. 
 
When viewed in the broader context provided here and in the previous chapter, 
al-Sadr’s next steps—the rapid publication of his most famous two volumes in 1959 and 
1961313 — can be seen as more than just a theological exercise. Al-Sadr was not merely 
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responding to his co-religionists as a cleric. Falsafatunā and Iqtiṣādunā were the response of 
a pious man uniquely positioned to be keenly aware of the specific political pressures of 
Iraq and the broader Middle East of his time; a thinker who was attuned as much to 
Shiite concerns as to the broader patriotic hopes and dreams of the July Revolution and 
the regional hopes of a Pan-Islamic polity. When looked at together, Al-Sadr’s writings 
are both intellectual critique and theological supplication, a proposal that painstakingly 
lays out the flaws in communism and that argues an Islamic ethical solution at the 
political and economic level of the nation-state. In other words, this early work is best 
understood as not just economic musings, but as Iraqi and Arab Muslim decolonization 
literature. Through al-Sadr’s framing, the concept of Islamic economics enters the 
intellectual history of the Arab Middle East as a microcosm of its time. 
 
Arab Decolonization 
Before discussing al-Sadr’s works, a brief introduction to decolonization, and 
specifically how to approach it in the Arab context, is in order.314 Decolonization studies 
as a field is fairly new, a late outgrowth of post-colonial studies. As emphasized in the 
Introduction to this project, the intellectual history of Arab decolonization is a field in 
formation, its first two books slated for publication by 2018.315  
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Decolonization takes shape in two primary realms: the practical (material), and 
the psychological (spiritual). The former typically comprises the actual physical process of 
structural decolonization and transfer of power and control of major social, 
governmental, educational, and economic institutions from the colonizers back to the 
hands of the colonized. The history of nationalization is often situated under this realm. 
The latter, far more subtle and complex, is the process of abandoning the intellectual and 
ideological structures of colonialism, particularly internalized discourses that justify the 
subjugation of peoples through explicit or implicit racism, sexism, classism, and more. 
Decolonization discourse is thus more than simply anticolonial, though anticolonialism 
forms its roots and frequently postcolonial critiques structure its arguments.316 Over and 
above critique, decolonization discourse explores the process of “undoing” colonialism, 
seeking as much as possible to reverse the effects of colonialism by unearthing and 
restoring “original” or “authentic” cultures and identities, seeking a self and society 
unmarred by imperialism. To do this, colonialism must be erased—or, at least, over-
written. And, in the place of the colonizers’ ideologies and organizational structures, new 
and different indigenous ideologies and structures must be constructed. 
Ideas about the process of erasure—as much as the likelihood of its success—have 
been as historically varied as the specific cultures and time periods of colonization.317 An 
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implied or stated notion of return to the ideal cultural and intellectual landscape that 
existed before animates some decolonizing discourses; others advocate the tearing down 
of colonial structures in the interest of starting anew; still others wish to borrow from 
colonially-introduced ideas to form their own variants. 
Arab decolonization, taking place largely during the Asr al-thawra (“Age of 
Revolution”) of the 1950s, exhibited all of these tendencies. In Egypt, for example, 
practical decolonization was realized through destructive catharsis followed by 
experimental creation: after a violent incident involving British soldiers, rising anger 
surrounding their continued presence in Egypt escalated into the burning of Cairo in 
1952, a sustained popular act of arson and looting that consumed the city, immolating 
three hundred sites.318 The fire has long been deemed the final act catalyzing the British 
exit, leaving a triumphant Nasser and the Free Officers to construct a new, Arab socialist 
Egypt from the (nearly literal) ashes. More concerned with state construction than pre-
colonialist ideological purity, the Egyptian project of decolonization under Nasser 
championed Arab identity, Arab unity, and Arab strength through a form of Arab 
socialism.  Against this Nasserist vision, Muslim Brotherhood leaders advocated a 
different kind of decolonization, wishing for a return to idealized pre-modern pasts. 
More broadly, during the period of 1950s and 1960s, Middle East Arab 
decolonization can be characterized as both practically (materially) and psychologically 
(ideologically) constructive. Rising nationalisms were ebullient and experimental, 
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characterized by a sense of boundless possibility and potentially infinite achievement 
across all sectors: national, artistic, scientific, and economic. This was the era of post-
revolutionary experiments in Pan-Arab nationalism, when Nasser’s Egypt combined with 
a Baath Party-run Syria to form the United Arab Republic (from 1958 – 1961), all the 
while urging Iraq to join. 
The intellectual and spiritual realm of decolonization— the psychological erasure 
of the colonizers from the colonized—requires a sense of intellectual and cultural 
replacement as well as the confidence that specific philosophical and ideological 
orientations can be properly demarcated as foreign and others as indigenous. For those 
who advocate a reclamation of pre-colonial pasts, it is an assertion of heritage and 
authenticity; a belief in a stable group identity and orientation that can be rediscovered 
and reintegrated. 
Decolonizing ventures are thus more than a desire to tear down or subvert the 
colonial through a Homi Bhabha-esque combination of cultural mimesis or hybridity.319 
They are also more than just a quest for cultural purity and an often-mythic pre-colonial 
state. Alongside this desire for cultural restoration is an underlying sense of hope; it is 
often the belief, like at Bandung, that a new, more authentic and empowered present can 
be structured from the foundations of the pre-colonial past. Not merely a militant 
rejection of colonization, decolonization is a conscious restructuring of self, of 
community, and of nation. And, as a direct response to colonial impositions of exterior 
control, decolonization has as its core social justice, ethics, and human rights as much as 
cultural (re)assertion. It is idealistic, reparative, and restorative in goals and scope, if as 
                                                





elusive as Anderson’s imagined communities.320 In the context of Iraq in the years 
immediately following British retreat, decolonization is also literal nation-state building 
through a conscious rejection of colonial imports. As will be argued in the next section, 
Al-Sadr’s works are best understood as quintessentially discourses of decolonization. They 
are an attempt to persuade his fellow Muslims—Sunni and Shii—of the inherent 




Al-Sadr’s Decolonizing Narrative: Restoring Islam through Reason 
Falsafatunā and Iqtiṣādunā take as their central premise two major issues, both of 
which were— not coincidentally— the primary topics for discussion in Bandung, and 
both of which were primary topics of local concern in Iraq: communism and economic 
ethics. Speaking to both secular and religious audiences, al-Sadr responds in these two 
volumes to both concerns, arguing forcefully against communism and advancing the 
notion that it is an inappropriate economic system.321 If Western economics and 
communism are not ethically or morally correct, what is the answer? Al-Sadr does not 
merely state tautologically that the answer is Islam.322 He also walks the reader through a 
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practical set of examples of ways that Islamic principles can be used to restructure 
Western finance, rendering it requisitely Islamic and stripping it of its foreign, colonizing 
power. Although written separately, these two books were intended to logically flow from 




Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy) 
Falsafatunā is a particularly intriguing text because of its ambitious attempt to 
respond to the encroaching philosophies of secular Enlightenment. Throughout the 
course of his highly prolific career, al-Sadr wrote many fatwās (judgments) and numerous 
other texts, establishing indisputably his credentials as a well-versed mujtahid. This was, 
after all, the basis by which he earned the title of marja’. In so doing, he demonstrated his 
ability as a faqih (scholar versed in Islamic jurisprudence), weighing current ethical and 
religious issues against the jurisprudential traditions and established modes of Islamic 
ethics. Yet Falsafatunā is an entirely different exercise, written in the style of Western 
philosophy, presumably to people with more than a passing familiarity with Western 
philosophy and a Western education. Instead of mounting an argument overtly based on 
Islamic ethics as first principles, it is an attempt to bridge intellectual traditions and to 
persuade the reader through reason that Islamic philosophy— “Our Philosophy” — is 
superior, both encompassing and responding to any Western offering. At over three 
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hundred pages in the original Arabic, it is a lengthy introduction to the even longer 
Iqtiṣādunā. Because of its length it is dealt with briefly and thematically here, focusing on 
major arguments. 
Falsafatunā is written in two parts with an author’s introduction, included in the 
second and subsequent editions, that specifies the intention of the book: it is designed to 
respond to what al-Sadr describes as “the social problem” (al-mushkilah ijtimā'īyah), or the 
question of which socioeconomic system— capitalist, communist, socialist, or Islamic— is 
superior. Thus from the outset, despite its perhaps opaque initial raison d'être, Falsafatunā 
was intended to ground and substantiate the argument for an Islamic economics—and 
against communism—in broader philosophical thought.323 This bears some emphasis 
because it demonstrates al-Sadr’s familiarity with the secular intellectuals and the 
communist Shiite students in his audience even as it shows the fundamental Muslim 
orientation of al-Sadr’s thought: Islam is conceived by the observant as a total system, 
encompassing every aspect of life.324 In this frame of reference, economics, like ethics and 
philosophy, are all subsets of a greater whole, which is adherence to the Divine will. A 
discussion that opens by contextualizing economics within a broader interrogation of 
epistemology is thus not surprising. 
Part One, Chapter One opens with just such a discussion of the nature of 
knowledge, turning immediately to the definition of knowledge and mental “conception” 
(taṣawwur) of ideas, and then proceeding to Platonic theories of the concept of 
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recollection.325 Al-Sadr refutes the Platonic concept of a pre-existent soul from which we 
remember a form of primordial knowledge, insisting that the Aristotelian explanation of 
universal, rationally testable truths is a more sound explanation for our capacity for 
knowledge.326 He continues on through a discussion of empiricism, arguing that neither 
strict rationalism nor empiricism can explain the human conception of unknowable or 
unverifiable things like the soul,327 while acknowledging repeatedly that he does not have 
the space to fully unpack the many ideas that he is interrogating.328 Throughout, Al-Sadr 
engages philosophers and thinkers of the Western canon that were prominent during the 
time of his writing. Many, such as Descartes, Kant, Hume and Locke, have had lasting 
power in the Western philosophical and academic traditions. Others, such as Marxist-
Leninist Hungarian writer Georges Politzer—who al-Sadr situates alongside Mao Tse-
Tung in his analysis329 – have faded in philosophical relevance with time and with the fall 
of the U.S.S.R.330 
  After summarizing epistemological theories of knowledge and finding them 
wanting, al-Sadr argues instead for what he calls the (Islamic) “theory of dispossession” 
(naḍharīya al-intizā’). In brief, al-Sadr states that knowledge is formed from two inseparable 
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elements: the “primary conception” of something— as in conceiving heat through touch, 
or color through vision—and the “secondary conception,” or the use of this knowledge to 
make judgments and begin to form ideas.331 Al-Sadr argues that Islamic dispossession 
theory—this fundamental ability to make judgments and build knowledge—is inherently 
rational and testable through logic. And, he claims, Islamic thought and Islamic social 
systems as a whole are founded in this rational thought, whereas Marxist thought is 
founded in merely experimental, empirical thought.332 The former, he argues, is clearly 
superior. 
Al-Sadr offers the claim that syllogistic reasoning is a superior means to establish 
rational claims, all part of the Islamic theory of dispossession, and then follows with a 
series of syllogisms in a critique of empiricism. For example, he argues that (the syllogisms 
are abbreviated here): 1) empirical (or experimental) thought assumes no a priori 
knowledge;333 therefore 2) any metaphysical exercise is impossible to an empiricist.334 
Second, 1) empirical (or experimental) thought cannot independently confirm the 
existence of matter, which is a rational proposition; therefore, 2) empirical thought lacks 
basic determinative abilities.335 Third, 1) empirical (or experimental) thought cannot 
confirm the impossibility of a thing because determining that something is impossible is 
outside the realm of experiments and is instead limited to logic and rational thought; 
therefore, 2) empiricism, logically thought through, leads to “the collapse of all knowledge 
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and science.”336 Fourth, causality cannot be affirmed by empiricists, a fact that Hume and 
John Stuart Mill have acknowledged.337 Al-Sadr nuances his argument, stating multiple 
times that it is clear that scientific experiments offer a great deal for the advancement of 
human knowledge, while still affirming that only rationalism, rooted firmly in 
mathematical logic, can serve as the basis of a sound epistemology.338 After establishing 
his reasoning for eschewing empiricism, al-Sadr spends most of the remainder of Part One, 
Chapter One quoting different Marxists, including Lenin,339 Mao-Tse Tung,340 and 
others, and establishing that they are, in fact, empiricists.  
Part One, Chapter Two continues in this ambitious attempt to mount a 
comprehensive, rationally-based Islamic philosophical system that rebuts the claims of 
Marxism. Yet, again, al-Sadr emphasizes his need for concision and brevity; given the 
enormous breadth of his project, significant limitations are required. Al-Sadr then 
composes, summarizes, and weighs the rational merits of a list of major Western thinkers 
and schools of thought, each of them brought to Iraq and to Arabic through the nahḍa. 
Thus, after summarizing the main contributions of major thinkers in Western philosophy 
from the Greeks forward, including Plato and Aristotle, Gorgias, Socrates, Descartes, and 
Locke341—itself a formidable undertaking—Al-Sadr turns to schools of thought, including 
George Berkeley’s philosophical idealism342, “physical idealism” (or the thought of early 
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nineteenth- and twentieth-century physicists)343; skepticism, under which he lists Pyrrho 
and Hume344; behaviorism345; relativism, including a lengthy section on Kantian 
relativism346; Freud347; and, finally, the philosophy of the U.S.S.R., dialectical 
materialism.348 Returning to his initial premise, he argues that dialectical materialism is 
founded on empiricism and is thus not ultimately viable as a system. This exhaustive 
section is not quite thorough and detailed enough to serve as a proper philosophical 
primer to Western thought, but it demonstrates al-Sadr’s keenness to show the breadth 
and depth of his engagement, and his awareness of the secular Western offerings available 
to his countrymen and women.349  
While clearly a great deal can be said about this wide-ranging and extremely 
ambitious text, a few items are noteworthy for our purposes: First, Falsafatunā has been the 
subject of critique from the small handful of scholars who choose to address it, most of 
them claiming that it is not a particularly impressive or original philosophical work. 
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Those who are familiar with it, foremost among them scholar Chibli Mallat, acknowledge 
that these philosophical shortcomings are partially a result of the source materials that al-
Sadr had available to him, largely Arabic translations (and partial translations) of different 
Western philosophical and communist thinkers.350 This problem also influences the first 
section of Iqtiṣādunā. Second, Al-Sadr’s decision to situate the thought of minor 
philosophers like Garaudy on a par with the more enduring thought of Marx and Engels 
makes his arguments less salient over time. However, his reason for doing so, noted 
earlier, should be underscored here: he was dialoguing with the main authors that people 
of his day were reading, not positioning them according to his perception of their 
philosophical merit.351 More problematically, his underlying axiom that all of Marxist 
thought constitutes— or should constitute—a logical whole in order to be of value limits 
his work. Nevertheless, it is this insistence on philosophical coherence—on a totalizing, 
comprehensive way of conceiving the world—that marks the ambition and the inherent 
Islamicity of his undertaking.352 Finally, it must be noted that Falsafatunā is less powerful 
as a work because its thematic through-line is negative, seeking more to disprove the 
validity of Marxism as a philosophy than to build up an alternative philosophy.353 His 
second work, narrower in scope and nearly double in length, would rectify this. 
 
I suggest that this first text of an intended trilogy is better evaluated apart from the 
question of its relative philosophical merit. This is a singular, unusual, difficult-to-place 
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work, falling outside of traditional parameters, Western or Islamic. Instead, writing at the 
moment of the July Revolution as the British were finally leaving and communist 
sentiment was rising, al-Sadr was attempting one of the first truly decolonizing texts of 
Iraq, and perhaps of Shiism. Calling upon the impressive extent of Islamic intellectual 
tradition, al-Sadr was carefully—but succinctly—writing for Iraq and even Islam as a 
whole, establishing its rational intellectual weight as superior to any introduction from the 
West, whether through colonial or communist intervention. His insistence upon engaging 
so many fundamental Western thinkers was by design, an intentional refutation as he 
championed the resilience and continued relevance of the original intellectual system of 
his ancestry. This was a work, however flawed, of deracination, designed to pull 
communism and colonialism up by their roots and to remind the Iraqi public of a proud 
imagined pre-colonial past. When coupled—as intended—with Iqtiṣādunā, it was also a 
quintessentially decolonizing narrative of imagined futures: not just critiquing and 
philosophically destroying the corrupt past and usurping communist and colonialist 
present, but creating a new, hopeful imaginary of an ideal Iraqi future. Thus, rather than 
conceive of Falsafatunā as an uncharacteristic or ill-conceived venture into Western 
philosophy, it should instead be examined as a primer to Iqtiṣādunā and the first third of a 
never-finished trilogy of decolonizing works, written for the broadest possible audience—
observant and non-observant, Sunni and Shia, Western-educated and traditionally-
educated—and centered on building a new society even as it sought to vanquish the 








Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economy) 
Iqtiṣādunā was written after Falsafatunā in quick succession, its first edition 
appearing in 1961, only two years after Falsafatunā, and thus also likely composed in the 
late 1950s. Like its predecessor, it is written in two parts, and, like its predecessor, the 
entire first part is a polemic against Marxism. At double the first volume—seven hundred 
pages—Iqtiṣādunā is an intimidating length. As such, after a brief summary of part one, 
only the most salient and relevant themes will be addressed here.  
Al-Sadr begins his analysis by situating Marxism within the framework of 
historical materialism, then critiquing the concept of materialism as the sole driver of 
sociohistorical change.354 Arguing that Western philosophical tools are in the main 
inadequate to the task of evaluating Marxist theory, al-Sadr again introduces dialectical 
materialism (the primary philosophical approach of the Soviet to communism) insisting 
that Marxist historical dialectic is spurious because “the result contradicts the method.”355  
After attempting an exhaustive evaluation of Marxism according to historical 
materialism, offering philosophical, psychological, and scientific readings, al-Sadr 
contends that there must exist a different, “higher criterion” of analysis.356 He continues 
with a rather singular critique of Marxist thought’s ability to “comprehend history” in its 
entirety, singling out religion, philosophy, scientific knowledge, class conceptions, 
aesthetics, and physical tastes as each larger than the sum of their respective parts and 
inadequately encompassed by the narrowness of Marxism.357 As in Falsafatunā, al-Sadr’s 
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concern with an all-encompassing approach to a philosophy of history demonstrates his 
Islamic worldview, in which a whole philosophy is a godly philosophy, as Islam by nature 
is both unified and unifying of all aspects of life.358 Al-Sadr further argues that, 
throughout history, no communist society has ever functioned, pointing to primitive 
communism, slavery, feudalism, and the historical lack of successful long-term 
transformative communist revolution.359  Part One ends with a shift in analysis to 
Marxism as creed, setting the tone for a theological comparison between Islam and 
Marxism, and including socialism in the critique for the first time.360 Like Falsafatunā, this 
lengthy critique of Marxism suffers most because of Al-Sadr’s inadequate Arabic source 
materials, making the analysis relevant not as a serious philosophical contribution, but as 
an indicator of the historical moment of its writing and of the kinds of texts that were 
available to Arab Marxists of Al-Sadr’s day. 
Part Two of Iqtiṣādunā marks an abrupt change in both tone and analytics, from a 
Western-styled philosophical treatise to a text written far more in the style of Islamic 
exegesis. This is by far the most complex and original part of the work, as Al-Sadr was in 
many ways forging his own path in terms of fiqh (jurisprudence), as he himself notes. This 
“Islamic portion” of the text itself remains framed yet again as part of his relentless 
refutation of Marxism, much to its conceptual and analytical detriment; this explicit 
response to socialism and communism, though understandable when placed in historical 
context, forestalls discussions of economics and finance that are not direct responses to a 
Marxist and Soviet model. This is doubtless the reason that, while capitalism is addressed 
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in this text, it receives comparatively short shrift. Nevertheless, it is detailed, thoughtful, 
and rigorous, and— perhaps most important—it sets forth quite clearly much of the 
analytical and theological scaffolding upon which the later Islamic financial industry 
would be based, as we shall see in Chapter Four.  
This portion of the book is structured quite loosely according to sections primarily 
concerned with production, ownership, and distribution. Because this is a loose 
combination of sections, lacking an overall argument beyond specific discussions of those 
topics, it does not lend itself easily to summary. As such, three central and relevant (and 
occasionally overlapping) themes will be discussed here: points of Islamic uniqueness 
(between Islamic economics and other economic systems); Islamic economics as creed; 
and Islamic economics and the state. 
 
  
Points of Uniqueness: Implications of Social Justice 
Al-Sadr asserts an essential theoretical and methodological point of difference 
between Islamic economics and other systems in a subsection acknowledging that 
economics is premised upon the goal of social justice and thus is not a science.”361 As a 
theologian, al-Sadr’s approach to Islamic economics is quintessentially theological and 
avowedly Muslim, an expression of the goal of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) from its 
inception: Islamic economics has as its primary aim the discovery (kashf) of the Divine will 
through careful study of the Qur’an, the Sunna and the Islamic jurisprudential 
                                                





traditions.362 Islamic economics is an attempt to change reality, not an attempt, like 
Marxism, to explain it.363 Thus freed from scientific constraints, Islamic economics can 
focus primarily on its ethical framework as a means of realizing social goals.  
Because Islamic economics is not a science, it utilizes a unique methodology 
underlined by a specific set of axioms.364 These include, first, as noted above, defining 
Islamic economics as a maḏhab (doctrine, school) as opposed to an ‘ilm (science). In other 
words, Islamic economics is intended to reveal the right economic system rather than to 
clarify the reasons undergirding economic change, and should not be compared with the 
work of the likes of Adam Smith.365 Second, Islamic economics is centered upon the 
concept of social justice. Other systems of organization, including socialism, do not 
explicitly contain a provision for caring for the needy. Thus, Al-Sadr argues, while 
questions of private property, economic freedom, or the nationalization of the means of 
production lie squarely under its purview, questions of the law of supply and demand do 
not.366 Third, Islamic law points the way to Islamic economics. Al-Sadr first notes that 
laws are designed to structure economic exchange, and he accepts axiomatically that 
Islamic law is the superior way to do so.367 Fourth, as noted above, Islamic economics is 
centered on the discovery of the right path, rather than an attempt to construct this pious 
path from scratch. Nevertheless, al-Sadr emphasizes the necessity of ijtihād as the correct 
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methodology to discover the proper contours of Islamic economics, even while 
acknowledging the likelihood of some inherent subjectivity in the process.368 
Al-Sadr further singles out several theoretical points of difference between Islamic 
economics and both capitalist and Marxist models, setting them up as first principles. 
Among the most important, he argues, is the nature of property itself. Capitalist societies, 
he claims, consider private property among their most fundamental principles, with 
nationalization of property the exception to the rule. Socialist societies invert this notion, 
considering common (ishtirakīya) property their first principle, and only allowing private 
property as the exception. Islamic societies follow neither path, adopting a notion of 
property that can take various forms,369 private, public, and governmental (milkiyāt al-
dawla).370 Al-Sadr further asserts that certain forms of economic behavior are carefully 
structured by the sharia. These include forbidding ribā, (or usury, often considered interest-
based banking), monopolies, and financial fraud. Furthermore, no leader is entitled to 
intervene or change these laws by, for example, charging interest or altering Islamic 
inheritance law.371  
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A second theoretical point of difference, this one between Marxism and Islamic 
economics, concerns the Marxist assumption of a direct historical corollary between 
development in operations and modes of production and development in social and 
distributive relations.372 Al-Sadr argues that, according to Islam, there is not necessarily a 
direct connection between economic life and social life, as both can occupy different 
spheres. Specifically, he insists that modes of operation and production can change and 
develop without altering social relationships or social systems.373 Furthermore, social life 
in Islam itself is governed by different laws, those providing for basic needs— eating, 
sleeping, etc.—and those allowing for secondary needs, exemplified by a leader allowing 
new legislation to respond to societal needs.374 The relationship of this area of social 
economic law to the means and modes of production are arbitrary at best. Finally, he 
argues, Islamic history itself points to the failure of Marxist historical materialism, as early 
Islam established equality in Mecca and Medina without the need of communist 
revolution. The issues brought up here—those of human need (ḥaja) or social justice as 
essential elements of Islamic economics375 —will be returned to in the section on Islamic 
economics as creed. 
Finally, a primary point of theoretical difference between Islamic economics and 
other systems relates to distribution and production— terms that al-Sadr doubtless uses 
because of their connection to Marxism— and their relationship to labor and ownership. 
Discussion surrounding the various permutations of jurisprudential rulings on this final 
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point comprises the vast majority of Iqtiṣādunā. Al-Sadr’s use of Marxist terminology to 
describe Islamic economics is, unfortunately, rather confusing, as his framework for 
Islamic economics is actually quite distinct from that of Marxism. Nevertheless, a brief 
summary is included here in order to give a sense of the kind of argumentation that al-
Sadr was making. 
Al-Sadr states that Islamic economics includes two main theoretical principles, the 
theory of distribution before production (naḍharīya tawzi’ mā qabl al-intāj) and the theory of 
distribution after production (naḍharīya tawzi’ mā ba’d al-intāj). Regarding the former, al-
Sadr explains that Islam negates the notion of primary private property rights that are 
unrelated to labor.376 In other words, value and ownership derive from labor, not from 
property itself. As a result, labor is the means through which one gains the acquisition of 
rights to natural resources.377 He then gives examples of how this applies to practical 
ownership, each of which indicates jurisprudential differences regarding the kind of land 
or property being utilized. (All of these examples center upon natural resources, 
reflecting, no doubt, the era in which much of the jurisprudential traditions evolved.) For 
example, fallow or unproductive land, if revived by a laborer, will then belong to said 
laborer, precluding any prior claim. On the other hand, a mine, if found, will give the 
person who found it rights to materials therein, yet another person discovering the same 
mine from elsewhere will have the same rights. Water can belong to no one, as a person 
who digs a well is entitled to use it but not to prevent others from accessing it.378 Thus, 
labor and ownership are inextricably linked, with labor the factor that entitles one to 
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ownership, yet a system of justice regarding access to resources is also in play. By 
describing this as “distribution before production,” al-Sadr is, in essence, using Marxist 
terminology to explain that Islamic law regarding the ownership of natural resources is 
fixed and independent of the concept of private property. 
What al-Sadr dubs “distribution after production,” on the other hand, is a much 
more complex area of Islamic economics. This is the area that deals with questions of 
ownership when, for example, two people are hunting or fishing together and cannot 
determine how to divide the spoils, or a person hires someone to fish or fetch wood on his 
or her behalf, or a person loans another person a net to catch fish, or other such issues. 
The general theory that al-Sadr derives from these issues, after a lengthy examination of 
different jurisprudential writings, is that the person who does the hunting, fishing, and 
gathering is the owner of what is gathered, meaning that it is not permissible to hire 
someone to do those acts. However, if one borrows a tool in one’s labor— say, a net to 
catch fish— one owes the owner of the tool a form of rent payment.379  
 
These rules render capitalist systems nearly impossible, a fact that al-Sadr 
acknowledges in the midst of this anti-Marxist work. If a capitalist hires laborers to extract 
oil or cut wood, he notes, the oil and wood will, according to Islamic law, belong to the 
laborers themselves.380 Further, capitalism combines two categories of wealth that are 
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considered separate in Islamic law— productive wealth and monetary wealth— into its 
own categories of interest, salaries (wages), rent and profit.381 Islam cannot accept these 
blurred distinctions and re-categorizations that do not take into account the means of 
acquisition of a natural resource – labor – when assigning ownership.382  It is of note here 
that capitalism occupies only a minimal amount of space in Iqtiṣādunā. At only around fifty 
pages, it is a pittance compared with the amount devoted to Marxism. In addition to al-
Sadr’s choice to respond to the popularity of communism among his fellow Iraqis, this 
can be attributed to al-Sadr’s understanding of the relationship of capitalism to social 
justice: Unlike Marxism, capitalism makes no claims to being an inherently ethical 
system, and is thus far less likely to be persuasive as a moral system to practicing Muslims. 
 
Islamic Economics as Creed 
As noted above, al-Sadr does not claim that his is a scientific theory. Instead, he 
argues that Islamic economics is a form of religious practice; another portion of the right 
path that the pious have yet to fully discover and enact. He further devotes a section to 
the under-theorization of economics in the fiqh (jurisprudential) literature, describing his 
process and acknowledging the inherent subjectivity of Iqtiṣādunā as a work of ijtihād.383  
Among his strongest reasons for advocating an Islamic economics is the 
underlying Islamic principle of social justice: Islamic economics is first and foremost a 
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system of ethics designed to ensure a just distribution of resources. This appears most 
strongly in his concern that socialism does not have an inherent structure to care for those 
in need.384 Anticipating his later work on banking, Al-Sadr points to Islamic ethics further 
by critiquing the largely capitalist question of monetary circulation, emphasizing that 
money itself should not become a commodity. Capitalism, in this view, uses money as an 
end in itself rather than for the good of society. Islam, however, has already prescribed 
the solution to such greed by requiring taxes (zakāt), prohibiting interest (riba), and 
allowing for the intervention of a just ruler.385 Indeed, the totality of the system, al-Sadr 
argues, is designed to implement structures that prevent the rich or powerful from preying 
on the weak. Science, for all of its benefits, can do nothing to resolve the conflict of 
interests between a rich man seeking a monopoly and the poor who would suffer from it. 
The ethical underpinnings of an Islamic economics as creed are the answer.386 
 
Islamic Economics and the State 
Al-Sadr ends Iqtiṣādunā with a discussion of the role of the state in the economy, 
significant in part because of the clues it offers for the intended final, never written—or, at 
least, never discovered—book in his trilogy, Mujtama’ana.387 Al-Sadr acknowledges a 
lacuna (faragh) in Islamic legal tradition regarding the role of the state in Islamic 
economics, emphasizing that there is no clear jurisprudential tradition or set of 
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prescriptions that lays down the precise ways in which a Muslim society should organize 
its economy.388 Arguing that the lacuna is intentional, an indication of inherent strength 
and flexibility of the Islamic theological framework, al-Sadr concludes that the 
jurisprudential lack has allowed different Muslim societies in different epochs to establish 
their own economic systems along general ethical principles according to their own 
idiosyncratic needs.389  
The state is an inextricable element of al-Sadr’s system. He argues that the 
purpose of the state is to protect and provide security for society by levying taxes and 
requiring zakāt of all citizens. Asserting that a just state run by a pious ruler is paramount, 
he posits an ideal system in which this ruler would have the power to intervene in the 
cause of social justice, instigating great projects that will prevent those who are so inclined 
from hoarding their wealth,390 and ensuring the proper distribution of goods and labor in 
society to establish justice.391 
Thus, Iqtiṣādunā stands as a unique, original work of ijtihād through which 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr sought to find a clear structure and set of principles guiding 
right economics. He did so by carefully evaluating the rulings of various jurists over 
matters relating to property ownership and monetary use, looking for consistent patterns 
in the rulings in order to establish an ethical Islamic economic superstructure. This is an 
example of modern systematic theology in an Islamic context. 
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While Marxism serves as al-Sadr’s constant preoccupation, dating the text and 
limiting its utility in some respects, it also clearly serves an important function in al-Sadr’s 
thought: Marxism was the foil that led him to think probingly and religiously about the 
economic issue itself. Al-Sadr’s concerns with communism’s perceived rational, historical, 
and ethical failings were the direct catalyst not only for his critique, but for his 
constructive questions about what would constitute a rational, ethical, and ideal historical 
system. Furthermore, Marxism’s theoretical structures of distribution, production, and 
ownership –and their failings, in his view – were the basis from which he was able to 
begin constructing his own theoretical structures of an ethically coherent Islamic 
economics. In fact, though he does not state this explicitly, it seems likely that al-Sadr’s 
vigorous critiques of Marxist philosophy in Falsafatunā as inherently empirical and 
therefore irrational are what led him to carefully couch his theoretical response in purely 
ethical and theological (un-scientific) terms; it is quite clear that al-Sadr had doubts about 
economics as a legitimate science to begin with. 
 
Moving away from religious and philosophical concerns, there are several notable 
choices in this text, each of which marks it as a unique product of the historical forces 
already addressed, and each of which makes it not just a tour de force on Islamic economics, 
but also a distinctly decolonizing text. First, Iqtiṣādunā is nothing short of remarkable for 
its lack of clear sectarianism. Though Al-Sadr does cite Shiite scholars to make his points, 





of jurisprudence) from each of the four main Sunni maḏhabs.392 This is, in other words, a 
decidedly ecumenical work; even though it champions Islam as the most moral means of 
structuring the economy, it does not single out Shiite practices or scholars in a way that 
marks it as uniquely or exclusively Shiite. Especially in his discussion of the need for ijtihād 
—a concept which, it will be recalled, had become increasingly associated with Shiism in 
the popular Muslim imagination by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—he writes 
carefully, even persuasively, cautioning that there may be other interpretations of a right 
Islamic economics but that such interpretive flexibility is to be expected.393 Clearly his 
intended audience extended far beyond his sectarian circle. 
Indeed, by framing his work in this way, al-Sadr is operating on multiple levels, 
each of which has a clear decolonizing goal. Perhaps most obvious, by emphasizing the 
social justice component of Islamic economics and by not just situating it against 
Marxism, but also couching it in Marxist terms, al-Sadr is speaking directly to Arab 
Marxists, secular and Muslim, in their language. This is an argument that states, 
essentially, that any social justice benefit one may see in Marxism or socialism is already 
found in Islam—that, in fact, the entire Muslim system is centered upon social justice and 
is therefore superior in conception and application. By avoiding overtly sectarian 
terminology and balancing his jurisprudential references, he underscores the Islamic 
credentials of his theory while maintaining the universalist ethos of his work: this is 
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designed to carefully, rationally persuade those from a variety of educational and religious 
backgrounds of the superiority of the Islamic system. Al-Sadr is not just arguing for the 
superiority and continuing relevance of Islam, however—though he is doing that. By 
writing against Marxism and for Islam he is working to persuade his fellow Arab Muslims 
that they need not cast about for any foreign idea—anything they need, in terms of 
philosophical framework, socioeconomic system, or ideological orientation, is already 
found in the theological and philosophical works of their home culture. By constructing 
his argument slowly, painstakingly, beginning in Falsafatunā with epistemological 
assertions and building through syllogism, al-Sadr is answering every foreign 
interpellation with rationalism and measured pride, signaling to his readers that they do 
not need to look elsewhere. Superior intellect, philosophy, ideology and statecraft were 
always here, embedded in the structures of their own system. By returning to Islam, the 
impositions of the colonizers—both material in the form of finance houses and 
government bureaucracy and psychological in the form of philosophical and ideological 
innovation—may be eschewed with due confidence. Written after the British left Iraq, al-
Sadr is advocating a decolonization of the mind without so much as explicitly naming 
colonialism. 
 
Thus, despite his bona fides, al-Sadr did not write Iqtiṣādunā with a limited Shiite 
audience in mind. Combined with Falsafatunā (as al-Sadr intended), this is a sweeping 
work designed to prove to a wide audience, believer and non-believer, of the failures of 
Marxism and the superiority of Islam. Furthermore, it seeks to do so through logic, 
building the case through a combined thousand pages that all worldly knowledge can be 





Islamic system at the level of economics and governance is the answer to social ills of 
every stripe.  
When contextualized alongside Bandung and the rising taqrīb and Pan-Islamic 
political movements—recall that Iqtiṣādunā was written during the time period of the 
United Arab Republic (1958 – 1961), when Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideas were at their 
regional heyday394 — this intention for a broad Muslim audience is underscored. Al-Sadr, 
perhaps one of the most politically and intellectually attuned clerics of his day, was 
responding to a local Marxist and Shiite crisis without question. But he had also heard the 
call of his countrymen at Bandung, voices that decried colonialism and communism and 
asked for a homegrown Islamic solution, and with his clerical cohort he was stepping up 
to engage fully in Iraqi and regional politics.  
This was a moment of restoration and reinvigoration of a long-established 
intellectual and theological tradition: reassertion of Islamic identity through creative and 
innovative intellectual engagement in the form of ijtihād. As part of this quintessentially 
Iraqi decolonization dialectic, al-Sadr’s work was a clear insistence that the answer was 
already there, in Islam, and that it always had been. No European import, properly 
interrogated, could stand up. Today, Iqtiṣādunā can rightly be called the historical fulcrum 
in the development of a viable Islamic economics: from the time of its writing, a clear 
vision began to take hold of an Islamic economic potentiality. Thus, while colonial 
interference, Marxist infiltration, and increasingly violent clerical reactions were the spark 
that gave rise to al-Sadr’s feverishly urgent response in Falsafatunā and Iqtiṣādunā, his work 
is nevertheless creative and constructive, comprising the first stages of a proposal 
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envisioning a bright, restored, reclaimed, decolonized and unified Islamic future. This is a 
work of hope. 
Yet Iqtiṣādunā was not yet fully explicit in its decolonizing intentions, and al-Sadr’s 
ideas of an Islamic economics were not fleshed out in terms of practical implications. It 
would take nearly another decade before the full weight of decolonization and Islamic 






























Chapter Four: From Idea to Reality: Decolonization,  
Islamism, and Islamic Banking, 1968 – 1975 
 
 
This final chapter makes the case that the turn to Islamic banking in practice in 
the 1960s—early 1970s in an extension of the broader rise of Islamism, contending that 
Islamic finance and Islamism mutually informed and constructed one another, each a 
form of Arab decolonization. It was during this period of post-1967-War regional 
transition that theorist of Islamic economics Iraqi cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr wrote 
two more tracts, each of which captured the spirit of the time and advanced the 
possibility of a realized Islamic banking: a new preface to the second edition of Iqtiṣādunā 
(1968) and a practical how-to manual on Islamic banking Al-Bank al-lā-Ribawi (The Usury-
Free Bank, 1969). These two texts are presented and contextualized here in their broader 
social and intellectual milieu, demonstrating the psychological and emotive power of 
Islamic banking during the regional shift to Islamism. Whereas the original texts of 
Iqtiṣādunā and Falsafatunā were artful and subtle, leaving their decolonizing agenda implied 
but unstated, these later texts were defiant in their dissent. Colonialism and its residual 
evils are explicitly called out in Iqtiṣādunā’s second edition preface, while in Al-Bank al-lā-
Ribawi (The Usury-Free Bank), capitalist banking models are offered as the formative spark 
off of which practical Islamist finance can be realized and spread. Under al-Sadr’s and 





time, Islamic economics made its transition from amorphous theoretical construct to 
practical reality by the mid-1970s. By 1975, the first banks designed around Islamic 
policies were attempted, marking the end of the formative period of Islamic economics.  
As the idea of Islamic economics became more diffuse and popularized, it 
simultaneously entered the mainstream of Islamist thought. The Middle East cultural 
focus of the late 1960s and 1970s changed dramatically, morphing from a 1950s- and 
early-1960s decolonizing narrative characterized by cultural reassertion and nationalist 
discovery to one of Islamist retrenchment and a desire to return to mythic pre-modern 
pasts. Salafi ideas, long percolating and expanding out of places like Saudi Arabia, took 
center stage as Muslims explicitly turned away from imported economic and political 
models with the rallying cry “We tried capitalism and it failed, we tried communism and 
it failed, now is the time for Islam!” Islamic economics, made real in the form of Islamic 
banks and Islamic financial products, became a practical means through which 
decolonizing cultural identity could be articulated and openly expressed. The rise of 
Islamic banking in the Middle East in the late 1960s and early 1970s served more than a 
pious religious rationale: It also served as a springboard for Muslim solidarity at the level 
of the psyche, informing Islamism as much as being shaped by it. Quintessentially cultural 
in conception and appeal, Islamic banking in practice shifted away from the philosophical 
and intellectual grounding of al-Sadr’s Iqtiṣādunā even as it relied upon it for its original 
justification in the zeitgeist. In so doing, Islamic banking became a decolonizing 
touchstone of Muslim identity.   
First, a few items must be noted. Thus far, this dissertation has focused primarily 
on the economic thought of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, detailing the ways that historical 





transnational community’s discussions, debates, educational transformations, and 
material concerns during the rise of nation-states have been used to situate and, to a 
certain extent, to represent broader cross-sectarian regional discussion. This is because, 
though Shiite Arab concerns were particular and unique, the product of specific 
historical, intellectual, theological, and political circumstances, many elements of al-
Sadr’s thought and context are nevertheless generalizable across sectarian lines. These 
elements include, among others, his assertion that neither capitalism nor communism nor 
socialism is requisitely Islamic, his condemnation of ribā as Western conventional 
banking’s largest detraction, his focus on social justice and communal ethics as hallmarks 
of an integrated Islamicity, and his advocacy of a decolonized, independent Muslim 
community. In other words, the question of Muslim pious living in an era of Western 
conventional banking was a common one throughout the lands of the Muslim Middle 
East, Sunni and Shii, from the time of the introduction of Western conventional banking 
in the nineteenth century. 
Concerns about economics practices were furthermore always entangled with 
broader questions about the regulatory and legal frameworks of the state in a post-
Ottoman, post-Caliphate world; one could not have a proper Islamic finance or an 
Islamic economy outside of the framework of an Islamic government to regulate taxes 
and alms.395 Yet Islamic government itself was a hazily defined concept, a matter of 
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constant debate throughout the twentieth century, particularly during the era of 
decolonization and independent nationalisms. And the existing secular Middle East 
nation-state itself was intimately, irrevocably tied to colonialism, the literal product of 
colonial-era foreign mapmakers.396 Questions of right polity, then, and the role of Islamic 
economics as part of that deeper question, are mutually imbricated. This issue of Muslim 
independence and Muslim self-governance and self-regulation, central to the state, is 
inherent to what makes Islamic economics a touchstone for broader conversations about 
decolonizing societal reclamation, Sunni and Shii. The general concerns of secularization, 
statecraft, and solidarity through political representation that embroiled al-Sadr’s Shiite 
community of Iraq, therefore, were mirrored in different communities throughout the 
broader Middle East as they grappled with colonialism’s legacy, rising nationalisms, and 
identity; Shiite circumstances in al-Sadr’s Iraq were in many ways a specific case study of 
broader trends. The concern that Muslim tradition could not (or should not) 
accommodate a Western model had been voiced frequently, and with various levels of 
erudition, throughout the Sunni world for decades. How did Islamic finance make the 
shift from an idea of intellectuals to practical reality? In no small measure, it was due to 
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The Setback: 1967 and the Rise of Islamism 
Intellectual historians of the post-colonial Middle East often divide the twentieth 
century along one major fault line: the 1967 Six-Day War, or naksah (setback).397 Up until 
that point, broad Arab public sentiment surrounding decolonization, rising nationalisms, 
and self-determination was ebullient and experimental, characterized by a sense of 
boundless possibility and potentially infinite achievement across all sectors: national, 
artistic, scientific, and economic. This was the era of post-revolutionary experiments in 
Pan-Arab nationalism, when Nasser’s Egypt combined with a Baath Party-run Syria to 
form the United Arab Republic (from 1958 – 1961), all the while urging Iraq to join. 
Leaders of popular revolutions region-wide—particularly Nasser—had not yet lost their 
burnished image in the public imaginary, and the hard clamp of autocratic leadership 
was not yet felt. The extent to which 1967 signaled a turning point in modern Arab 
intellectual history is introduced here to provide brief context for the rise of Islamism and, 
in turn, the rise of practical Islamic finance. 
The war was an unequivocally seismic event, destroying regional faith in Egypt’s 
Nasser and, more deeply, crippling the broader Arab sense of self.398 Viewed on television 
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screens and discussed endlessly in coffee houses, the war and ensuing humiliation of the 
Arab defeat had a sobering effect, hampering the heady optimism of the previous decade 
and a half.399 Media and popular analysis was mirrored in academic discussion, as 
regional conferences and writings among leading Arab intellectuals became preoccupied 
on an almost existential level with the topic of societal failure.400 A sense of malaise and 
forestalled dreams permeated the secular intellectual work of the 1970s, along with biting 
and sometimes bitter self-critique.401 
It was at this time—starting in the 1970s—that a resurgent religious sensibility was 
felt throughout the Middle East at the popular level, cutting across class and national 
lines. As Gilles Kepel emphasizes, the “1967 defeat seriously undermined the ideological 
edifice of nationalism and created a vacuum to be filled a few years later by [Sayyid] 
Qutb's Islamist philosophy.”402  
Until his execution in 1966 at Nasser’s orders, Muslim Brotherhood intellectual 
Sayyid Qutb had for decades championed a return to conservative, non-Western Islamic 
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principles, excoriating what he viewed as the materialism and licentiousness of the United 
States and its Western allies. Qutb represented a uniquely twentieth-century Muslim 
religious voice: Though he had received a secular education and had gradually self-
radicalized into his own idiosyncratic version of anti-Western Islam, Qutb’s abilities as a 
popular writer who had once published book and film reviews stood him in good stead.403 
His written ideas about Islamic resurgence and revival were immensely popular, proving 
more accessible and provocative to the rising generation in the 1950s and 1960s than the 
more staid writings of formally-trained clerics from the likes of Al-Azhar.404  Though until 
1967 they had “been confined to small circles of Muslim Brothers, prisoners, and convicts 
sentenced to hard labor in camps,” Qutb’s teachings soon spread transnationally in the 
post-Nasser era, popularized by Egyptian students and young professionals who went 
abroad to oil-rich countries to seek their fortunes.405 
These young Egyptian students and teachers, trained through Nasser’s nationalist 
professional programs but unable to find good work outside of the failing Egyptian 
bureaucratic juggernaut, had been galvanized into post-war soul-searching. In pursuit of 
an ideological orientation, they turned to Qutb’s Muslim Brotherhood ideas as more 
authentically Muslim and more in tune with their regional heritage and culture. Landing 
in the oil-rich countries to work as teachers, their Qutb-inspired Islamist ideas meshed 
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easily with Saudi Wahhabist tradition.406 Soon, backed by rising oil wealth, these Islamist 
ideas were in turn exported further throughout the region as Saudi-funded mosques were 
constructed at an unprecedented rate. As Kepel emphasizes,  
 
Later on, conservative Saudis would call 1967 a form of divine punishment for 
forgetting religion. They would contrast that war, in which Egyptian soldiers went 
into battle shouting ‘Land! Sea! Air!’ with the struggle of 1973, in which the same 
soldiers cried ‘Allah Akhbar!’ and were consequently more successful.407 
 
  Yet Islamism of the 1970s was not limited to the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
acolytes. Islamism is difficult to encapsulate outside of the broadest brush strokes; like 
post-Qutb Muslim Brotherhood thought (from which much of it was inspired), Islamism 
has often been characterized by its intellectual poverty (faqr fikrī)– or, at least, for its lack 
of systematization, theological or otherwise.408 It is perhaps best explained as a region-
wide Middle Eastern movement for a “return to Islam” in the most general terms, with 
the notion of Islam itself—and of return— interpreted and understood with great 
variability by its advocates.409 For most, Islamism took the form of a political stance, 
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advocating legislation and state structures designed and operated according to Islamic 
principles. This idea held variability within itself, as there is neither a unified Islamic 
doctrine of the state nor a unified set of Islamic laws; sharia (Islamic law) is interpretively 
malleable by definition. Furthermore, the means of political reform pursued by Islamists 
lacked uniformity: some, like the Muslim Brothers with whom Qutb had affiliated before 
his death, sought to alter existing political structures from within. Others advocated much 
more radical overthrow. Still others saw Islamism as a personal, inner religious revival, 
with little overt political effect but significant spiritual and psychological change. It was 
from the 1970s forward, for example, that Muslim women throughout the Middle East 
began to voluntarily re-adopt the veil, an uncommon sartorial choice in the previous 
several decades.  
However nebulously defined or organized, Islamism as a principle and movement 
signaled an important epistemic shift away from secular markers of identity, foremost 
among them nationalism. As Kepel explains, with the rise of Islamism came a 
 
shift in the balance of power among Muslim states toward the oil-producing 
countries. Under Saudi influence, the notion of a worldwide `Islamic domain of 
shared meaning` transcending the nationalist divisions among Arabs, Turks, 
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Africans, and Asians was created. All Muslims were offered a new identity that 
emphasized their religious commonality while downplaying differences of 
language, ethnicity, and nationality.410  
 
 
Thus with Islamism, “Muslim” became the defining identity marker and ideological 
orientation of the Middle East. Concomitant with this new Islamist sensibility came a 
lesser-studied shift in financial sensibilities, as the oil-rich states of the Middle East took 
control of their oil production and began incorporating Islam into their banking 
establishments. As we shall see, this shift in banking was simultaneously informed by and 
constitutive of Islamism. And, as will be shown, it was centered in the narrative that had 
been continuously evolving from the previous, more hopeful generation: decolonization. 
In other words, Islamic banking grew as an Islamist extension of the continuing quest for 
decolonizing cultural authenticity. Islamism itself, I argue, is part and parcel of the larger 
decolonizing venture of the 1970s. Among the earliest contributions to an Islamist 
decolonizing discourse of Islamic economics were, yet again, two formative pieces by 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. 
 
A New Preface and Decolonization 
Initially, Baqir al-Sadr’s forays into constructing—or, in his view—discovering411 
a framework to restore a socially just Islamic economic “Third Way” were only indirectly 
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anti-colonialist.412 That is to say, the decolonizing intentions in his two volumes were 
implicit, advanced at the level of an Islamic ideology expressly rooted in rationalism. No 
overt discussion of the social, moral, or economic effects of colonialism specifically was 
ventured in the first editions of Falsafatunā (1959) or Iqtiṣādunā (1961).413 Rather, al-Sadr’s 
efforts at constructing a decolonizing narrative were in the form of logically-based 
persuasion: meticulously combining already existing Islamic jurisprudential traditions into 
a framework for societal and economic organization; comparing this framework with the 
philosophical and intellectual ideas flooding in from Europe; and constructing a logically-
rooted case for the Islamic alternative.414 
This subtlety in critique would reverse itself in the second edition of Iqtiṣādunā 
(1968),415 to which was added an author’s preface that is openly, searingly critical of the 
effects of colonialism on Arab and Muslim societies. Published after nearly a decade of 
attempts at Arab socialism in Egypt, Syria, the UAR, and Al-Sadr’s home country of 
Iraq, Al-Sadr’s preface is much more frank in its criticism of European-inspired socialism. 
He is further far more direct in asserting the intellectual aspirations and decolonizing 
intentions of Iqtiṣādunā, arguing for the book’s growing relevance in the Arab world. 
Finally, it is in this preface, itself far more social commentary than the book it introduces, 
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that al-Sadr is his most explicit about the practical applications of Iqtiṣādunā—and Islamic 
frameworks generally—for Arab economic development, a key regional issue in the 
1960s. 
Al-Sadr argues that upon acquaintance with European thought the Islamic world 
“yielded” (yadh’an) to its intellectual approach civilizational leadership and, shifting its self-
understanding to the national frameworks modeled by the Europeans.416 Europeans had 
divided the world into countries according to economic potential, effectively placing 
themselves and their own countries into the “advanced” category and the Middle East 
into the “economically poor or backward” category. This, “according to European logic,” 
meant that Muslims were obliged to accept European leadership as the more advanced 
civilization, leading to a threefold subordination of the Muslim world to Europe.417 First, 
the Islamic world was politically subordinated to “economically advanced” European 
nations through direct rule (i.e., colonialism). Second, the Islamic world was economically 
subordinated as a result of Europeans devising ways 1) to exploit its resources; 2) to 
introduce foreign (European-run) capitalism; and 3) to monopolize local industries “under 
the pretext of training the people of the backward countries to bear the burden of their 
economic development.”418 Third, the peoples of the Islamic world subordinated 
themselves in the methods through which they sought political and economic 
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independence from European domination.419 Through “experiments” at independence, 
Middle Eastern Muslim peoples sought to reclaim autonomous power to develop their 
own economies.420 Yet their understanding of the economic problem itself was rooted in 
European frameworks, so they unwisely chose European methods to attempt their 
corrective.421 
The “capitalist axis,” al-Sadr explains, was the first of these European methods to 
enter the Arab Islamic world “and polarize its countries” through colonialism.422 These 
colonial associations led to Arab Muslim interest in an antithetical European axis, 
socialism, soon considered the ideal method for Arab development.423 With either model, 
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planned economic model of socialism, each of which has built up the European economy 
(iii). 
422 iv. 
423 Iv. Al- Sadr faults capitalists and socialists for their refusal to acknowledge any reason 
for their failures other than the legacy of the “artificial conditions” created by colonialists 
in the region. He insists that there is yet alive, theoretically and ideologically, an 





al-Sadr emphasizes, the global economic subordination of “backward” countries to 
advanced countries has meant a continuing belief in “European practice as a leading 
principle.”424 Against this belief, al-Sadr advances his decolonizing solution: Islamic 
economics stands outside of these two axes, untainted by colonialism, and is therefore the 
superior choice.425 
By definition, decolonization means full separation from the institutions, 
ideologies, and intellectual traditions of the colonial past. Historically speaking, al-Sadr 
explains, colonialism left a strong psychological mark on the Islamic world, imbuing a 
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Sadr explains. The first points to European economic success, with the argument that the 
same method only need be adopted in order for “backward” countries to reap a similar 
reward. The second argues that, when gaining their impressive economic successes, 
Europeans did not have to contend with a globally integrated economy in which other 
regions were already more advanced. Planned socialism, so the argument goes, is the best 
strategy for a “backward” country entering an already uneven playing field. (vii) 
425 v. Still, Al-Sadr wishes to win over the reader through his characteristic method of 
carefully constructed logical argument: the Islamic alternative is not simply better because 
he claims it is so; he must establish its superiority through reason. To do so, he clarifies 
that any comparison between Islamic economics and its European alternatives must first 
be contextualized historically. His rationale is simple: economic success and failure is not 
a result of economic method alone, he argues, but a result of method intermingled with 
surrounding historical circumstances. It is thus not so much that economic development 
requires a specific method, but more that economic development requires a “framework 
of social organization” for the state (viii). In other words, European economic systems 
were not successful of themselves alone. Instead, their success depended on the extent to 





feeling of being trapped due to a “long bitter history of exploitation and struggle.”426 This 
feeling has inculcated a sense of “recoiling” (al-inkimash) in the ummah from the 
“European’s organizational gifts,” leaving a negative feeling toward “the organizations 
derived from the social practices in the countries of the colonialists.”427 Thus, al-Sadr 
concludes, the ummah must “base its modern revival” on social organizations and 
“cultural particularities not related to the countries of the colonizers.”428  
Al-Sadr emphasizes that, thus far, the Arab attempts at throwing off colonial 
influence have been unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. Nationalism is not sufficient to 
fulfill societal needs because it is not properly an ideology or philosophy; it is simply a 
linguistic and social commonality.429 It is perhaps for this reason that Arab nationalists 
have attempted to claim Arab socialism, though in doing so, al-Sadr claims, Arabs are 
already acknowledging their discomfort with socialism’s European origins.430 Why else 
feel the need to mark their version as distinctly Arab? Calling something “Arab” does not 
in fact advance a specific philosophy for structuring society, al-Sadr explains, since Arab 
socialists cannot realistically distinguish between Arab, Persian, or Turkish socialism, “nor 
can they explain how socialism differs by merely being given a nationalist framework.”431 
Instead, the ummah can only “build the modern renaissance” on a basis that is entirely 











disconnected from the countries of the colonizers.432 Islamic economics, an idea without 
European connections, is this framework. 
Finishing his argument for economic decolonization, al-Sadr rests his case on the 
twin factors of identity and religious belief: Islam is, for the ummah, “the expression of its 
very self” and the “key to its former glory”; a psychologically empowering framework for 
a people working toward postcolonial economic development.433 Not only do Muslims 
need to reassert their own independent, decolonized identity, but in order to do so they 
require an economic framework that is not contrary to their own religious beliefs.  
Explicating this last in his most biting anti-colonial polemic, al-Sadr continues: 
whereas Europeans have come to “look to the earth” for its material wealth and 
possessions, developing philosophical frameworks that focus on acquisition and pleasure, 
Islam sets its sights upon the heavens. Al-Sadr argues that the notion of “freedom,” 
divorced from morality and accountability, drives the European concept of economy: 
“The absence of any feeling of moral responsibility was a basic precondition for many of 
the activities that were part of the process of [colonial economic] development.”434 But it 
is not just economy. The belief that life is characterized by a struggle for freedom of the 
individual—that the mere existence of one individual automatically impedes the freedom 
of another—is integral and inherent to European thought and philosophy, al-Sadr insists. 
It is expressed repeatedly, in Western scientific thought about the struggle for existence in 
nature, in capitalist free-market aspirations, and in socialist thought about class 








struggle.435 This, to al-Sadr, is a reflection of the spiritual reality of the European: a 
struggle that exists in all arenas, including economy, played out in “unlimited rivalry.”436 
Al-Sadr’s concludes his preface with an apologetical turn. In a parallelism of his 
European critique, he paints a softer portrait of the ummah: as noted, instead of keeping 
their eyes fastened upon the earth, Muslims set their sights to the heavens. This focus on 
the ineffable divine limits the Muslim’s attachment to the material, and is expressed in 
Islam’s focus on the intellectual world over the physical world.437 A Muslim does not 
understand freedom in the same way a European does, having an inner sense of being 
watched by heaven that restrains his impulses. This inner restraint will avert difficulties 
that commonly arise from the “free economy.” Further, the ummah has been instructed to 
enjoin jihad, in this case to use all of its forces—including economic ones—to preserve 
itself existence and its self-governance.438 Harnessing this attachment to the unseen by 
imbuing the earth with the framework of heaven, and laboring with a sense of duty and 
worship, will transform the mentality of heaven-focused Muslims to one of earth-based 
productivity, raising the overall economy.439 Thus unburdened by the alienation of 
materialism and the uneasiness of foreign, socialist ideas, the economic framework of 
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Islam will provide the Muslim with the psychological means to compete productively in 
the developing economy—even if he is not particularly pious.440  
By the time that this preface was first published in 1968, al-Sadr had been deeply 
involved in Iraqi resistance politics for over a decade.441 He adapted his language in this 
preface to the state of the times: Although never known for the emotional rhetoric and 
firebrand style of his more famous colleague and fellow Shiite revolutionary Ruhollah 
Khomeini—al-Sadr always preferred argument through logic and rationalism—the 
decolonizing language here is blunt and bold, galvanizing and impassioned rather than 
straightforwardly analytical. He re-directs the overall focus of Iqtiṣādunā in this preface as 
well: After watching Pan-Arab Baathist socialist experiments rise— including the short-
lived (1958 – 1961) United Arab Republic and the 1963 Baathist coup in Iraq— his 
former communist preoccupations had dissipated. Not once in this preface does he use 
the term “Marxism” —a centerpoint of his analysis in the main text of both Falsafatunā 
and Iqtiṣādunā—no doubt because socialist Baathism and Nasserism had effectively 
curtailed the growing Arab and Iraqi Marxist movements of the 1940s – 1950s.442 By 
reframing the relevance of the book in decolonizing terms, al-Sadr showed his continuing 
keen political attunement.  
Still, al-Sadr’s preface demonstrates a sustained interest in the principles of 
Bandung (discussed in Chapter Three), particularly its focus on the idea of a united Third 
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World project of economic development, itself a positive response to the Bretton Woods 
and IMF messaging of the 1950s and 1960s.443 Decolonization, for al-Sadr, was not a 
rejection of Western economic ideas in toto. Instead, it was revised vision, derived from 
the open markets championed at Bretton Woods and centered on the Middle East Islamic 
community (ummah). Local development would instead come from the process of rejecting 
capitalist, socialist, and communist norms in favor of an Islamically-guided economics 
centered in social justice. Decolonization, in other words, was part of development.  
 
From Economic Ideal to Banking in Practice: The Usury-Free Bank in Islam 
Still, for all of its strengths as a persuasive decolonization platform and timely 
piece of jurisprudential philosophy, Iqtiṣādunā did not touch upon the practical issues of 
how to run a functional Islamic bank. As described in Chapter Three, it instead 
uncovered what the ideals of an Islamic economics would (and should) be, deriving its 
arguments from rulings on mercantile exchange and labor for hire in the jurisprudential 
literature. Much of the functionality of the ideas in Iqtiṣādunā further hinge upon a key 
factor that is discussed in its last sections and that, no doubt, would have occupied the 
center of analysis in al-Sadr’s third book, Mujtama’na (Our Society), had it been written. 
That factor is the role of the state, particularly of the head of state, in al-Sadr’s view an 
inspired Islamic ruler who is designated as arbiter and decision-maker in crucial 
economics decisions. For example, al-Sadr argues that the gaps in economic policy in the 
jurisprudential literature are intentional, allowing the head of state (imam) broad 
autonomy to make crucial economic decisions for the good of the Muslim community as 
                                                





a whole.444 Iqtiṣādunā is, in other words, premised upon its Arabic possessive form -na; it is 
our economics— our referring to the Muslim community (ummah)– and it is an ideal that 
can exist functionally only within an ideal Muslim polity.  
In the absence of either a pious Muslim leader or an ideal Islamic polity, how 
would an Islamic bank be attempted? Such a question was put forth in a request from the 
Kuwaiti Ministry of Awqaf (Charitable Endowments) in the late 1960s. Sending out a call 
to fuqaha (jurists) for guidance, they asked: How would one operate a bank (with an 
implied international clientele) according to Islamic principles?445 Al-Sadr heeded the 
call, his practical response coming in the form of Al-Bank al-lā Ribāwī fī al-Islām (“The 
Usury-Free Bank in Islam,” hereafter Al-Bank), an undated text published from Kuwait 
that has been traced to 1968 or 1969.446 It was this manual that contained some of the 
earliest ideas of Islamic banking as it came to be practiced.  
Before discussing Al-Bank, a few items should be noted. First, notwithstanding 
Iqtisadunā’s anti-Marxist conceptual thrust, and despite the socialist turn of the Baathist 
and Nasserist experiments of the 1950s and 1960s, it was capitalism (and not 
communism) that structured much of the banking of the Arab Middle East of the mid-
twentieth century—and it was capitalism that underpinned the growing global market. In 
this late 1960s manual, al-Sadr—ever a Shiite and accustomed to envisioning minority 
religious practices under an alien majority—redirected his focus to Islamic banking under 
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capitalism.447 Unlike Marxism or socialism, capitalism did not present itself in terms of 
social justice and lacked the conceptual core of leveling class disparities, so it required less 
rebuttal to refute its Islamicity. With the switch to capitalism, al-Sadr’s focus in this 
manual was no longer on an ostensible, unrealized revolutionary ideal. Recognizing that 
any viable Islamic economic banking system would need to work in tandem with existing 
structures, he turned his focus to the development of a practical Islamic banking system: 
What could be done to render conventional Western capitalist banking systems compliant 
with the sharia? In other words, after Iqtisadunā and now confronting capitalism, the 
question in Al-Bank was no longer how to find the economics of Islam, but how to find 
Islam in (existing) economics. 
Second, Al-Bank is not a deeply analytical text; it is, in many ways, more of a 
lengthy manual listing different Western conventional banking services and practices and 
al-Sadr’s Islamic banking equivalents, including everything from deposit and savings 
accounts to checking to types of loans. From its inception, Al-Bank was designed as a 
usable guide for actual bankers and not as a philosophical text. Because it is not 
structured as an overarching argument, and because similar literature constitutes the bulk 
of current available information on Islamic banking, here the main focus will be on a few 
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examples of the ways that it set the tone for Islamic banking as a whole, with occasional 
references to Iqtiṣādunā for context. 
Iqtiṣādunā had spoken only sparingly of banks, encouraging traditional practices 
regarding capital. Ribā (usury, usually defined as interest) was to be avoided through one 
of the earliest economics concepts in the Islamic jurisprudential literature: a muḍāraba 
contract (often translated as a commenda partnership or profit sharing).448 Muḍāraba, 
(from the Arabic root for “venture”), is a contractual investment partnership in which one 
partner (the rabb al-māl, “owner of the money”) provides all of the capital for the other 
partner (the muḍārib “venturer”) to manage and invest in a commercial venture. In a 
muḍāraba agreement, any loss incurred affects the rabb al-māl only.449 Muḍāraba contracts— 
and related mushāraka contracts, a partnership in which risk is proportional and profits 
and losses are equally shared—are among the oldest attested economics concepts in the 
Islamic literature, and form the basis of most juristic rulings regarding Islamicity in 
banking. Yet the relationship of such a contract with modern banking is not immediately 
intuitive. How, then, would an interest-free banking system operate?  
Taking as its premise and focal point that ribā (interest) is the chief obstacle in 
Western conventional finance,450 Al-Sadr adopts several concessionary premises in Al-
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Bank: First, the manual is written with the acknowledgement that any functional Islamic 
bank in the current international capitalist system will need to interact and compete with 
Western conventional (interest-using) banks. Second, as a result, realism is paramount: 
despite prohibitions against ribā (interest), Islamic banks will inevitably possess some 
interest-bearing accounts as a result of needing to do business with conventional banks.451 
This is unavoidable. Al-Sadr justifies the argument for pragmatism in a Western-
dominated banking environment by asserting that it is well grounded within the Islamic 
tradition: Abu Ḥanifa,452 among other jurists, allowed the practice of ribā with non-
believers (dhimmis).453 Thus, throughout Al-Bank al-Sadr acknowledges that some 
compromises must be made for a functional non-ribawi (non-usurious) bank to exist in the 
current (capitalist) global economic structure. Yet the foundational Islamic ethical 
principles remain: earnings should derive from commodities-based labor, not from capital 
itself. Risk should be proportional,454 a contract between lending institutions, borrowers, 
and investors, rather than shifted heavily onto the shoulders of borrowers. Making money 
on money – the soul of most Western finance – should be avoided as much as possible 
because it fosters greed and corruption by shifting focus from the purpose of money, 
which is to support the well-being of society. 
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As Chibli Mallat emphasizes, in Al-Sadr’s view, the role of the Western 
conventional bank is to act as broker between two different kinds of clients: entrepreneurs 
(investors), and depositors,455 combining and simultaneously obfuscating two different legal 
relationships: as “debtor [to] the depositors […] and as a creditor to the investors.”456 
Islamic banking, on the other hand, amplifies those legal relationships and expressly 
“establishes a correspondence between the bank’s resources (Capital + Deposits) and the 
bank’s investments in loans.”457 The differences in practice are therefore slight at best, but 
– crucially— this is by design: in order to compete with Western conventional banks— 
particularly in an international market—Islamic banks must have products and practices 
that can cohere well with the existing system.  
How, then, was such a bank to make a profit? A few examples of the subtle 
differences in Islamic banking follow, illustrating Al-Sadr’s theory and demonstrating 
some of the foundational methodology for contemporary Islamic banking. First, Al-Sadr 
promotes a muḍāraba contract, described above, in which two parties engage in a “profit 
and loss” partnership, agreeing ahead of time to share the profits on the basis of 
percentage. If the amount of capital does not change, its original owner will receive it 
back, and if there is a loss, the original owner will suffer it.458 In this instance, the Islamic 
bank would act as intermediary between the partners, guaranteeing the deposit.459 
Instead of a fixed return— which would be ribā— the depositor receives a percentage of 
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the profits of the specific investment. Furthermore, loss is unlikely, because the deposit is 
to be tied to the sum of all the banks investments.460 This would incentivize going to the 
bank rather than conducting the contract independently. 
Returning to the idea of modeling Western conventional practices, al-Sadr argues 
that when paying out the profit to the members of the muḍāraba contract, Islamic banks 
should endeavor to match the interest rate percentage of a conventional bank.461 In other 
words, if the venture profits by 20%, and a conventional bank pays 5% on fixed loans, an 
Islamic bank should pay out 25% total profit on the successful muḍāraba venture. The 
bank, though not a full partner in this contract, would still earn a profit through a flat fee 
for its initial participation, and a separate flat fee constituting a share in the profits.462 
Throughout the process, 1) interest is technically avoided; 2) the bank’s role is up-front 
and agreed-upon; and 3) the bank is able to compete with Western conventional banks by 
offering incentives and fees for direct labor.  
Al-Sadr distinguishes between Islamic banking and Western conventional banking 
in several other ways, all of them subtle and focused more on intent and theoretical 
approach than on practice. For example, he notes that Western conventional banks have 
a variety of different account options, including current accounts (ḥisab jari, checking 
accounts), and savings accounts (tawfīr). The main difference between the two, he 
emphasizes, is the timing of access to the money: in a checking account immediate access 
is expected, whereas deposits in savings accounts are intended to be for a length of time. 
Islamic banking, he explains, does not have this concept of deposit for an unspecified 
                                                
460 Mallat, Renewal, 169. 
461 Al-Bank, 34-36. 





length of time; loans are always due at specified times or are expected to be immediately 
available.463 Checks occupy a significant proportion of al-Sadr’s discussion as he explores 
situations in which they may be permissible or impermissible. For example, if a check is 
conceived as loan, it is not permissible.464 
 
While Al-Bank details many more areas of theoretical difference between an 
Islamic bank and a Western conventional model, the overall pattern is clear from these 
examples: Islamic banking was from its inception intentionally conceived by al-Sadr to fit 
in seamlessly with its Western conventional counterpart. This last cannot be overstated, as 
knowledge of the original intentions undergirding Islamic finance appear to have been 
lost in the decades since Al-Bank was written. Though Al-Bank is only a preliminary text 
and is early enough that it does not discuss topics like Islamic mortgages (introduced in 
1975),465 insurance (1978),466 and capitalist financial products like stocks and futures,467 
the groundwork for Islamic banking as it would come to be practiced in the late twentieth 
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century had been laid. By the end of the twentieth century, each of the aforementioned 
products would be developed along an Islamic model— one may, in the twenty-first 
century, invest in sharia-compliant bonds, insurance, and even, as of 2009, Islamic 
derivatives.468  
Islamic banking, then, from its origins in the mind of al-Sadr took the form of 
practical compromise. Departing from the ideal Islamic economic system that al-Sadr 
had labored to uncover a decade earlier in Iqtiṣādunā, Islamic banking as conceived in Al-
Bank was more modest in scope and goals, flexible enough to function within the existing 
capitalist system while still endeavoring to retain core Islamic principles of social justice. 
Yet, as can be seen from the above, it lacked the intellectual and philosophical richness of 
al-Sadr’s earlier, probing work. Furthermore, it is decidedly non-nationalist in nature: 
Nothing in Al-Bank addresses the relationship of the bank to the state. Much like the rest 
of the rising tide of Islamism, Islamic banking was inherently modern— nothing akin to it 
had ever been attempted in the name of Islam before— and inherently a reaction to 
surrounding historical circumstances. More than anything, Islamic finance in al-Sadr’s 
view and Islamism more broadly were forms of ideological and identitarian assertion 
against long-dominant foreign powers; a reaction to imposed alien systems under 
colonialism. Rather than a truly unique or innovative form of finance, Islamic banking 
was a carefully branded decolonizing endeavor, notable for its earnestness in conception 
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and designed— as noted in al-Sadr’s preface to the second edition of Iqtiṣādunā— to 
restore the Muslim psyche.  
Finally, it is important to underscore here that it was Islamic banking, and not the 
broader state-centered ideal Islamic economics of al-Sadr’s Iqtiṣādunā, that budded into 
existence in the 1970s. Though often spoken of synonymously with Islamic economics, 
Islamic banking and finance are narrow projects relative to the scope of economics as a 
discipline. Islamic banking has not mounted a challenge to the capitalist system in which 
it is embedded, for example; as noted by Timur Kuran, the applications of Islamic 
economics— here he uses the term interchangeably with Islamic banking— have been 
quite narrow, limited primarily to a focus on ribā prohibition and “norms of Islamic 
economic behavior.”469 While questions of the relationship of Islam to economy and 
economic systems doubtless remained after the 1970s, Islamic finance as a brand was 
limited and non-revolutionary, constrained by political economy. Although a discussion 
of post-1970s Islamic finance exceeds the scope of this project, it is notable here that 




Islam and Economics in Popular Discourse 
Thus far this project has focused primarily on the Islamic economics and Islamic 
banking writings of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. This choice was made for three reasons: 
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First, al-Sadr’s thought represents the most intellectually and theologically thorough, 
wide-ranging, comprehensive and detailed approach of any Arab writer on the subject 
until his time. He is all the more notable because he situates his concept of Islamic 
economics explicitly as a response to Western encroachment while building a dual case, 
rational and jurisprudential, for the realization of the phenomenon. Second, honing in on 
one thinker and his cultural and intellectual milieu facilitates a closer reading of the 
relationship between climates of ideas and their historical implications. Particularly in this 
instance, where economics and banking operate as symbolic and actual tools of cultural 
reclamation, a close reading of an individual thinker facilitates deeper understanding of 
the multivalent layers of influence that gave rise to Islamic economics: personal, 
theological, and political at the level of municipality (in al-Sadr’s case, Najaf), country (the 
Iraqi revolution), region (the Middle East Arab asr al-thawra, “Age of Revolution” of the 
1950s), and globe (Bandung, the Third World, and decolonization). Third, al-Sadr and 
Iqtiṣādunā in particular are often cited in the later Islamic economics literature as 
formative, even canonical.470  
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Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to draw the conclusion that al-Sadr was the 
only thinker of his time exploring and critiquing the relationship between Islam and 
economics, or even the most famous. Due to constraints of space, the remainder of this 
chapter briefly sketches out the general circumstances that led the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference to found the multi-government-run Islamic Development Bank in 
1974, and to the founding of the non-governmental Dubai Islamic Bank the following 
year (1975). But first it must be emphasized that public interest in Islamic banking was 
critical to its realization, and creating such interest required the attention of a variety of 
voices. As described in the early sections of this chapter, the 1960s and particularly post-
1967 were a time of public crisis, as members of the Arab public sought for solidarity in 
the form of new political and ideological orientations: first came the Arab Age of 
Revolution and the rise of (largely secular) Arab socialism in the 1950s and 1960s; then 
came a post-war reckoning and the beginning of an Islamist resurgence starting in the 
1970s. Though Egypt under Nasser was the locus of the 1967 crisis of identity, it was not 
a limited national phenomenon: the 1967 naksa (setback) reverberated outward, 
influencing the political and ideological will of the region as a whole. Stepping in to fill 
the void left by Nasserism, Arab socialism, and failing dreams of Pan-Arab unity were 
Islamic activists and social critics hailing a return to Islam. Though many had voiced 
their societal concerns for decades— Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, for example, was 
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founded in 1928— it was post-67 that their power was felt at a mass level in the Arab 
public sphere. 
For example, Muslim Brotherhood intellectual and Islamist progenitor Sayyid 
Qutb (1906 – 1966), mentioned earlier in this chapter, was one of those outspoken 
thinkers in the decades before 1967. Like many other Muslim thinkers of his time— and 
unlike al-Sadr— for the most part Qutb did not parse economics from his broader 
thoughts on the good Muslim life; his thoughts on economics are found intermingled in 
his writings on the more general topics of social justice, his critiques of the West, and his 
social commentaries on the Egyptian society in which he lived. For example, as early as 
his famous 1949 treatise Al-'adala al-Ijtima'iyya fil-Islām (Social Justice in Islam), Qutb argues 
that Islam is unique relative to the Christian West because of its focus on social justice 
and its prioritization of the interest of the community over the individual. Focusing on the 
conditions of the Egyptian poor from whom he came, Qutb contends that Islam allows 
for those in penury to have access to public funds; that Islam is opposed to ostentation 
and excess; that taxes should be progressive; and that families should be “supported 
according to need, social security, universal liability to pay zakat [alms; one of the five 
pillars of Islam], and mutual responsibility.”471 Like al-Sadr above, he further argues that 
colonialism has inflicted a psychological wound that only Islam can heal.472 Yet, not a 
trained Islamic scholar or a professor in the Western tradition, Qutb does not ground his 
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analysis in the jurisprudential literature; his is explicitly and proudly not a work of 
ijtihād.473  
Qutb’s Ma'arakat al-islām wa'l ra'smaliyya (The Battle Between Islam and Capitalism),474 
published the following year in 1950, is also not an academic analysis of capitalism per se. 
Instead, it is a strident critique of the influence on Egyptian society of colonialism and 
capitalism— which, like al-Sadr and others, he often conflates.475 In his later, more 
philosophical works, including Al-Islām wa-mushkilāt al-ḥaḍārah (Islam and the Problems of 
Civilization, 1962), Qutb delves more deeply into questions of capitalism. Again, however, 
his goal is to argue that capitalism is incompatible with Islam based on his own 
perceptions of capitalism and Islam. This is not Sadrian attempt to participate in a 
scholarly conversation or to persuade the reader through carefully crafted ground-up 
rational argument. In other words, Qutb is of interest here because he was an extremely 
well-known and widely-read thinker who contributed to a discourse critical of the 
relationship between Islam, economics, and colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
notion that economic systems like capitalism and communism were un-Islamic 
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impositions of the colonizers and the root of significant social problems was thus not 
unique to al-Sadr.476 
Similarly, Indian scholar Sayyid Abu A’la Maududi (1903 – 1979), also one of the 
primary progenitors of the Islamist resurgence of the 1970s, was a prolific writer whose 
work was widely read in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. As early as 1941, Maududi was 
delivering lectures on the topic of economic systems and Islam in his native tongue of 
Urdu in India, arguing against capitalism, communism, colonialism, and greed.477 
Maududi continued writing and teaching on economics and its relationship to Islam over 
the course of the rest of his life, with many of his most detailed works on the Islamic 
philosophy of economics written contemporaneous with or after al-Sadr’s main works in 
the 1960s.478 Like Qutb, Maududi’s ideas on the topics of ribā, social justice, zakat (alms), 
and his compilation of verses dealing with economics in the Qur’an were included in 
discussions of broader themes of a return to Islam in lectures, pamphlets, and short 
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essays.479 Maududi’s ideological influence on the Muslim Middle East and the rise of 
Islamism generally is well attested, though it is difficult to reconstruct the timing of his 
economic influence with historical precision as many of his Urdu works are undated, and 
we often do not have copies of the original Arabic translations.480 Regardless, Maududi’s 
prolific and persistent work on the question of Islam and economics further underscores 
the extent to which it was a widespread post-colonial preoccupation. 
 
 
Financing Islamic Finance: Petro-Islam and the First Islamic Banks 
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Baqir al-Sadr’s practical suggestions for 
interest-free banking in Al-Bank held particular resonance. It was no accident that Al-Bank 
came at the behest of the Kuwaiti government— the question of how to operate a 
national economy and a national bank in accordance with Islam had long troubled the 
oil-rich nations of the Middle East. For example, Saudi Arabia of the 1960s was by all 
accounts eager to develop its national economy, but its economic and financial troubles 
ran far deeper than its commonly known entanglement with the Western-owned-and-run 
oil companies, the Seven Sisters.481 The Wahhabi Kingdom, subscribing to a particularly 
conservative form of Islam, did not believe in interest-based banking. In a particularly 
                                                
479Ibid. 
480 See, e.g., Irfan Ahmad “Genealogy of the Islamic State: Reflections on Maududi's 
Political Thought and Islamism. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Vol. 15, 
Islam, Politics, Anthropology (2009), 145-162; Shiraz Maher Salafi-Jihadism: The History of 
an Idea (C. Hurst, 2016), 177- 178. 
481 The Seven Sisters were Western-owned oil companies that participated in profit-





revealing portion of a 1968 dissertation on Saudi economic development, describing 
research that had been conducted over the previous several years, the author notes one of 
the two greatest factors impeding economic development: 
 
Not very long ago, the terms ‘money changer’ and ‘banker’ were used, even in the 
monetized sector, with very little discrimination. Recently, however, a ‘banking 
literacy’ has been developed in a very peculiar way. Banks are not expected to act 
as profit-making institutions for depositors, mainly because ‘interest’ is usury, and, 
hence, forbidden under the law of the land. The implication of that is twofold: 
First, the illegality of ‘interest,’ the writer believes, has been the single most 
important factor that has crippled the process of ‘deposit creation,’ at least in the 
form of savings accounts. If one does not receive a premium on his deposits, then 
why bother putting them in a bank? Second, if banks cannot charge interest on 
their loans, then why bother to make loans? 
 
The consequence thus far is sad and bleak. Banks have failed to adequately supply 
the dynamic ingredient which is so vital to the growing economy – credit. Against 
this crippled role of banks in the development process, government has assumed 
responsibility to supply both the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy 
with venture capital, the lifeblood of economic growth. To fill the gap, under 
pressure of necessity, the Saudi government has established two developmental 
state-owned banks: Industrial Bank and Agricultural Bank. Each bank is supposed 
to assist, without interest, small private investors who were previously left with 
only two choices: gradual death in business and / or extremely high interest rate 
in the financial ‘black market.’482 
 
Saudi Arabia’s concerns about Islamicity in banking were soon addressed head-on by al-
Sadr’s proposals in Al-Bank, at a historical juncture in which a return to Islam was 
coupled with anti-Western economic resistance. In the aftermath of 1967, the countries 
that would soon become OAPEC (Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, newly-formed under 
Saudi Arabia’s leadership in January 1968) organized its first, lesser-known and less-
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successful oil embargo, followed in 1973 by a second more famous— and economically 
brutal— successor.483   
Adjusted for inflation, oil revenues throughout the Arabian Peninsula and Saudi 
Arabia grew tenfold between 1970 and 1974.484 With growing awareness of the political 
and economic might of oil came a sense of obligation to use its power to fund the 
expansion of conservative Islamist ideology— a goal easily realized as Egyptian teachers, 
eager for work and sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood views after the 1967 War, began 
flooding Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in the early 1970s. As Saudi “Petro-Islam” 
constructed mosques preaching Islamic revival throughout the Middle East, the ministries 
of oil-rich countries came together, joining with other regional Muslim countries in the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Led by Saudi King Faisal, the OIC attempted to 
implement Islamic policy in a new bank, the Islamic Development Bank (founded in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1974).485 The following year, the Dubai Islamic Bank, a non-
governmental commercial bank, was founded in 1975.486 Shortly thereafter, in 1976 the 
first Islamic Conference on Islamic Economics was held in Mecca.487 Islamic banking was 
born. 
 
Thus, al-Sadr’s dreams became a reality in the form of Islamic banks in the mid-
1970s. After the 1967 war, Islamist yearning for an elusive, idealized, pre-European past 
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led to calls to practice all areas of life— including finance— according to the “Third 
Way” of Islam. The idea of Islamic banking in the Middle East came to serve more than 
a pious religious rationale: It also served as a springboard for Muslim solidarity at the 
level of the psyche, informing Islamism as much as being shaped by it. Quintessentially 
cultural in conception and appeal, Islamic banking shifted away from its philosophical 
and intellectual grounding by the mid-1970s, soon becoming a rallying point for solidarity 
and identity even as it lost much of al-Sadr’s original, state-centered vision. No longer a 
concept concerned with the intricacies of distribution and production, it became instead a 






























This dissertation set out with the intent to seek answers to two main questions: 
First, why and how was Islamic economics conceived as a form of spiritual as well as 
material decolonization? Second, why did Islamic economics, a potentially vast subject, 
come to be narrowly defined as Islamic banking by the 1970s? The questions were 
answered in two parts. First, through an analysis of specific historical transformations—
the Ottoman bankruptcy and attendant rise of Western conventional banking in the 
Middle East; the transformation of the intellectual culture and religious political economy 
of Shiite Najaf; the influence of Bandung on Iraqi and Arab-Muslim decolonization 
discourses of the 1950s; and the cultural reverberations of Islamism and the 1967 Six-Day 
War—this project sought to uncover the formative intellectual climate and religious 
political economy that fomented and lent urgency to the idea of an Islamic economics. 
Second, through an analysis of the canonical Islamic economics texts of a single and 
singular cleric, this project presented and analyzed the intellectual scaffolding of Islamic 
economics and the theological justification for its eventual foundations within the existing 
structures of Western conventional banking.   
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was neither the only person to write about the question 
of Islamic economics, nor was he the first. He was, however, the first Arab Muslim 
thinker to simultaneously propose a jurisprudentially-centered ethical need for a 





applications of his idea— or, as he would put it, exercise ijtihād in order to discover the 
Divine will regarding right economic practices.  
Al-Sadr’s identity as a gifted Arab Shiite from a prominent family, coupled with 
the extraordinary intellectual milieu and epistemic moment in which he lived, uniquely 
positioned him to do this creative work. As a mujtahid participating in a Shiite intellectual 
renaissance (nahḍa) and witnessing the widespread appeal of communism among his 
cohort in Najaf even as the ancient Shiite shrine cities began to suffer economic collapse, 
al-Sadr’s mind understandably turned to the theological ethics of communism, and to the 
question of economy as a whole. As a cleric living during a movement toward a truly pan-
Islamic rapprochement (taqrīb) in the midst of region-wide national revolutions, it is not 
surprising that he cast his ideological and theological net wide. The palpable sense of 
decolonizing urgency in al-Sadr’s program is further made legible when it is situated 
alongside Bandung and the British exit from Iraq. 
Thus, though the groundwork was laid through the Ottoman bankruptcy and the 
colonial infiltration of Western conventional banking, it is through a study of the culture 
and religious political economy of al-Sadr’s community that we begin to gain a sense of 
the multiple levels through which the idea of Islamic economics developed and came to 
operate in the Arab Muslim world. Islamic economics was not only conceived as the 
physical decolonization of financial institutions. It was also a spiritual decolonization from 
laissez-faire colonialist capitalism and the interpolation of Soviet communism. It was, in its 
earliest iterations, cultural reassertion through an idea, making the reclamation of 
banking and financial practices a touchstone of both an inner, intellectual and spiritual 
decolonization, and an outer, society-wide Muslim decolonization. It served as a 





Islamism and Arab banking of the 1970s as much as being shaped by them. In this vein it 
acted, like most decolonizing mechanisms, as a means to facilitate a form of cultural 
competition on the material as well as spiritual levels— not only reclaiming culture from 
the Europeans, but surpassing them in the global economic market by doing so.  
Falsafatunā (1959) and Iqtiṣādunā (1961) were the response of a pious man keenly 
aware of the specific political pressures of Iraq and the broader Middle East of his time; a 
thinker who was attuned as much to local Shiite concerns as to the broader patriotic 
hopes and dreams of the July Revolution and the regional hopes of a Pan-Islamic polity. 
Today, Iqtiṣādunā can rightly be called the historical fulcrum in the development of a 
viable Islamic economics: from the time of its writing, a clear vision began to take hold of 
an Islamic economic potentiality. Thus, while colonial interference, Marxist infiltration, 
and increasingly violent clerical reactions were the spark that gave rise to al-Sadr’s 
feverish response in Falsafatunā and Iqtiṣādunā, his work is nevertheless creative and 
constructive, comprising the first stages of a proposal envisioning a bright, restored, 
reclaimed, decolonized and unified Arab Muslim future.  
When viewed from this perspective, Islamic economics as a topic of analysis helps 
us to expand the analytical scope and understanding of the implications of the intellectual 
work of Arab decolonization. Decolonization was not just the work of expelling the 
colonizers, nor is it reducible to the process of reclaiming cultural, political, and 
intellectual institutions—though it is and was those things. Arab decolonization was also a 
deeply creative process, through which intellectuals and activists region-wide utilized the 
knowledge and information gleaned from the colonizers in conjunction with indigenous 
intellectual traditions and turned their gaze inward. Colonial discourses served to spark 





questions that became the primary preoccupations of the twentieth century Arab 
world.488 Yet, critically, these questions prompted innovative responses among 
intellectuals of the decolonizing era. Al-Sadr’s Islamic economics was not simply a 
reaction to the colonizer’s legacy. Nor was it, to use Chakrabarty’s famous phrase, limited 
to a form of “provincializing” European thought.489 Al-Sadr’s Islamic economics of the 
late 1950s was as constructive as it was reactive, as much a work of theological brilliance 
and cultural creation as it was one of defensive reclamation. Drawing upon the wealth of 
Islamic jurisprudential writing and relying upon Shiite rationalist philosophical tradition, 
al-Sadr grounded his work apart from colonizing discourses even as he responded to 
them. The intellectual work of Arab decolonization, in other words, may be viewed as 
one of heightened creativity and exploration, not simply as anti-colonial justification. 
With his post-1967 new preface to the second edition of Iqtiṣādunā (1968) and Al-
Bank al-lā Ribawi (The Usury-Free Bank, 1969), al-Sadr kept up with the spirit of the times by 
situating his concept of a practical Islamic banking under the later decolonizing umbrella 
of Islamism. By presenting the agenda of Islamic economics as specifically decolonizing, 
al-Sadr underscored its psychological and emotive power. Colonialism and its residual 
evils are explicitly called out in Iqtiṣādunā’s second edition preface, while in The Usury-Free 
Bank, capitalist banking models are offered as the formative spark from which practical 
Islamist finance can be realized and spread. Justified as unavoidable in the absence of a 
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rightly-guided Islamic state, Western conventional banking served as a template for al-
Sadr’s Islamic banks, with the express intent to keep the interest-free soul of original 
endeavor. Under al-Sadr’s and others’ intellectual guidance and in keeping with the 
resurgent Islamist sentiment of the time, Islamic economics made its transition from 
amorphous theoretical construct to practical reality by the mid-1970s, maintaining its 
psychological weight while losing much of its original idealized jurisprudential scaffolding. 
Crucially, however, al-Sadr had established the spiritual and psychological bona fides of 
Islamic finance, grounding them in his work of ijtihād. Even as Islamic finance developed 
into a niche market of Western conventional finance, its emotive power as a decolonial 
option persisted. 
   
 
Beyond providing a more detailed and comprehensive historical account than has 
previously been written on Islamic economics, this dissertation has broad implications on 
two different levels: First, when taken altogether, the different junctures in the 
development of Islamic economics combine to fill in chapters in the Islamic intellectual 
history of the twentieth century. In other words, Islamic economics itself, first as 
imaginary and then as praxis, has since its inception been emblematic of broader 
intellectual movements and climates of opinion in the Middle East, starting with early 
twentieth century Islamic modernism, moving to the rise of communist movements and 
the little-studied movement for taqrīb in the 1940s and 1950s, leading to post-
revolutionary decolonization and attendant nationalisms, and finally ending with the rise 





Middle East intellectual history, Islamic finance operated as a cultural touchstone of 
authenticity, power, and anti-colonial resistance.  
Second, in part because it combines a focus on ethics and theology with one of 
culture and statecraft, Islamic economics serves as an excellent conceptual bridge for 
historians eager to problematize some of the stark binary constructions inherited from 
Western-based historical theory. Even the political economy of religion is surprisingly 
understudied as a whole, despite its obvious relevance. As Omnia El-Shakry and Ibrahim 
Abu ‘Rabi have rightly noted, one cannot properly do intellectual history of the Middle 
East without negotiating Islam,490 yet there is a tendency among scholars to reduplicate 
Western models drawing sharp divisions between “religious” and “intellectual” thought as 
subjects of study. Al-Sadr’s wide-ranging intellectual work, emerging from an ancient 
Shiite center and now informing global financial networks, is self-aware and exacting, 
theological and logical, a deft demonstration of the older, pre-colonial Muslim principle 
that Islam encompasses all and is not “separate and separable.” 
As explicitly envisioned means of decolonization, Islamic economics and Islamic 
finance of the early-to-mid twentieth century were simultaneously societal and personal, 
outwardly practical and realizable while inwardly spiritual and psychological, defying 
easy disciplinary categorization. The phenomenon of Islamic economics— a 
theologically-rooted and culturally-inflected approach to the structures surrounding 
wealth and its acquisition— allows for a critique of the twentieth century Western 
scholarly axiom that economics at its core is purely theoretical and objective, an observer 
rather than a participant in human subjectivity. This, in turn, opens up the theoretical 
                                                





ground to interrogate long-held presuppositions, including both the relationship between 
economics and culture and the relationship between church and state. Al-Sadr, and the 
phenomenon of Islamic economics as a whole, may be the lens through which we can 
begin to examine the ideological and theological presuppositions informing free market 
capitalism and modern financial networks as a whole. 
Put another way, al-Sadr’s concept of a “doctrine” of economics (as opposed to a 
science) is a framework to rethink the way that we conceptualize money and economy in 
history generally. When combined with the reality of contemporary Islamic banking, the 
cultural and ethical underpinnings of economy— how we choose to conceptualize value 
and organize and negotiate valuables— is far more informed by cultural constraints and 
ideological forces than is often considered. In other words, rather than only viewing 
economic history as a separable category, structured in large part by the system of nation-
states (GDP, tariffs and imports, etc.), Islamic economic history has the potential to hold 
up a mirror to the world, enabling us to interrogate the intimate relationship between 
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